Commit 205f149f authored by Vivek Goyal's avatar Vivek Goyal Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman

ovl: Do not lose security.capability xattr over metadata file copy-up

commit 993a0b2a upstream.

If a file has been copied up metadata only, and later data is copied up,
upper loses any security.capability xattr it has (underlying filesystem
clears it as upon file write).

From a user's point of view, this is just a file copy-up and that should
not result in losing security.capability xattr.  Hence, before data copy
up, save security.capability xattr (if any) and restore it on upper after
data copy up is complete.
Signed-off-by: default avatarVivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAmir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Fixes: 0c288874 ("ovl: A new xattr OVL_XATTR_METACOPY for file on upper")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+
Signed-off-by: default avatarMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent 6f048ae2
...@@ -711,6 +711,8 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c) ...@@ -711,6 +711,8 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
{ {
struct path upperpath, datapath; struct path upperpath, datapath;
int err; int err;
char *capability = NULL;
ssize_t uninitialized_var(cap_size);
ovl_path_upper(c->dentry, &upperpath); ovl_path_upper(c->dentry, &upperpath);
if (WARN_ON(upperpath.dentry == NULL)) if (WARN_ON(upperpath.dentry == NULL))
...@@ -720,15 +722,37 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c) ...@@ -720,15 +722,37 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_meta_inode_data(struct ovl_copy_up_ctx *c)
if (WARN_ON(datapath.dentry == NULL)) if (WARN_ON(datapath.dentry == NULL))
return -EIO; return -EIO;
if (c->stat.size) {
err = cap_size = ovl_getxattr(upperpath.dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
&capability, 0);
if (err < 0 && err != -ENODATA)
goto out;
}
err = ovl_copy_up_data(&datapath, &upperpath, c->stat.size); err = ovl_copy_up_data(&datapath, &upperpath, c->stat.size);
if (err) if (err)
return err; goto out_free;
/*
* Writing to upper file will clear security.capability xattr. We
* don't want that to happen for normal copy-up operation.
*/
if (capability) {
err = ovl_do_setxattr(upperpath.dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
capability, cap_size, 0);
if (err)
goto out_free;
}
err = vfs_removexattr(upperpath.dentry, OVL_XATTR_METACOPY); err = vfs_removexattr(upperpath.dentry, OVL_XATTR_METACOPY);
if (err) if (err)
return err; goto out_free;
ovl_set_upperdata(d_inode(c->dentry)); ovl_set_upperdata(d_inode(c->dentry));
out_free:
kfree(capability);
out:
return err; return err;
} }
......
...@@ -277,6 +277,8 @@ int ovl_lock_rename_workdir(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir); ...@@ -277,6 +277,8 @@ int ovl_lock_rename_workdir(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir);
int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct dentry *dentry); int ovl_check_metacopy_xattr(struct dentry *dentry);
bool ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(struct dentry *dentry); bool ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(struct dentry *dentry);
char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, int padding); char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, int padding);
ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,
size_t padding);
static inline bool ovl_is_impuredir(struct dentry *dentry) static inline bool ovl_is_impuredir(struct dentry *dentry)
{ {
......
...@@ -867,28 +867,49 @@ bool ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(struct dentry *dentry) ...@@ -867,28 +867,49 @@ bool ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(struct dentry *dentry)
return (oe->numlower > 1); return (oe->numlower > 1);
} }
char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, int padding) ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, char **value,
size_t padding)
{ {
int res; ssize_t res;
char *s, *next, *buf = NULL; char *buf = NULL;
res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_REDIRECT, NULL, 0); res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, NULL, 0);
if (res < 0) { if (res < 0) {
if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP) if (res == -ENODATA || res == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return NULL; return -ENODATA;
goto fail; goto fail;
} }
buf = kzalloc(res + padding + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (res != 0) {
if (!buf) buf = kzalloc(res + padding, GFP_KERNEL);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
if (res == 0) res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, name, buf, res);
goto invalid; if (res < 0)
goto fail;
}
*value = buf;
return res;
fail:
pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get xattr %s: err=%zi)\n",
name, res);
kfree(buf);
return res;
}
res = vfs_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_REDIRECT, buf, res); char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, int padding)
{
int res;
char *s, *next, *buf = NULL;
res = ovl_getxattr(dentry, OVL_XATTR_REDIRECT, &buf, padding + 1);
if (res == -ENODATA)
return NULL;
if (res < 0) if (res < 0)
goto fail; return ERR_PTR(res);
if (res == 0) if (res == 0)
goto invalid; goto invalid;
...@@ -904,15 +925,9 @@ char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, int padding) ...@@ -904,15 +925,9 @@ char *ovl_get_redirect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, int padding)
} }
return buf; return buf;
err_free:
kfree(buf);
return ERR_PTR(res);
fail:
pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: failed to get redirect (%i)\n", res);
goto err_free;
invalid: invalid:
pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: invalid redirect (%s)\n", buf); pr_warn_ratelimited("overlayfs: invalid redirect (%s)\n", buf);
res = -EINVAL; res = -EINVAL;
goto err_free; kfree(buf);
return ERR_PTR(res);
} }
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