Commit 228514bf authored by Tejun Heo's avatar Tejun Heo Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman

cgroup/pids: remove spurious suspicious RCU usage warning

commit 1d18c274 upstream.

pids_can_fork() is special in that the css association is guaranteed
to be stable throughout the function and thus doesn't need RCU
protection around task_css access.  When determining the css to charge
the pid, task_css_check() is used to override the RCU sanity check.

While adding a warning message on fork rejection from pids limit,
135b8b37 ("cgroup: Add pids controller event when fork fails
because of pid limit") incorrectly added a task_css access which is
neither RCU protected or explicitly annotated.  This triggers the
following suspicious RCU usage warning when RCU debugging is enabled.

  cgroup: fork rejected by pids controller in

  ===============================
  [ ERR: suspicious RCU usage.  ]
  4.10.0-work+ #1 Not tainted
  -------------------------------
  ./include/linux/cgroup.h:435 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!

  other info that might help us debug this:

  rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0
  1 lock held by bash/1748:
   #0:  (&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem){+++++.}, at: [<ffffffff81052c96>] _do_fork+0xe6/0x6e0

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 3 PID: 1748 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.10.0-work+ #1
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.3-1.fc25 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x68/0x93
   lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xd7/0x110
   pids_can_fork+0x1c7/0x1d0
   cgroup_can_fork+0x67/0xc0
   copy_process.part.58+0x1709/0x1e90
   _do_fork+0xe6/0x6e0
   SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x140
   entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
  RIP: 0033:0x7f7853fab93a
  RSP: 002b:00007ffc12d05c90 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7853fab93a
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001200011
  RBP: 00007ffc12d05cc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f78548db700
  R10: 00007f78548db9d0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000006d4
  R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000055e3ebe2c04d
  /asdf

There's no reason to dereference task_css again here when the
associated css is already available.  Fix it by replacing the
task_cgroup() call with css->cgroup.
Signed-off-by: default avatarTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: default avatarMike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Fixes: 135b8b37 ("cgroup: Add pids controller event when fork fails because of pid limit")
Cc: Kenny Yu <kennyyu@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent 3f406ecd
...@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static int pids_can_fork(struct task_struct *task) ...@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static int pids_can_fork(struct task_struct *task)
/* Only log the first time events_limit is incremented. */ /* Only log the first time events_limit is incremented. */
if (atomic64_inc_return(&pids->events_limit) == 1) { if (atomic64_inc_return(&pids->events_limit) == 1) {
pr_info("cgroup: fork rejected by pids controller in "); pr_info("cgroup: fork rejected by pids controller in ");
pr_cont_cgroup_path(task_cgroup(current, pids_cgrp_id)); pr_cont_cgroup_path(css->cgroup);
pr_cont("\n"); pr_cont("\n");
} }
cgroup_file_notify(&pids->events_file); cgroup_file_notify(&pids->events_file);
......
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment