ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it

commit 77751427 upstream.

Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.

If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)

The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.

Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>

net/ipv6/addrconf.c

@@ -4656,6 +4656,21 @@ int addrconf_sysctl_forward(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static
+int addrconf_sysctl_mtu(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
+			void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct inet6_dev *idev = ctl->extra1;
+	int min_mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
+	struct ctl_table lctl;
+
+	lctl = *ctl;
+	lctl.extra1 = &min_mtu;
+	lctl.extra2 = idev ? &idev->dev->mtu : NULL;
+
+	return proc_dointvec_minmax(&lctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
 static void dev_disable_change(struct inet6_dev *idev)
 {
 	struct netdev_notifier_info info;
@@ -4767,7 +4782,7 @@ static struct addrconf_sysctl_table
 			.data		= &ipv6_devconf.mtu6,
 			.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
 			.mode		= 0644,
-			.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+			.proc_handler	= addrconf_sysctl_mtu,
 		},
 		{
 			.procname	= "accept_ra",