Commit 408d53e9 authored by Mike Salvatore's avatar Mike Salvatore Committed by John Johansen

apparmor: compute file permissions on profile load

Rather than computing file permissions for each file access, file
permissions can be computed once on profile load and stored for lookup.
Signed-off-by: default avatarMike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
parent 2218d081
......@@ -624,7 +624,7 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
if (state) {
struct path_cond cond = { };
tmp = aa_compute_fperms(dfa, state, &cond);
tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(profile->file), state, &cond));
}
} else if (profile->policy.dfa) {
if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, *match_str))
......
......@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
if (!state)
goto fail;
}
*perms = aa_compute_fperms(profile->file.dfa, state, &cond);
*perms = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(profile->file), state, &cond));
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms);
if ((perms->allow & request) != request)
return -EACCES;
......@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
return 0;
next:
tmp = aa_compute_fperms(profile->file.dfa, state, &cond);
tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(profile->file), state, &cond));
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
......@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start);
if (!state)
goto fail;
tmp = aa_compute_fperms(profile->file.dfa, state, &cond);
tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(profile->file), state, &cond));
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
}
......@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
}
/* find exec permissions for name */
state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, cond, &perms);
state = aa_str_perms(&(profile->file), state, name, cond, &perms);
if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
/* exec permission determine how to transition */
new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target,
......@@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
}
/* find exec permissions for name */
state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, xname, cond, &perms);
state = aa_str_perms(&(profile->file), state, xname, cond, &perms);
if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) {
info = "no change_onexec valid for executable";
goto audit;
......
......@@ -201,49 +201,99 @@ static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old)
return new;
}
/**
* aa_compute_fperms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms
* @dfa: dfa to compute perms for (NOT NULL)
* @state: state in dfa
* @cond: conditions to consider (NOT NULL)
*
* TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry, do computation conversion
* at load time.
*
* Returns: computed permission set
*/
struct aa_perms aa_compute_fperms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
struct path_cond *cond)
static void __aa_compute_fperms_allow(struct aa_perms *perms,
struct aa_dfa *dfa,
unsigned int state)
{
perms->allow |= AA_MAY_GETATTR;
/* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000)
perms->allow |= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x40000000)
perms->allow |= AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
}
static struct aa_perms __aa_compute_fperms_user(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
unsigned int state)
{
/* FIXME: change over to new dfa format
* currently file perms are encoded in the dfa, new format
* splits the permissions from the dfa. This mapping can be
* done at profile load
*/
struct aa_perms perms = { };
if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond->uid)) {
perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state));
perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state));
perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state));
perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
} else {
__aa_compute_fperms_allow(&perms, dfa, state);
return perms;
}
static struct aa_perms __aa_compute_fperms_other(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
unsigned int state)
{
struct aa_perms perms = { };
perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(dfa, state));
perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_other_audit(dfa, state));
perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state));
perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state);
}
perms.allow |= AA_MAY_GETATTR;
/* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000)
perms.allow |= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x40000000)
perms.allow |= AA_MAY_ONEXEC;
__aa_compute_fperms_allow(&perms, dfa, state);
return perms;
}
/**
* aa_compute_fperms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms and store
* them so they can be retrieved later.
* @file_rules: a file_rules structure containing a dfa (NOT NULL) for which
* permissions will be computed (NOT NULL)
*
* TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry
*/
void aa_compute_fperms(struct aa_file_rules *file_rules)
{
int state;
int state_count = file_rules->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
// DFAs are restricted from having a state_count of less than 2
file_rules->fperms_table = kvzalloc(
state_count * 2 * sizeof(struct aa_perms), GFP_KERNEL);
// Since fperms_table is initialized with zeroes via kvzalloc(), we can
// skip the trap state (state == 0)
for (state = 1; state < state_count; state++) {
file_rules->fperms_table[state * 2] =
__aa_compute_fperms_user(file_rules->dfa, state);
file_rules->fperms_table[state * 2 + 1] =
__aa_compute_fperms_other(file_rules->dfa, state);
}
}
/**
* aa_lookup_fperms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms
* @dfa: dfa to lookup perms for (NOT NULL)
* @state: state in dfa
* @cond: conditions to consider (NOT NULL)
*
* TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry
*
* Returns: a pointer to a file permission set
*/
struct aa_perms default_perms = {};
struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_fperms(struct aa_file_rules *file_rules,
unsigned int state, struct path_cond *cond)
{
if (!(file_rules->fperms_table))
return &default_perms;
if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond->uid))
return &(file_rules->fperms_table[state * 2]);
return &(file_rules->fperms_table[state * 2 + 1]);
}
/**
* aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name
* @dfa: to match against (MAYBE NULL)
......@@ -254,13 +304,13 @@ struct aa_perms aa_compute_fperms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
*
* Returns: the final state in @dfa when beginning @start and walking @name
*/
unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_file_rules *file_rules, unsigned int start,
const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
struct aa_perms *perms)
{
unsigned int state;
state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, name);
*perms = aa_compute_fperms(dfa, state, cond);
state = aa_dfa_match(file_rules->dfa, start, name);
*perms = *(aa_lookup_fperms(file_rules, state, cond));
return state;
}
......@@ -273,7 +323,7 @@ int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
if (profile_unconfined(profile))
return 0;
aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, name, cond, perms);
aa_str_perms(&(profile->file), profile->file.start, name, cond, perms);
if (request & ~perms->allow)
e = -EACCES;
return aa_audit_file(profile, perms, op, request, name, NULL, NULL,
......@@ -380,7 +430,7 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
error = -EACCES;
/* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, lname,
state = aa_str_perms(&(profile->file), profile->file.start, lname,
cond, &lperms);
if (!(lperms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK))
......@@ -388,7 +438,7 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
/* test to see if target can be paired with link */
state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, tname, cond, &perms);
aa_str_perms(&(profile->file), state, tname, cond, &perms);
/* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
* in the link pair.
......@@ -410,7 +460,7 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
/* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are
* a subset of the allowed permissions on target.
*/
aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, tname, cond,
aa_str_perms(&(profile->file), profile->file.start, tname, cond,
&perms);
/* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
......
......@@ -181,11 +181,13 @@ struct aa_file_rules {
/* struct perms perms; */
struct aa_domain trans;
/* TODO: add delegate table */
struct aa_perms *fperms_table;
};
struct aa_perms aa_compute_fperms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
struct path_cond *cond);
unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
void aa_compute_fperms(struct aa_file_rules *file_rules);
struct aa_perms *aa_lookup_fperms(struct aa_file_rules *file_rules,
unsigned int state, struct path_cond *cond);
unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_file_rules *file_rules, unsigned int start,
const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
struct aa_perms *perms);
......@@ -204,10 +206,17 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
void aa_inherit_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files);
static inline void aa_free_fperms_table(struct aa_perms *fperms_table)
{
if (fperms_table)
kvfree(fperms_table);
}
static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)
{
aa_put_dfa(rules->dfa);
aa_free_domain_entries(&rules->trans);
aa_free_fperms_table(rules->fperms_table);
}
/**
......
......@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/cred.h"
#include "include/crypto.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/match.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
......@@ -878,6 +879,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
} else
profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
aa_compute_fperms(&(profile->file));
if (!unpack_trans_table(e, profile)) {
info = "failed to unpack profile transition table";
goto fail;
......
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