ovl: filter trusted xattr for non-admin

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1765010

[ Upstream commit a082c6f6 ]

Filesystems filter out extended attributes in the "trusted." domain for
unprivlieged callers.

Overlay calls underlying filesystem's method with elevated privs, so need
to do the filtering in overlayfs too.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

fs/overlayfs/inode.c

@@ -272,6 +272,16 @@ ssize_t ovl_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	return vfs_getxattr(realpath.dentry, name, value, size);
 }
 
+static bool ovl_can_list(const char *s)
+{
+	/* List all non-trusted xatts */
+	if (strncmp(s, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN) != 0)
+		return true;
+
+	/* Never list trusted.overlay, list other trusted for superuser only */
+	return !ovl_is_private_xattr(s) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
 ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
 {
 	struct path realpath;
@@ -296,7 +306,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
 			return -EIO;
 
 		len -= slen;
-		if (ovl_is_private_xattr(s)) {
+		if (!ovl_can_list(s)) {
 			res -= slen;
 			memmove(s, s + slen, len);
 		} else {