Commit 007ea448 authored by Miklos Szeredi's avatar Miklos Szeredi

ovl: relax permission checking on underlying layers

Make permission checking more consistent:

 - special files don't need any access check on underling fs

 - exec permission check doesn't need to be performed on underlying fs
Reported-by: default avatar"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
parent 6cd07870
...@@ -286,13 +286,22 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) ...@@ -286,13 +286,22 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
if (err) if (err)
return err; return err;
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); /* No need to do any access on underlying for special files */
if (!upperinode && if (special_file(realinode->i_mode))
!special_file(realinode->i_mode) && mask & MAY_WRITE) { return 0;
/* No need to access underlying for execute */
mask &= ~MAY_EXEC;
if ((mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)) == 0)
return 0;
/* Lower files get copied up, so turn write access into read */
if (!upperinode && mask & MAY_WRITE) {
mask &= ~(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND); mask &= ~(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND);
/* Make sure mounter can read file for copy up later */
mask |= MAY_READ; mask |= MAY_READ;
} }
old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
err = inode_permission(realinode, mask); err = inode_permission(realinode, mask);
revert_creds(old_cred); revert_creds(old_cred);
......
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