crypto/tls: implement TLS 1.3 PSK authentication (client side)

Also check original certificate validity when resuming TLS 1.0–1.2. Will
refuse to resume a session if the certificate is expired or if the
original connection had InsecureSkipVerify and the resumed one doesn't.

Support only PSK+DHE to protect forward secrecy even with lack of a
strong session ticket rotation story.

Tested with NSS because s_server does not provide any way of getting the
same session ticket key across invocations. Will self-test like TLS
1.0–1.2 once server side is implemented.

Incorporates CL 128477 by @santoshankr.

Fixes #24919
Updates #9671

Change-Id: Id3eaa5b6c77544a1357668bf9ff255f3420ecc34
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147420Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>

src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go

@@ -399,12 +399,16 @@ func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
 func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite {
 	for _, id := range have {
 		if id == want {
-			for _, suite := range cipherSuites {
-				if suite.id == want {
-					return suite
+			return cipherSuiteByID(id)
 		}
 	}
 	return nil
+}
+
+func cipherSuiteByID(id uint16) *cipherSuite {
+	for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites {
+		if cipherSuite.id == id {
+			return cipherSuite
 		}
 	}
 	return nil
@@ -413,12 +417,16 @@ func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite {
 func mutualCipherSuiteTLS13(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
 	for _, id := range have {
 		if id == want {
-			for _, suite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
-				if suite.id == want {
-					return suite
+			return cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id)
 		}
 	}
 	return nil
+}
+
+func cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(id uint16) *cipherSuiteTLS13 {
+	for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
+		if cipherSuite.id == id {
+			return cipherSuite
 		}
 	}
 	return nil

src/crypto/tls/common.go

@@ -240,22 +240,32 @@ type ClientSessionState struct {
 	sessionTicket      []uint8               // Encrypted ticket used for session resumption with server
 	vers               uint16                // SSL/TLS version negotiated for the session
 	cipherSuite        uint16                // Ciphersuite negotiated for the session
-	masterSecret       []byte                // MasterSecret generated by client on a full handshake
+	masterSecret       []byte                // Full handshake MasterSecret, or TLS 1.3 resumption_master_secret
 	serverCertificates []*x509.Certificate   // Certificate chain presented by the server
 	verifiedChains     [][]*x509.Certificate // Certificate chains we built for verification
+	receivedAt         time.Time             // When the session ticket was received from the server
+
+	// TLS 1.3 fields.
+	nonce  []byte    // Ticket nonce sent by the server, to derive PSK
+	useBy  time.Time // Expiration of the ticket lifetime as set by the server
+	ageAdd uint32    // Random obfuscation factor for sending the ticket age
 }
 
 // ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState objects that can be used
 // by a client to resume a TLS session with a given server. ClientSessionCache
 // implementations should expect to be called concurrently from different
-// goroutines. Only ticket-based resumption is supported, not SessionID-based
-// resumption.
+// goroutines. Up to TLS 1.2, only ticket-based resumption is supported, not
+// SessionID-based resumption. In TLS 1.3 they were merged into PSK modes, which
+// are supported via this interface.
 type ClientSessionCache interface {
 	// Get searches for a ClientSessionState associated with the given key.
 	// On return, ok is true if one was found.
 	Get(sessionKey string) (session *ClientSessionState, ok bool)
 
-	// Put adds the ClientSessionState to the cache with the given key.
+	// Put adds the ClientSessionState to the cache with the given key. It might
+	// get called multiple times in a connection if a TLS 1.3 server provides
+	// more than one session ticket. If called with a nil *ClientSessionState,
+	// it should remove the cache entry.
 	Put(sessionKey string, cs *ClientSessionState)
 }
 
@@ -502,19 +512,19 @@ type Config struct {
 	// the order of elements in CipherSuites, is used.
 	PreferServerCipherSuites bool
 
-	// SessionTicketsDisabled may be set to true to disable session ticket
-	// (resumption) support. Note that on clients, session ticket support is
+	// SessionTicketsDisabled may be set to true to disable session ticket and
+	// PSK (resumption) support. Note that on clients, session ticket support is
 	// also disabled if ClientSessionCache is nil.
 	SessionTicketsDisabled bool
 
-	// SessionTicketKey is used by TLS servers to provide session
-	// resumption. See RFC 5077. If zero, it will be filled with
-	// random data before the first server handshake.
+	// SessionTicketKey is used by TLS servers to provide session resumption.
+	// See RFC 5077 and the PSK mode of RFC 8446. If zero, it will be filled
+	// with random data before the first server handshake.
 	//
 	// If multiple servers are terminating connections for the same host
 	// they should all have the same SessionTicketKey. If the
 	// SessionTicketKey leaks, previously recorded and future TLS
-	// connections using that key are compromised.
+	// connections using that key might be compromised.
 	SessionTicketKey [32]byte
 
 	// ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState entries for TLS
@@ -937,15 +947,21 @@ func NewLRUClientSessionCache(capacity int) ClientSessionCache {
 	}
 }
 
-// Put adds the provided (sessionKey, cs) pair to the cache.
+// Put adds the provided (sessionKey, cs) pair to the cache. If cs is nil, the entry
+// corresponding to sessionKey is removed from the cache instead.
 func (c *lruSessionCache) Put(sessionKey string, cs *ClientSessionState) {
 	c.Lock()
 	defer c.Unlock()
 
 	if elem, ok := c.m[sessionKey]; ok {
+		if cs == nil {
+			c.q.Remove(elem)
+			delete(c.m, sessionKey)
+		} else {
 			entry := elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry)
 			entry.state = cs
 			c.q.MoveToFront(elem)
+		}
 		return
 	}
 

src/crypto/tls/conn.go

@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ type Conn struct {
 	secureRenegotiation bool
 	// ekm is a closure for exporting keying material.
 	ekm func(label string, context []byte, length int) ([]byte, error)
+	// resumptionSecret is the resumption_master_secret for generating or
+	// handling NewSessionTicket messages. nil if config.SessionTicketsDisabled.
+	resumptionSecret []byte
 
 	// clientFinishedIsFirst is true if the client sent the first Finished
 	// message during the most recent handshake. This is recorded because
@@ -1169,10 +1172,15 @@ func (c *Conn) handlePostHandshakeMessage() error {
 		return err
 	}
 
+	c.retryCount++
+	if c.retryCount > maxUselessRecords {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: too many non-advancing records"))
+	}
+
 	switch msg := msg.(type) {
 	case *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13:
-		// TODO(filippo): TLS 1.3 session ticket not implemented.
-		return nil
+		return c.handleNewSessionTicket(msg)
 	case *keyUpdateMsg:
 		return c.handleKeyUpdate(msg)
 	default:
@@ -1182,19 +1190,7 @@ func (c *Conn) handlePostHandshakeMessage() error {
 }
 
 func (c *Conn) handleKeyUpdate(keyUpdate *keyUpdateMsg) error {
-	c.retryCount++
-	if c.retryCount > maxUselessRecords {
-		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
-		return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: too many non-advancing records"))
-	}
-
-	var cipherSuite *cipherSuiteTLS13
-	for _, suite := range cipherSuitesTLS13 {
-		if suite.id == c.cipherSuite {
-			cipherSuite = suite
-			break
-		}
-	}
+	cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite)
 	if cipherSuite == nil {
 		return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertInternalError))
 	}

src/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import (
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
 )
 
 type clientHandshakeState struct {
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ NextCipherSuite:
 	return hello, params, nil
 }
 
-func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
+func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() (err error) {
 	if c.config == nil {
 		c.config = defaultConfig()
 	}
@@ -148,8 +149,20 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
 		return err
 	}
 
-	var newSession *ClientSessionState
-	cacheKey, session := c.loadSession(hello)
+	cacheKey, session, earlySecret, binderKey := c.loadSession(hello)
+	if cacheKey != "" && session != nil {
+		defer func() {
+			// If we got a handshake failure when resuming a session, throw away
+			// the session ticket. See RFC 5077, Section 3.2.
+			//
+			// RFC 8446 makes no mention of dropping tickets on failure, but it
+			// does require servers to abort on invalid binders, so we need to
+			// delete tickets to recover from a corrupted PSK.
+			if err != nil {
+				c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil)
+			}
+		}()
+	}
 
 	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal()); err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -177,14 +190,14 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
 			hello:       hello,
 			ecdheParams: ecdheParams,
 			session:     session,
+			earlySecret: earlySecret,
+			binderKey:   binderKey,
 		}
 
-		if err := hs.handshake(); err != nil {
-			return err
+		// In TLS 1.3, session tickets are delivered after the handshake.
+		return hs.handshake()
 	}
 
-		newSession = hs.session
-	} else {
 	hs := &clientHandshakeState{
 		c:           c,
 		serverHello: serverHello,
@@ -196,62 +209,128 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
 		return err
 	}
 
-		newSession = hs.session
-	}
-
 	// If we had a successful handshake and hs.session is different from
 	// the one already cached - cache a new one.
-	if hello.ticketSupported && newSession != nil && session != newSession {
-		c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, newSession)
+	if cacheKey != "" && hs.session != nil && session != hs.session {
+		c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, hs.session)
 	}
 
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string, session *ClientSessionState) {
+func (c *Conn) loadSession(hello *clientHelloMsg) (cacheKey string,
+	session *ClientSessionState, earlySecret, binderKey []byte) {
 	if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil {
-		return
+		return "", nil, nil, nil
 	}
 
 	hello.ticketSupported = true
 
+	if hello.supportedVersions[0] == VersionTLS13 {
+		// Require DHE on resumption as it guarantees forward secrecy against
+		// compromise of the session ticket key. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.9.
+		hello.pskModes = []uint8{pskModeDHE}
+	}
+
 	// Session resumption is not allowed if renegotiating because
 	// renegotiation is primarily used to allow a client to send a client
 	// certificate, which would be skipped if session resumption occurred.
 	if c.handshakes != 0 {
-		return
+		return "", nil, nil, nil
 	}
 
 	// Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if available.
 	cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
-	candidateSession, ok := c.config.ClientSessionCache.Get(cacheKey)
-	if !ok {
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Check that the ciphersuite and version used for the previous session
-	// are still valid.
-	cipherSuiteOk := false
-	for _, id := range hello.cipherSuites {
-		if id == candidateSession.cipherSuite {
-			cipherSuiteOk = true
-			break
-		}
+	session, ok := c.config.ClientSessionCache.Get(cacheKey)
+	if !ok || session == nil {
+		return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
 	}
 
+	// Check that version used for the previous session is still valid.
 	versOk := false
 	for _, v := range hello.supportedVersions {
-		if v == candidateSession.vers {
+		if v == session.vers {
 			versOk = true
 			break
 		}
 	}
+	if !versOk {
+		return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	// Check that the cached server certificate is not expired, and that it's
+	// valid for the ServerName. This should be ensured by the cache key, but
+	// protect the application from a faulty ClientSessionCache implementation.
+	if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
+		if len(session.verifiedChains) == 0 {
+			// The original connection had InsecureSkipVerify, while this doesn't.
+			return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
+		}
+		serverCert := session.serverCertificates[0]
+		if c.config.time().After(serverCert.NotAfter) {
+			// Expired certificate, delete the entry.
+			c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil)
+			return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
+		}
+		if err := serverCert.VerifyHostname(c.config.ServerName); err != nil {
+			return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	if session.vers != VersionTLS13 {
+		// In TLS 1.2 the cipher suite must match the resumed session. Ensure we
+		// are still offering it.
+		if mutualCipherSuite(hello.cipherSuites, session.cipherSuite) == nil {
+			return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
+		}
 
-	if versOk && cipherSuiteOk {
-		session = candidateSession
 		hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Check that the session ticket is not expired.
+	if c.config.time().After(session.useBy) {
+		c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, nil)
+		return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
 	}
 
+	// In TLS 1.3 the KDF hash must match the resumed session. Ensure we
+	// offer at least one cipher suite with that hash.
+	cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(session.cipherSuite)
+	if cipherSuite == nil {
+		return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
+	}
+	cipherSuiteOk := false
+	for _, offeredID := range hello.cipherSuites {
+		offeredSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(offeredID)
+		if offeredSuite != nil && offeredSuite.hash == cipherSuite.hash {
+			cipherSuiteOk = true
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if !cipherSuiteOk {
+		return cacheKey, nil, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	// Set the pre_shared_key extension. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11.1.
+	ticketAge := uint32(c.config.time().Sub(session.receivedAt) / time.Millisecond)
+	identity := pskIdentity{
+		label:               session.sessionTicket,
+		obfuscatedTicketAge: ticketAge + session.ageAdd,
+	}
+	hello.pskIdentities = []pskIdentity{identity}
+	hello.pskBinders = [][]byte{make([]byte, cipherSuite.hash.Size())}
+
+	// Compute the PSK binders. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.11.2.
+	psk := cipherSuite.expandLabel(session.masterSecret, "resumption",
+		session.nonce, cipherSuite.hash.Size())
+	earlySecret = cipherSuite.extract(psk, nil)
+	binderKey = cipherSuite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, resumptionBinderLabel, nil)
+	transcript := cipherSuite.hash.New()
+	transcript.Write(hello.marshalWithoutBinders())
+	pskBinders := [][]byte{cipherSuite.finishedHash(binderKey, transcript)}
+	hello.updateBinders(pskBinders)
+
 	return
 }
 
@@ -275,8 +354,8 @@ func (c *Conn) pickTLSVersion(serverHello *serverHelloMsg) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// Does the handshake, either a full one or resumes old session.
-// Requires hs.c, hs.hello, and, optionally, hs.session to be set.
+// Does the handshake, either a full one or resumes old session. Requires hs.c,
+// hs.hello, hs.serverHello, and, optionally, hs.session to be set.
 func (hs *clientHandshakeState) handshake() error {
 	c := hs.c
 
@@ -692,6 +771,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
 		masterSecret:       hs.masterSecret,
 		serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
 		verifiedChains:     c.verifiedChains,
+		receivedAt:         c.config.time(),
 	}
 
 	return nil

src/crypto/tls/handshake_client_test.go

@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ func runClientTestForVersion(t *testing.T, template *clientTest, version, option
 
 		test.name = version + "-" + test.name
 		if len(test.command) == 0 {
-			test.command = defaultClientCommand
+			test.command = defaultServerCommand
 		}
 		test.command = append([]string(nil), test.command...)
 		test.command = append(test.command, option)
@@ -747,7 +747,6 @@ func TestHandshakeClientCHACHA20SHA256(t *testing.T) {
 func TestHandshakeClientECDSATLS13(t *testing.T) {
 	test := &clientTest{
 		name: "ECDSA",
-		command: []string{"openssl", "s_server"},
 		cert: testECDSACertificate,
 		key:  testECDSAPrivateKey,
 	}
@@ -871,6 +870,9 @@ func TestClientKeyUpdate(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestClientResumption(t *testing.T) {
+	// TODO(filippo): update to test both TLS 1.3 and 1.2 once PSK are
+	// supported server-side.
+
 	serverConfig := &Config{
 		CipherSuites: []uint16{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA},
 		Certificates: testConfig.Certificates,
@@ -907,6 +909,10 @@ func TestClientResumption(t *testing.T) {
 	getTicket := func() []byte {
 		return clientConfig.ClientSessionCache.(*lruSessionCache).q.Front().Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry).state.sessionTicket
 	}
+	deleteTicket := func() {
+		ticketKey := clientConfig.ClientSessionCache.(*lruSessionCache).q.Front().Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry).sessionKey
+		clientConfig.ClientSessionCache.Put(ticketKey, nil)
+	}
 	randomKey := func() [32]byte {
 		var k [32]byte
 		if _, err := io.ReadFull(serverConfig.rand(), k[:]); err != nil {
@@ -951,6 +957,28 @@ func TestClientResumption(t *testing.T) {
 	testResumeState("DifferentCipherSuite", false)
 	testResumeState("DifferentCipherSuiteRecovers", true)
 
+	deleteTicket()
+	testResumeState("WithoutSessionTicket", false)
+
+	// Session resumption should work when using client certificates
+	deleteTicket()
+	serverConfig.ClientCAs = rootCAs
+	serverConfig.ClientAuth = RequireAndVerifyClientCert
+	clientConfig.Certificates = serverConfig.Certificates
+	testResumeState("InitialHandshake", false)
+	testResumeState("WithClientCertificates", true)
+
+	// Tickets should be removed from the session cache on TLS handshake failure
+	farFuture := func() time.Time { return time.Unix(16725225600, 0) }
+	serverConfig.Time = farFuture
+	_, _, err = testHandshake(t, clientConfig, serverConfig)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("handshake did not fail after client certificate expiry")
+	}
+	serverConfig.Time = nil
+	testResumeState("AfterHandshakeFailure", false)
+	serverConfig.ClientAuth = NoClientCert
+
 	clientConfig.ClientSessionCache = nil
 	testResumeState("WithoutSessionCache", false)
 }
@@ -994,10 +1022,21 @@ func TestLRUClientSessionCache(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("session cache failed update for key 0")
 	}
 
-	// Adding a nil entry is valid.
+	// Calling Put with a nil entry deletes the key.
 	cache.Put(keys[0], nil)
-	if s, ok := cache.Get(keys[0]); !ok || s != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("failed to add nil entry to cache")
+	if _, ok := cache.Get(keys[0]); ok {
+		t.Fatalf("session cache failed to delete key 0")
+	}
+
+	// Delete entry 2. LRU should keep 4 and 5
+	cache.Put(keys[2], nil)
+	if _, ok := cache.Get(keys[2]); ok {
+		t.Fatalf("session cache failed to delete key 4")
+	}
+	for i := 4; i < 6; i++ {
+		if s, ok := cache.Get(keys[i]); !ok || s != &cs[i] {
+			t.Fatalf("session cache should not have deleted key: %s", keys[i])
+		}
 	}
 }
 
@@ -1128,11 +1167,10 @@ func TestHandshakClientSCTs(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 
-	test := &clientTest{
-		name: "SCT",
 	// Note that this needs OpenSSL 1.0.2 because that is the first
 	// version that supports the -serverinfo flag.
-		command:    []string{"openssl", "s_server"},
+	test := &clientTest{
+		name:       "SCT",
 		config:     config,
 		extensions: [][]byte{scts},
 		validate: func(state ConnectionState) error {
@@ -1238,7 +1276,6 @@ func TestRenegotiateTwiceRejected(t *testing.T) {
 func TestHandshakeClientExportKeyingMaterial(t *testing.T) {
 	test := &clientTest{
 		name:   "ExportKeyingMaterial",
-		command: []string{"openssl", "s_server"},
 		config: testConfig.Clone(),
 		validate: func(state ConnectionState) error {
 			if km, err := state.ExportKeyingMaterial("test", nil, 42); err != nil {

src/crypto/tls/handshake_client_tls13.go

@@ -11,22 +11,30 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"hash"
 	"sync/atomic"
+	"time"
 )
 
 type clientHandshakeStateTLS13 struct {
 	c           *Conn
 	serverHello *serverHelloMsg
 	hello       *clientHelloMsg
+	ecdheParams ecdheParameters
+
+	session     *ClientSessionState
+	earlySecret []byte
+	binderKey   []byte
+
 	certReq       *certificateRequestMsgTLS13
+	usingPSK      bool
 	sentDummyCCS  bool
-	ecdheParams   ecdheParameters
 	suite         *cipherSuiteTLS13
 	transcript    hash.Hash
 	masterSecret  []byte
 	trafficSecret []byte // client_application_traffic_secret_0
-	session       *ClientSessionState
 }
 
+// handshake requires hs.c, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, hs.ecdheParams, and,
+// optionally, hs.session, hs.earlySecret and hs.binderKey to be set.
 func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	c := hs.c
 
@@ -50,22 +58,12 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
 
 	if bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.random, helloRetryRequestRandom) {
-		// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
-		// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
-		chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
-		hs.transcript.Reset()
-		hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
-		hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
-		hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
-
 		if err := hs.sendDummyChangeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 		if err := hs.processHelloRetryRequest(); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-
-		hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
 	}
 
 	hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
@@ -83,7 +81,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) handshake() error {
 	if err := hs.readServerParameters(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
+	if err := hs.readServerCertificate(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 	if err := hs.readServerFinished(); err != nil {
@@ -178,6 +176,14 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendDummyChangeCipherSpec() error {
 func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
 	c := hs.c
 
+	// The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
+	// HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
+	chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
+	hs.transcript.Reset()
+	hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
+	hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
+
 	if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != 0 {
 		c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
 		return errors.New("tls: received malformed key_share extension")
@@ -218,6 +224,31 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
 	hs.hello.cookie = hs.serverHello.cookie
 
 	hs.hello.raw = nil
+	if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) > 0 {
+		pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
+		if pskSuite == nil {
+			return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+		}
+		if pskSuite.hash == hs.suite.hash {
+			// Update binders and obfuscated_ticket_age.
+			ticketAge := uint32(c.config.time().Sub(hs.session.receivedAt) / time.Millisecond)
+			hs.hello.pskIdentities[0].obfuscatedTicketAge = ticketAge + hs.session.ageAdd
+
+			transcript := hs.suite.hash.New()
+			transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
+			transcript.Write(chHash)
+			transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
+			transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshalWithoutBinders())
+			pskBinders := [][]byte{hs.suite.finishedHash(hs.binderKey, transcript)}
+			hs.hello.updateBinders(pskBinders)
+		} else {
+			// Server selected a cipher suite incompatible with the PSK.
+			hs.hello.pskIdentities = nil
+			hs.hello.pskBinders = nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	hs.transcript.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
 	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -259,11 +290,40 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processServerHello() error {
 		return errors.New("tls: malformed key_share extension")
 	}
 
+	if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group == 0 {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server did not send a key share")
+	}
 	if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != hs.ecdheParams.CurveID() {
 		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
 		return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
 	}
 
+	if !hs.serverHello.selectedIdentityPresent {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if int(hs.serverHello.selectedIdentity) >= len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK")
+	}
+
+	if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) != 1 || hs.session == nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+	pskSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(hs.session.cipherSuite)
+	if pskSuite == nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+	if pskSuite.hash != hs.suite.hash {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: server selected an invalid PSK and cipher suite pair")
+	}
+
+	hs.usingPSK = true
+	c.didResume = true
+	c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
+	c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -276,7 +336,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) establishHandshakeKeys() error {
 		return errors.New("tls: invalid server key share")
 	}
 
-	earlySecret := hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
+	earlySecret := hs.earlySecret
+	if !hs.usingPSK {
+		earlySecret = hs.suite.extract(nil, nil)
+	}
 	handshakeSecret := hs.suite.extract(sharedKey,
 		hs.suite.deriveSecret(earlySecret, "derived", nil))
 
@@ -328,9 +391,15 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerParameters() error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) doFullHandshake() error {
+func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerCertificate() error {
 	c := hs.c
 
+	// Either a PSK or a certificate is always used, but not both.
+	// See RFC 8446, Section 4.1.1.
+	if hs.usingPSK {
+		return nil
+	}
+
 	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -419,13 +488,10 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) readServerFinished() error {
 		return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
 	}
 
-	// See RFC 8446, sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.
-	finishedKey := hs.suite.expandLabel(c.in.trafficSecret, "finished", nil, hs.suite.hash.Size())
-	expectedMAC := hmac.New(hs.suite.hash.New, finishedKey)
-	expectedMAC.Write(hs.transcript.Sum(nil))
-	if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC.Sum(nil), finished.verifyData) {
+	expectedMAC := hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
+	if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC, finished.verifyData) {
 		c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
-		return errors.New("tls: invalid finished hash")
+		return errors.New("tls: invalid server finished hash")
 	}
 
 	hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
@@ -465,11 +531,8 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientCertificate() error {
 func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error {
 	c := hs.c
 
-	finishedKey := hs.suite.expandLabel(c.out.trafficSecret, "finished", nil, hs.suite.hash.Size())
-	verifyData := hmac.New(hs.suite.hash.New, finishedKey)
-	verifyData.Write(hs.transcript.Sum(nil))
 	finished := &finishedMsg{
-		verifyData: verifyData.Sum(nil),
+		verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
 	}
 
 	hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
@@ -479,5 +542,58 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) sendClientFinished() error {
 
 	c.out.setTrafficSecret(hs.suite, hs.trafficSecret)
 
+	if !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled && c.config.ClientSessionCache != nil {
+		c.resumptionSecret = hs.suite.deriveSecret(hs.masterSecret,
+			resumptionLabel, hs.transcript)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conn) handleNewSessionTicket(msg *newSessionTicketMsgTLS13) error {
+	if !c.isClient {
+		c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+		return errors.New("tls: received new session ticket from a client")
+	}
+
+	if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled || c.config.ClientSessionCache == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// See RFC 8446, Section 4.6.1.
+	if msg.lifetime == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	lifetime := time.Duration(msg.lifetime) * time.Second
+	if lifetime > 7*24*time.Hour {
+		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+		return errors.New("tls: received a session ticket with invalid lifetime")
+	}
+
+	cipherSuite := cipherSuiteTLS13ByID(c.cipherSuite)
+	if cipherSuite == nil || c.resumptionSecret == nil {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+	}
+
+	// Save the resumption_master_secret and nonce instead of deriving the PSK
+	// to do the least amount of work on NewSessionTicket messages before we
+	// know if the ticket will be used. Forward secrecy of resumed connections
+	// is guaranteed by the requirement for pskModeDHE.
+	session := &ClientSessionState{
+		sessionTicket:      msg.label,
+		vers:               c.vers,
+		cipherSuite:        c.cipherSuite,
+		masterSecret:       c.resumptionSecret,
+		serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
+		verifiedChains:     c.verifiedChains,
+		receivedAt:         c.config.time(),
+		nonce:              msg.nonce,
+		useBy:              c.config.time().Add(lifetime),
+		ageAdd:             msg.ageAdd,
+	}
+
+	cacheKey := clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
+	c.config.ClientSessionCache.Put(cacheKey, session)
+
 	return nil
 }

src/crypto/tls/handshake_messages.go

@@ -288,6 +288,50 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshal() []byte {
 	return m.raw
 }
 
+// marshalWithoutBinders returns the ClientHello through the
+// PreSharedKeyExtension.identities field, according to RFC 8446, Section
+// 4.2.11.2. Note that m.pskBinders must be set to slices of the correct length.
+func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshalWithoutBinders() []byte {
+	bindersLen := 2 // uint16 length prefix
+	for _, binder := range m.pskBinders {
+		bindersLen += 1 // uint8 length prefix
+		bindersLen += len(binder)
+	}
+
+	fullMessage := m.marshal()
+	return fullMessage[:len(fullMessage)-bindersLen]
+}
+
+// updateBinders updates the m.pskBinders field, if necessary updating the
+// cached marshalled representation. The supplied binders must have the same
+// length as the current m.pskBinders.
+func (m *clientHelloMsg) updateBinders(pskBinders [][]byte) {
+	if len(pskBinders) != len(m.pskBinders) {
+		panic("tls: internal error: pskBinders length mismatch")
+	}
+	for i := range m.pskBinders {
+		if len(pskBinders[i]) != len(m.pskBinders[i]) {
+			panic("tls: internal error: pskBinders length mismatch")
+		}
+	}
+	m.pskBinders = pskBinders
+	if m.raw != nil {
+		lenWithoutBinders := len(m.marshalWithoutBinders())
+		// TODO(filippo): replace with NewFixedBuilder once CL 148882 is imported.
+		b := cryptobyte.NewBuilder(m.raw[:lenWithoutBinders])
+		b.AddUint16LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+			for _, binder := range m.pskBinders {
+				b.AddUint8LengthPrefixed(func(b *cryptobyte.Builder) {
+					b.AddBytes(binder)
+				})
+			}
+		})
+		if len(b.BytesOrPanic()) != len(m.raw) {
+			panic("tls: internal error: failed to update binders")
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
 	*m = clientHelloMsg{raw: data}
 	s := cryptobyte.String(data)

src/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go

@@ -756,14 +756,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processCertsFromClient(certificates [][]byte) (c
 func (hs *serverHandshakeState) setCipherSuite(id uint16, supportedCipherSuites []uint16, version uint16) bool {
 	for _, supported := range supportedCipherSuites {
 		if id == supported {
-			var candidate *cipherSuite
-
-			for _, s := range cipherSuites {
-				if s.id == id {
-					candidate = s
-					break
-				}
-			}
+			candidate := cipherSuiteByID(id)
 			if candidate == nil {
 				continue
 			}

src/crypto/tls/handshake_server_tls13.go

@@ -434,12 +434,8 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerCertificate() error {
 func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) sendServerFinished() error {
 	c := hs.c
 
-	// See RFC 8446, sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.
-	finishedKey := hs.suite.expandLabel(c.out.trafficSecret, "finished", nil, hs.suite.hash.Size())
-	verifyData := hmac.New(hs.suite.hash.New, finishedKey)
-	verifyData.Write(hs.transcript.Sum(nil))
 	finished := &finishedMsg{
-		verifyData: verifyData.Sum(nil),
+		verifyData: hs.suite.finishedHash(c.out.trafficSecret, hs.transcript),
 	}
 
 	hs.transcript.Write(finished.marshal())
@@ -488,10 +484,8 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeStateTLS13) readClientFinished() error {
 		return unexpectedMessageError(finished, msg)
 	}
 
-	finishedKey := hs.suite.expandLabel(c.in.trafficSecret, "finished", nil, hs.suite.hash.Size())
-	expectedMAC := hmac.New(hs.suite.hash.New, finishedKey)
-	expectedMAC.Write(hs.transcript.Sum(nil))
-	if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC.Sum(nil), finished.verifyData) {
+	expectedMAC := hs.suite.finishedHash(c.in.trafficSecret, hs.transcript)
+	if !hmac.Equal(expectedMAC, finished.verifyData) {
 		c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
 		return errors.New("tls: invalid client finished hash")
 	}

src/crypto/tls/key_schedule.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package tls
 
 import (
 	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/hmac"
 	"errors"
 	"golang_org/x/crypto/cryptobyte"
 	"golang_org/x/crypto/curve25519"
@@ -77,6 +78,16 @@ func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) trafficKey(trafficSecret []byte) (key, iv []byte) {
 	return
 }
 
+// finishedHash generates the Finished verify_data or PskBinderEntry according
+// to RFC 8446, Section 4.4.4. See sections 4.4 and 4.2.11.2 for the baseKey
+// selection.
+func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) finishedHash(baseKey []byte, transcript hash.Hash) []byte {
+	finishedKey := c.expandLabel(baseKey, "finished", nil, c.hash.Size())
+	verifyData := hmac.New(c.hash.New, finishedKey)
+	verifyData.Write(transcript.Sum(nil))
+	return verifyData.Sum(nil)
+}
+
 // exportKeyingMaterial implements RFC5705 exporters for TLS 1.3 according to
 // RFC 8446, Section 7.5.
 func (c *cipherSuiteTLS13) exportKeyingMaterial(masterSecret []byte, transcript hash.Hash) func(string, []byte, int) ([]byte, error) {

src/crypto/tls/prf_test.go

@@ -87,20 +87,11 @@ func TestKeysFromPreMasterSecret(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func cipherSuiteById(id uint16) *cipherSuite {
-	for _, cipherSuite := range cipherSuites {
-		if cipherSuite.id == id {
-			return cipherSuite
-		}
-	}
-	panic("ciphersuite not found")
-}
-
 // These test vectors were generated from GnuTLS using `gnutls-cli --insecure -d 9 `
 var testKeysFromTests = []testKeysFromTest{
 	{
 		VersionTLS10,
-		cipherSuiteById(TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA),
+		cipherSuiteByID(TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA),
 		"0302cac83ad4b1db3b9ab49ad05957de2a504a634a386fc600889321e1a971f57479466830ac3e6f468e87f5385fa0c5",
 		"4ae66303755184a3917fcb44880605fcc53baa01912b22ed94473fc69cebd558",
 		"4ae663020ec16e6bb5130be918cfcafd4d765979a3136a5d50c593446e4e44db",
@@ -116,7 +107,7 @@ var testKeysFromTests = []testKeysFromTest{
 	},
 	{
 		VersionTLS10,
-		cipherSuiteById(TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA),
+		cipherSuiteByID(TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA),
 		"03023f7527316bc12cbcd69e4b9e8275d62c028f27e65c745cfcddc7ce01bd3570a111378b63848127f1c36e5f9e4890",
 		"4ae66364b5ea56b20ce4e25555aed2d7e67f42788dd03f3fee4adae0459ab106",
 		"4ae66363ab815cbf6a248b87d6b556184e945e9b97fbdf247858b0bdafacfa1c",
@@ -132,7 +123,7 @@ var testKeysFromTests = []testKeysFromTest{
 	},
 	{
 		VersionTLS10,
-		cipherSuiteById(TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA),
+		cipherSuiteByID(TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA),
 		"832d515f1d61eebb2be56ba0ef79879efb9b527504abb386fb4310ed5d0e3b1f220d3bb6b455033a2773e6d8bdf951d278a187482b400d45deb88a5d5a6bb7d6a7a1decc04eb9ef0642876cd4a82d374d3b6ff35f0351dc5d411104de431375355addc39bfb1f6329fb163b0bc298d658338930d07d313cd980a7e3d9196cac1",
 		"4ae663b2ee389c0de147c509d8f18f5052afc4aaf9699efe8cb05ece883d3a5e",
 		"4ae664d503fd4cff50cfc1fb8fc606580f87b0fcdac9554ba0e01d785bdf278e",
@@ -148,7 +139,7 @@ var testKeysFromTests = []testKeysFromTest{
 	},
 	{
 		VersionSSL30,
-		cipherSuiteById(TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA),
+		cipherSuiteByID(TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA),
 		"832d515f1d61eebb2be56ba0ef79879efb9b527504abb386fb4310ed5d0e3b1f220d3bb6b455033a2773e6d8bdf951d278a187482b400d45deb88a5d5a6bb7d6a7a1decc04eb9ef0642876cd4a82d374d3b6ff35f0351dc5d411104de431375355addc39bfb1f6329fb163b0bc298d658338930d07d313cd980a7e3d9196cac1",
 		"4ae663b2ee389c0de147c509d8f18f5052afc4aaf9699efe8cb05ece883d3a5e",
 		"4ae664d503fd4cff50cfc1fb8fc606580f87b0fcdac9554ba0e01d785bdf278e",