Commit 174a74db authored by Eric Biggers's avatar Eric Biggers Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman

KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings

commit c9f838d1 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2017-7472.

Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:

	#include <keyutils.h>

	int main()
	{
		for (;;)
			keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
	}

Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.

Fixes: d84f4f99 ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent b2dd90e8
......@@ -1256,8 +1256,8 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
* Read or set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys and
* return the old setting.
*
* If a process keyring is specified then this will be created if it doesn't
* yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful.
* If a thread or process keyring is specified then it will be created if it
* doesn't yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful.
*/
long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
{
......@@ -1282,11 +1282,8 @@ long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != -EEXIST)
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
ret = 0;
}
goto set;
case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
......
......@@ -127,13 +127,18 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)
}
/*
* Install a fresh thread keyring directly to new credentials. This keyring is
* allowed to overrun the quota.
* Install a thread keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have
* one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.
*
* Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
if (new->thread_keyring)
return 0;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
......@@ -146,7 +151,9 @@ int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
}
/*
* Install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one.
* Install a thread keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.
*
* Return: 0 if a thread keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
static int install_thread_keyring(void)
{
......@@ -157,8 +164,6 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void)
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
BUG_ON(new->thread_keyring);
ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
......@@ -169,17 +174,17 @@ static int install_thread_keyring(void)
}
/*
* Install a process keyring directly to a credentials struct.
* Install a process keyring to the given credentials struct if it didn't have
* one already. This is allowed to overrun the quota.
*
* Returns -EEXIST if there was already a process keyring, 0 if one installed,
* and other value on any other error
* Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
if (new->process_keyring)
return -EEXIST;
return 0;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
......@@ -193,11 +198,9 @@ int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
}
/*
* Make sure a process keyring is installed for the current process. The
* existing process keyring is not replaced.
* Install a process keyring to the current task if it didn't have one already.
*
* Returns 0 if there is a process keyring by the end of this function, some
* error otherwise.
* Return: 0 if a process keyring is now present; -errno on failure.
*/
static int install_process_keyring(void)
{
......@@ -211,14 +214,18 @@ static int install_process_keyring(void)
ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret != -EEXIST ? ret : 0;
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
}
/*
* Install a session keyring directly to a credentials struct.
* Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the given credentials
* struct, replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL,
* then install a new anonymous session keyring.
*
* Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.
*/
int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
{
......@@ -253,8 +260,11 @@ int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
}
/*
* Install a session keyring, discarding the old one. If a keyring is not
* supplied, an empty one is invented.
* Install the given keyring as the session keyring of the current task,
* replacing the existing one if any. If the given keyring is NULL, then
* install a new anonymous session keyring.
*
* Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure.
*/
static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
{
......
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