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Commit 290fe0fa authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit 

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "Another merge window, another small audit pull request.

  Four patches in total: one is cosmetic, one removes an unnecessary
  initialization, one renames some enum values to prevent name
  collisions, and one converts list_del()/list_add() to list_move().

  None of these are earth shattering and all pass the audit-testsuite
  tests while merging cleanly on top of your tree from earlier today"

* tag 'audit-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: remove unnecessary 'ret' initialization
  audit: remove trailing spaces and tabs
  audit: Use list_move instead of list_del/list_add
  audit: Rename enum audit_state constants to avoid AUDIT_DISABLED redefinition
  audit: add blank line after variable declarations
parents 6bd344e5 0ecc6178
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Showing with 53 additions and 37 deletions
include/uapi/linux/audit.h
View file @ 290fe0fa
......@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
* 2500 - 2999 future user space (maybe integrity labels and related events)
*
* Messages from 1000-1199 are bi-directional. 1200-1299 & 2100 - 2999 are
* exclusively user space. 1300-2099 is kernel --> user space
* exclusively user space. 1300-2099 is kernel --> user space
* communication.
*/
#define AUDIT_GET 1000 /* Get status */
......@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
#define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG 1199
#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 2100 /* More user space messages */
#define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2 2999
#define AUDIT_DAEMON_START 1200 /* Daemon startup record */
#define AUDIT_DAEMON_END 1201 /* Daemon normal stop record */
#define AUDIT_DAEMON_ABORT 1202 /* Daemon error stop record */
......
kernel/audit.h
View file @ 290fe0fa
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
/* audit -- definition of audit_context structure and supporting types
/* audit -- definition of audit_context structure and supporting types
*
* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc.
* Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
......@@ -21,16 +21,16 @@
a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
the syscall filter. */
enum audit_state {
AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
* No syscall-specific audit records can
* be generated. */
AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
AUDIT_STATE_BUILD, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
* and fill it in at syscall
* entry time. This makes a full
* syscall record available if some
* other part of the kernel decides it
* should be recorded. */
AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
AUDIT_STATE_RECORD /* Create the per-task audit_context,
* always fill it in at syscall entry
* time, and always write out the audit
* record at syscall exit time. */
......@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static inline int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
return 0;
}
#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_DISABLED
#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
......
kernel/audit_tree.c
View file @ 290fe0fa
......@@ -689,8 +689,7 @@ void audit_trim_trees(void)
tree = container_of(cursor.next, struct audit_tree, list);
get_tree(tree);
list_del(&cursor);
list_add(&cursor, &tree->list);
list_move(&cursor, &tree->list);
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
err = kern_path(tree->pathname, 0, &path);
......@@ -899,8 +898,7 @@ int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new)
tree = container_of(cursor.next, struct audit_tree, list);
get_tree(tree);
list_del(&cursor);
list_add(&cursor, &tree->list);
list_move(&cursor, &tree->list);
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
err = kern_path(tree->pathname, 0, &path2);
......@@ -925,8 +923,7 @@ int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new)
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
spin_lock(&hash_lock);
if (!tree->goner) {
list_del(&tree->list);
list_add(&tree->list, &tree_list);
list_move(&tree->list, &tree_list);
}
spin_unlock(&hash_lock);
put_tree(tree);
......@@ -937,8 +934,7 @@ int audit_tag_tree(char *old, char *new)
tree = container_of(barrier.prev, struct audit_tree, list);
get_tree(tree);
list_del(&tree->list);
list_add(&tree->list, &barrier);
list_move(&tree->list, &barrier);
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
if (!failed) {
......
kernel/auditsc.c
View file @ 290fe0fa
......@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = {
static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
{
unsigned n;
if (unlikely(!ctx))
return 0;
n = ctx->major;
......@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
{
if (!ctx->prio) {
ctx->prio = 1;
ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
}
}
......@@ -239,6 +240,7 @@ static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
{
struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
int left = ctx->tree_count;
if (likely(left)) {
p->c[--left] = chunk;
ctx->tree_count = left;
......@@ -259,6 +261,7 @@ static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
{
struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->trees) {
ctx->trees = p;
......@@ -277,6 +280,7 @@ static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
{
struct audit_tree_refs *q;
int n;
if (!p) {
/* we started with empty chain */
p = ctx->first_trees;
......@@ -303,6 +307,7 @@ static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
{
struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
q = p->next;
kfree(p);
......@@ -313,6 +318,7 @@ static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
{
struct audit_tree_refs *p;
int n;
if (!tree)
return 0;
/* full ones */
......@@ -337,13 +343,13 @@ static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
{
struct audit_names *n;
int rc;
if (name) {
rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
......@@ -361,13 +367,13 @@ static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
{
struct audit_names *n;
int rc;
if (name) {
rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
......@@ -751,10 +757,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
}
switch (rule->action) {
case AUDIT_NEVER:
*state = AUDIT_DISABLED;
*state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED;
break;
case AUDIT_ALWAYS:
*state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
*state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
break;
}
return 1;
......@@ -773,14 +779,14 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
&state, true)) {
if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
*key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
rcu_read_unlock();
return state;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD;
}
static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
......@@ -802,7 +808,7 @@ static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is
* not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not
* high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record
* (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
* (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD).
*/
static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx)
......@@ -923,7 +929,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
if (!context)
return NULL;
context->state = state;
context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
context->fds[0] = -1;
......@@ -950,7 +956,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) {
clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
return 0;
}
......@@ -1225,6 +1231,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
switch (context->type) {
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
......@@ -1240,6 +1247,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
if (osid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
*call_panic = 1;
......@@ -1289,6 +1297,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
break;
case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
audit_log_format(ab,
"mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
"mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
......@@ -1325,6 +1334,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
{
char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
end--;
......@@ -1513,6 +1523,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
......@@ -1628,7 +1639,7 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context);
audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
audit_log_exit();
}
......@@ -1647,7 +1658,7 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
* audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
* filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
* per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
* per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD,
* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
* be written).
......@@ -1664,11 +1675,11 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
state = context->state;
if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
return;
context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) {
context->prio = 0;
if (auditd_test_task(current))
return;
......@@ -1693,7 +1704,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
* @return_code: return value of the syscall
*
* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
* auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
* auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from
* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
* free the names stored from getname().
......@@ -1735,12 +1746,12 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
audit_filter_syscall(current, context);
audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
if (context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
audit_log_exit();
}
context->in_syscall = 0;
context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
audit_free_module(context);
audit_free_names(context);
......@@ -1753,7 +1764,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
context->sockaddr_len = 0;
context->type = 0;
context->fds[0] = -1;
if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
if (context->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) {
kfree(context->filterkey);
context->filterkey = NULL;
}
......@@ -1765,6 +1776,7 @@ static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
struct audit_tree_refs *p;
struct audit_chunk *chunk;
int count;
if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
return;
context = audit_context();
......@@ -1806,8 +1818,10 @@ static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
for(;;) {
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
struct audit_chunk *chunk;
chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
if (chunk) {
if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
......@@ -2203,7 +2217,7 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
*serial = ctx->serial;
if (!ctx->prio) {
ctx->prio = 1;
ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
}
return 1;
}
......@@ -2285,6 +2299,7 @@ void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
......@@ -2298,6 +2313,7 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
......@@ -2362,6 +2378,7 @@ int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
context->fds[0] = fd1;
context->fds[1] = fd2;
}
......@@ -2379,6 +2396,7 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
if (!context->sockaddr) {
void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
context->sockaddr = p;
......@@ -2510,6 +2528,7 @@ int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
......@@ -2521,6 +2540,7 @@ void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
{
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
context->mmap.fd = fd;
context->mmap.flags = flags;
context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
......@@ -2686,6 +2706,7 @@ void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
{
struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
return NULL;
return &ctx->killed_trees;
......
security/lsm_audit.c
View file @ 290fe0fa
......@@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
return -EINVAL;
ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
ret = 0;
/* IPv6 can have several extension header before the Transport header
* skip them */
offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
......
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