Commit 1c0fe622 authored by Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar Greg Kroah-Hartman

LSM: Enable the security framework. This includes basic task control hooks.

parent 2b15fe63
......@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ objtree := $(TOPDIR)
export srctree objtree
SUBDIRS := init kernel mm fs ipc lib drivers sound net
SUBDIRS := init kernel mm fs ipc lib drivers sound net security
noconfig_targets := xconfig menuconfig config oldconfig randconfig \
defconfig allyesconfig allnoconfig allmodconfig \
......@@ -223,7 +224,7 @@ endif
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
INIT := init/init.o
CORE_FILES := kernel/kernel.o mm/mm.o fs/fs.o ipc/ipc.o
CORE_FILES := kernel/kernel.o mm/mm.o fs/fs.o ipc/ipc.o security/built-in.o
LIBS := lib/lib.a
DRIVERS := drivers/built-in.o sound/sound.o
NETWORKS := net/network.o
......
......@@ -423,4 +423,5 @@ fi
endmenu
source security/Config.in
source lib/Config.in
......@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ ENTRY(sys_call_table)
.long sys_getdents64 /* 220 */
.long sys_fcntl64
.long sys_ni_syscall /* reserved for TUX */
.long sys_ni_syscall /* reserved for Security */
.long sys_security /* reserved for Security */
.long sys_gettid
.long sys_readahead /* 225 */
.long sys_setxattr
......
......@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
......@@ -159,6 +160,9 @@ asmlinkage int sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, long addr, long data)
/* are we already being traced? */
if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto out;
ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
ret = 0;
......
......@@ -623,6 +623,7 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int mode;
struct inode * inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
int retval;
mode = inode->i_mode;
/*
......@@ -652,27 +653,10 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->e_gid = inode->i_gid;
}
/* We don't have VFS support for capabilities yet */
cap_clear(bprm->cap_inheritable);
cap_clear(bprm->cap_permitted);
cap_clear(bprm->cap_effective);
/* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
* executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
* capability sets for the file.
*
* If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
* and permitted sets of the executable file.
*/
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
cap_set_full(bprm->cap_inheritable);
cap_set_full(bprm->cap_permitted);
}
if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
cap_set_full(bprm->cap_effective);
}
/* fill in binprm security blob */
retval = security_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
memset(bprm->buf,0,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file,0,bprm->buf,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
......@@ -695,16 +679,9 @@ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
void compute_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
int do_unlock = 0;
new_permitted = cap_intersect(bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
working = cap_intersect(bprm->cap_inheritable,
current->cap_inheritable);
new_permitted = cap_combine(new_permitted, working);
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid ||
!cap_issubset(new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) {
current->mm->dumpable = 0;
lock_kernel();
......@@ -716,32 +693,17 @@ void compute_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
}
if(!capable(CAP_SETPCAP)) {
new_permitted = cap_intersect(new_permitted,
current->cap_permitted);
}
}
do_unlock = 1;
}
/* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
* in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
* capability rules */
if (current->pid != 1) {
current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
current->cap_effective =
cap_intersect(new_permitted, bprm->cap_effective);
}
/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
if(do_unlock)
unlock_kernel();
current->keep_capabilities = 0;
security_ops->bprm_compute_creds(bprm);
}
......@@ -811,6 +773,10 @@ int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm,struct pt_regs *regs)
}
}
#endif
retval = security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
/* kernel module loader fixup */
/* so we don't try to load run modprobe in kernel space. */
set_fs(USER_DS);
......@@ -887,7 +853,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, char ** argv, char ** envp, struct pt_regs * regs
bprm.sh_bang = 0;
bprm.loader = 0;
bprm.exec = 0;
bprm.security = NULL;
bprm.mm = mm_alloc();
retval = -ENOMEM;
if (!bprm.mm)
......@@ -905,6 +871,10 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, char ** argv, char ** envp, struct pt_regs * regs
if ((retval = bprm.envc) < 0)
goto out_mm;
retval = security_ops->bprm_alloc_security(&bprm);
if (retval)
goto out;
retval = prepare_binprm(&bprm);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
......@@ -923,9 +893,11 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, char ** argv, char ** envp, struct pt_regs * regs
goto out;
retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
if (retval >= 0)
if (retval >= 0) {
/* execve success */
security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
return retval;
}
out:
/* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
......@@ -935,6 +907,9 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, char ** argv, char ** envp, struct pt_regs * regs
__free_page(page);
}
if (bprm.security)
security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
out_mm:
mmdrop(bprm.mm);
......
......@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ struct linux_binprm{
struct file * file;
int e_uid, e_gid;
kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective;
void *security;
int argc, envc;
char * filename; /* Name of binary */
unsigned long loader, exec;
......
......@@ -354,6 +354,8 @@ struct task_struct {
void *notifier_data;
sigset_t *notifier_mask;
void *security;
/* Thread group tracking */
u32 parent_exec_id;
u32 self_exec_id;
......@@ -587,10 +589,9 @@ extern int request_irq(unsigned int,
unsigned long, const char *, void *);
extern void free_irq(unsigned int, void *);
/*
* capable() checks for a particular capability.
* See include/linux/capability.h for defined capabilities.
*/
/* capable prototype and code moved to security.[hc] */
#include <linux/security.h>
#if 0
static inline int capable(int cap)
{
if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) {
......@@ -599,6 +600,7 @@ static inline int capable(int cap)
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* if 0 */
/*
* Routines for handling mm_structs
......
......@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
......@@ -390,6 +391,7 @@ asmlinkage void __init start_kernel(void)
fork_init(mempages);
proc_caches_init();
security_scaffolding_startup();
buffer_init();
vfs_caches_init(mempages);
radix_tree_init();
......
......@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)
data.permitted = cap_t(target->cap_permitted);
data.inheritable = cap_t(target->cap_inheritable);
data.effective = cap_t(target->cap_effective);
ret = security_ops->capget(target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, &data.permitted);
out:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
......@@ -87,9 +88,7 @@ static inline void cap_set_pg(int pgrp, kernel_cap_t *effective,
for_each_task(target) {
if (target->pgrp != pgrp)
continue;
target->cap_effective = *effective;
target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
security_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
}
......@@ -106,9 +105,7 @@ static inline void cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective,
for_each_task(target) {
if (target == current || target->pid == 1)
continue;
target->cap_effective = *effective;
target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
security_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
}
......@@ -166,7 +163,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
ret = -EPERM;
/* verify restrictions on target's new Inheritable set */
if (security_ops->capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted))
goto out;
if (!cap_issubset(inheritable, cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
current->cap_permitted)))
goto out;
......@@ -182,6 +181,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
ret = 0;
/* having verified that the proposed changes are legal,
we now put them into effect. */
if (pid < 0) {
if (pid == -1) /* all procs other than current and init */
cap_set_all(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
......@@ -189,9 +190,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
else /* all procs in process group */
cap_set_pg(-pid, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
} else {
target->cap_effective = effective;
target->cap_inheritable = inheritable;
target->cap_permitted = permitted;
security_ops->capset_set(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
}
out:
......
......@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/namespace.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/acct.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
......@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ static void release_task(struct task_struct * p)
wait_task_inactive(p);
#endif
atomic_dec(&p->user->processes);
security_ops->task_free_security(p);
free_uid(p->user);
unhash_process(p);
......@@ -187,10 +189,7 @@ void reparent_to_init(void)
/* cpus_allowed? */
/* rt_priority? */
/* signals? */
current->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
current->cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET;
current->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET;
current->keep_capabilities = 0;
security_ops->task_reparent_to_init(current);
memcpy(current->rlim, init_task.rlim, sizeof(*(current->rlim)));
current->user = INIT_USER;
......@@ -625,6 +624,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_wait4(pid_t pid,unsigned int * stat_addr, int options, struc
if (((p->exit_signal != SIGCHLD) ^ ((options & __WCLONE) != 0))
&& !(options & __WALL))
continue;
if (security_ops->task_wait(p))
continue;
flag = 1;
switch (p->state) {
case TASK_STOPPED:
......
......@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
......@@ -618,6 +618,10 @@ struct task_struct *do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
retval = security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
if (retval)
goto fork_out;
retval = -ENOMEM;
p = dup_task_struct(current);
if (!p)
......@@ -697,13 +701,16 @@ struct task_struct *do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
p->array = NULL;
p->lock_depth = -1; /* -1 = no lock */
p->start_time = jiffies;
p->security = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->local_pages);
retval = -ENOMEM;
if (security_ops->task_alloc_security(p))
goto bad_fork_cleanup;
/* copy all the process information */
if (copy_semundo(clone_flags, p))
goto bad_fork_cleanup;
goto bad_fork_cleanup_security;
if (copy_files(clone_flags, p))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
if (copy_fs(clone_flags, p))
......@@ -812,6 +819,8 @@ struct task_struct *do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
exit_files(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_semundo:
exit_semundo(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_security:
security_ops->task_free_security(p);
bad_fork_cleanup:
put_exec_domain(p->thread_info->exec_domain);
if (p->binfmt && p->binfmt->module)
......
......@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ int exec_usermodehelper(char *program_path, char *argv[], char *envp[])
/* Give kmod all effective privileges.. */
curtask->euid = curtask->fsuid = 0;
curtask->egid = curtask->fsgid = 0;
cap_set_full(curtask->cap_effective);
security_ops->task_kmod_set_label();
/* Allow execve args to be in kernel space. */
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
......
......@@ -41,7 +41,9 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)
int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
{
int retval;
task_lock(task);
retval = -EPERM;
if (task->pid <= 1)
goto bad;
if (task == current)
......@@ -53,7 +55,6 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
(current->uid != task->uid) ||
(current->gid != task->egid) ||
(current->gid != task->sgid) ||
(!cap_issubset(task->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) ||
(current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto bad;
rmb();
......@@ -62,6 +63,9 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto bad;
retval = security_ops->ptrace(current, task);
if (retval)
goto bad;
/* Go */
task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
......@@ -82,7 +86,7 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
bad:
task_unlock(task);
return -EPERM;
return retval;
}
int ptrace_detach(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int data)
......
......@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
/*
* Convert user-nice values [ -20 ... 0 ... 19 ]
......@@ -1123,6 +1124,7 @@ void set_user_nice(task_t *p, long nice)
asmlinkage long sys_nice(int increment)
{
int retval;
long nice;
/*
......@@ -1144,6 +1146,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_nice(int increment)
nice = -20;
if (nice > 19)
nice = 19;
retval = security_ops->task_setnice(current, nice);
if (retval)
return retval;
set_user_nice(current, nice);
return 0;
}
......@@ -1236,6 +1243,10 @@ static int setscheduler(pid_t pid, int policy, struct sched_param *param)
!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
goto out_unlock;
retval = security_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, &lp);
if (retval)
goto out_unlock;
array = p->array;
if (array)
deactivate_task(p, task_rq(p));
......@@ -1280,8 +1291,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_sched_getscheduler(pid_t pid)
retval = -ESRCH;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
p = find_process_by_pid(pid);
if (p)
if (p) {
retval = security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
if (!retval)
retval = p->policy;
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
out_nounlock:
......@@ -1302,6 +1316,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_sched_getparam(pid_t pid, struct sched_param *param)
retval = -ESRCH;
if (!p)
goto out_unlock;
retval = security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
if (retval)
goto out_unlock;
lp.sched_priority = p->rt_priority;
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
......@@ -1509,14 +1528,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_sched_rr_get_interval(pid_t pid, struct timespec *interval)
retval = -ESRCH;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
p = find_process_by_pid(pid);
if (p)
if (!p)
goto out_unlock;
retval = security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
if (retval)
goto out_unlock;
jiffies_to_timespec(p->policy & SCHED_FIFO ?
0 : TASK_TIMESLICE(p), &t);
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
if (p)
retval = copy_to_user(interval, &t, sizeof(t)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
out_nounlock:
return retval;
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return retval;
}
static void show_task(task_t * p)
......
......@@ -548,6 +548,9 @@ printk("SIG queue (%s:%d): %d ", t->comm, t->pid, sig);
ret = -EPERM;
if (bad_signal(sig, info, t))
goto out_nolock;
ret = security_ops->task_kill(t, info, sig);
if (ret)
goto out_nolock;
/* The null signal is a permissions and process existence probe.
No signal is actually delivered. Same goes for zombies. */
......
......@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/tqueue.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/times.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
......@@ -234,6 +235,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval)
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
for_each_task(p) {
int no_nice;
if (!proc_sel(p, which, who))
continue;
if (p->uid != current->euid &&
......@@ -243,10 +245,17 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setpriority(int which, int who, int niceval)
}
if (error == -ESRCH)
error = 0;
if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
error = -EACCES;
else
continue;
}
no_nice = security_ops->task_setnice(p, niceval);
if (no_nice) {
error = no_nice;
continue;
}
set_user_nice(p, niceval);
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
......@@ -416,6 +425,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
int old_egid = current->egid;
int new_rgid = old_rgid;
int new_egid = old_egid;
int retval;
retval = security_ops->task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
if ((old_rgid == rgid) ||
......@@ -457,6 +471,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
{
int old_egid = current->egid;
int retval;
retval = security_ops->task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
{
......@@ -481,52 +500,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
return 0;
}
/*
* cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
* a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
*
* 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
* {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
* cleared.
*
* 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
* capabilities of the process are cleared.
*
* 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
* capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
*
* fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
* never happen.
*
* -astor
*
* cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
* A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
* calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
* effective sets will be retained.
* Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
* of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
* Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
* files..
* Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
*/
static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(int old_ruid, int old_euid,
int old_suid)
{
if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
(current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
!current->keep_capabilities) {
cap_clear(current->cap_permitted);
cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
}
if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
}
if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
}
}
static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear)
{
struct user_struct *new_user, *old_user;
......@@ -572,6 +545,11 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int dumpclear)
asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
{
int old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_euid;
int retval;
retval = security_ops->task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
if (retval)
return retval;
new_ruid = old_ruid = current->uid;
new_euid = old_euid = current->euid;
......@@ -608,11 +586,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
current->suid = current->euid;
current->fsuid = current->euid;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
cap_emulate_setxuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
}
return 0;
return security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RE);
}
......@@ -632,6 +606,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
{
int old_euid = current->euid;
int old_ruid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_suid;
int retval;
retval = security_ops->task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
if (retval)
return retval;
old_ruid = new_ruid = current->uid;
old_suid = current->suid;
......@@ -652,11 +631,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
current->fsuid = current->euid = uid;
current->suid = new_suid;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
cap_emulate_setxuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
}
return 0;
return security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_ID);
}
......@@ -669,6 +644,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
int old_ruid = current->uid;
int old_euid = current->euid;
int old_suid = current->suid;
int retval;
retval = security_ops->task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && (ruid != current->uid) &&
......@@ -697,11 +677,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
current->suid = suid;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
cap_emulate_setxuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
}
return 0;
return security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
}
asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t *ruid, uid_t *euid, uid_t *suid)
......@@ -720,6 +696,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t *ruid, uid_t *euid, uid_t *suid)
*/
asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
{
int retval;
retval = security_ops->task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && (rgid != current->gid) &&
(rgid != current->egid) && (rgid != current->sgid))
......@@ -768,6 +750,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getresgid(gid_t *rgid, gid_t *egid, gid_t *sgid)
asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
{
int old_fsuid;
int retval;
retval = security_ops->task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS);
if (retval)
return retval;
old_fsuid = current->fsuid;
if (uid == current->uid || uid == current->euid ||
......@@ -782,24 +769,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
current->fsuid = uid;
}
/* We emulate fsuid by essentially doing a scaled-down version
* of what we did in setresuid and friends. However, we only
* operate on the fs-specific bits of the process' effective
* capabilities
*
* FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
* if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
*/
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
cap_t(current->cap_effective) &= ~CAP_FS_MASK;
}
if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
cap_t(current->cap_effective) |=
(cap_t(current->cap_permitted) & CAP_FS_MASK);
}
}
retval = security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_fsuid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS);
if (retval)
return retval;
return old_fsuid;
}
......@@ -810,6 +782,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
{
int old_fsgid;
int retval;
retval = security_ops->task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS);
if (retval)
return retval;
old_fsgid = current->fsgid;
if (gid == current->gid || gid == current->egid ||
......@@ -904,6 +881,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setpgid(pid_t pid, pid_t pgid)
}
ok_pgid:
err = security_ops->task_setpgid(p, pgid);
if (err)
goto out;
p->pgrp = pgid;
err = 0;
out:
......@@ -924,8 +905,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getpgid(pid_t pid)
p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
retval = -ESRCH;
if (p)
if (p) {
retval = security_ops->task_getpgid(p);
if (!retval)
retval = p->pgrp;
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return retval;
}
......@@ -949,8 +933,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getsid(pid_t pid)
p = find_task_by_pid(pid);
retval = -ESRCH;
if(p)
if(p) {
retval = security_ops->task_getsid(p);
if (!retval)
retval = p->session;
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return retval;
}
......@@ -1008,12 +995,19 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t *grouplist)
asmlinkage long sys_setgroups(int gidsetsize, gid_t *grouplist)
{
gid_t groups[NGROUPS];
int retval;
if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
return -EPERM;
if ((unsigned) gidsetsize > NGROUPS)
return -EINVAL;
if(copy_from_user(current->groups, grouplist, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t)))
if(copy_from_user(groups, grouplist, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t)))
return -EFAULT;
retval = security_ops->task_setgroups(gidsetsize, groups);
if (retval)
return retval;
memcpy(current->groups, groups, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t));
current->ngroups = gidsetsize;
return 0;
}
......@@ -1158,6 +1152,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_old_getrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *rlim)
asmlinkage long sys_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *rlim)
{
struct rlimit new_rlim, *old_rlim;
int retval;
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
return -EINVAL;
......@@ -1172,6 +1167,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *rlim)
if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > NR_OPEN || new_rlim.rlim_max > NR_OPEN)
return -EPERM;
}
retval = security_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, &new_rlim);
if (retval)
return retval;
*old_rlim = new_rlim;
return 0;
}
......@@ -1243,6 +1243,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
int error = 0;
int sig;
error = security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
if (error)
return error;
switch (option) {
case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
sig = arg2;
......
......@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/highuid.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
......@@ -128,6 +129,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getgroups16(int gidsetsize, old_gid_t *grouplist)
asmlinkage long sys_setgroups16(int gidsetsize, old_gid_t *grouplist)
{
old_gid_t groups[NGROUPS];
gid_t new_groups[NGROUPS];
int i;
if (!capable(CAP_SETGID))
......@@ -137,7 +139,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgroups16(int gidsetsize, old_gid_t *grouplist)
if (copy_from_user(groups, grouplist, gidsetsize * sizeof(old_gid_t)))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0 ; i < gidsetsize ; i++)
current->groups[i] = (gid_t)groups[i];
new_groups[i] = (gid_t)groups[i];
i = security_ops->task_setgroups(gidsetsize, new_groups);
if (i)
return i;
memcpy(current->groups, new_groups, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t));
current->ngroups = gidsetsize;
return 0;
}
......
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