Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
   (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.

 - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
   sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.

 - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.

 - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
  selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
  KEYS: refcount bug fix
  ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
  IMA: policy can be updated zero times
  selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
  selinux: export validatetrans decisions
  gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
  selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
  security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
  selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
  selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
  keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
  keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
  keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
  tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
  tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
  tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
  tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
  ...

Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt

@@ -38,6 +38,15 @@ Usage:
        pcrlock=	     pcr number to be extended to "lock" blob
        migratable=   0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
                      default 1 (resealing allowed)
+       hash=         hash algorithm name as a string. For TPM 1.x the only
+                     allowed value is sha1. For TPM 2.x the allowed values
+                     are sha1, sha256, sha384, sha512 and sm3-256.
+       policydigest= digest for the authorization policy. must be calculated
+                     with the same hash algorithm as specified by the 'hash='
+                     option.
+       policyhandle= handle to an authorization policy session that defines the
+                     same policy and with the same hash algorithm as was used to
+                     seal the key.
 
 "keyctl print" returns an ascii hex copy of the sealed key, which is in standard
 TPM_STORED_DATA format.  The key length for new keys are always in bytes.

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c

@@ -321,6 +321,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 			goto error_free_cert;
 	} else if (!prep->trusted) {
 		ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());
+		if (ret)
+			ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_ima_mok_keyring());
 		if (!ret)
 			prep->trusted = 1;
 	}

crypto/hash_info.c

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ const char *const hash_algo_name[HASH_ALGO__LAST] = {
 	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_128]	= "tgr128",
 	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_160]	= "tgr160",
 	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_192]	= "tgr192",
+	[HASH_ALGO_SM3_256]	= "sm3-256",
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hash_algo_name);
 
@@ -52,5 +53,6 @@ const int hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO__LAST] = {
 	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_128]	= TGR128_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_160]	= TGR160_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	[HASH_ALGO_TGR_192]	= TGR192_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	[HASH_ALGO_SM3_256]	= SM3256_DIGEST_SIZE,
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hash_digest_size);

drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c

@@ -310,10 +310,12 @@ unsigned long tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 {
 	int duration_idx = TPM_UNDEFINED;
 	int duration = 0;
-	u8 category = (ordinal >> 24) & 0xFF;
 
-	if ((category == TPM_PROTECTED_COMMAND && ordinal < TPM_MAX_ORDINAL) ||
-	    (category == TPM_CONNECTION_COMMAND && ordinal < TSC_MAX_ORDINAL))
+	/*
+	 * We only have a duration table for protected commands, where the upper
+	 * 16 bits are 0. For the few other ordinals the fallback will be used.
+	 */
+	if (ordinal < TPM_MAX_ORDINAL)
 		duration_idx = tpm_ordinal_duration[ordinal];
 
 	if (duration_idx != TPM_UNDEFINED)
@@ -501,6 +503,21 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	struct duration_t *duration_cap;
 	ssize_t rc;
 
+	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
+		/* Fixed timeouts for TPM2 */
+		chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A);
+		chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_B);
+		chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_C);
+		chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_D);
+		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] =
+		    msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_SHORT);
+		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] =
+		    msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM);
+		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] =
+		    msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_LONG);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
 	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
 	tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);

drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h

@@ -83,16 +83,20 @@ enum tpm2_structures {
 };
 
 enum tpm2_return_codes {
-	TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE	= 0x0100,
-	TPM2_RC_TESTING		= 0x090A,
+	TPM2_RC_HASH		= 0x0083, /* RC_FMT1 */
+	TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE	= 0x0100, /* RC_VER1 */
 	TPM2_RC_DISABLED	= 0x0120,
+	TPM2_RC_TESTING		= 0x090A, /* RC_WARN */
 };
 
 enum tpm2_algorithms {
 	TPM2_ALG_SHA1		= 0x0004,
 	TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH	= 0x0008,
 	TPM2_ALG_SHA256		= 0x000B,
-	TPM2_ALG_NULL		= 0x0010
+	TPM2_ALG_SHA384		= 0x000C,
+	TPM2_ALG_SHA512		= 0x000D,
+	TPM2_ALG_NULL		= 0x0010,
+	TPM2_ALG_SM3_256	= 0x0012,
 };
 
 enum tpm2_command_codes {
@@ -138,7 +142,6 @@ struct tpm_vendor_specific {
 	unsigned long base;		/* TPM base address */
 
 	int irq;
-	int probed_irq;
 
 	int region_size;
 	int have_region;

drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "tpm.h"
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include <keys/trusted-type.h>
 
 enum tpm2_object_attributes {
@@ -104,6 +105,19 @@ struct tpm2_cmd {
 	union tpm2_cmd_params	params;
 } __packed;
 
+struct tpm2_hash {
+	unsigned int crypto_id;
+	unsigned int tpm_id;
+};
+
+static struct tpm2_hash tpm2_hash_map[] = {
+	{HASH_ALGO_SHA1, TPM2_ALG_SHA1},
+	{HASH_ALGO_SHA256, TPM2_ALG_SHA256},
+	{HASH_ALGO_SHA384, TPM2_ALG_SHA384},
+	{HASH_ALGO_SHA512, TPM2_ALG_SHA512},
+	{HASH_ALGO_SM3_256, TPM2_ALG_SM3_256},
+};
+
 /*
  * Array with one entry per ordinal defining the maximum amount
  * of time the chip could take to return the result. The values
@@ -429,8 +443,20 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 {
 	unsigned int blob_len;
 	struct tpm_buf buf;
+	u32 hash;
+	int i;
 	int rc;
 
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map); i++) {
+		if (options->hash == tpm2_hash_map[i].crypto_id) {
+			hash = tpm2_hash_map[i].tpm_id;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_hash_map))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -452,12 +478,26 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable);
 
 	/* public */
+	if (options->policydigest)
+		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->digest_len);
+	else
 		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14);
 
 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
-	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_SHA256);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
+
+	/* policy */
+	if (options->policydigest) {
+		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
+		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->digest_len);
+		tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
+			       options->digest_len);
+	} else {
 		tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH);
-	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); /* policy digest size */
+		tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+	}
+
+	/* public parameters */
 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_NULL);
 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
 
@@ -488,8 +528,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 out:
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 
-	if (rc > 0)
+	if (rc > 0) {
+		if ((rc & TPM2_RC_HASH) == TPM2_RC_HASH)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+		else
 			rc = -EPERM;
+	}
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -583,7 +627,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		return rc;
 
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle);
-	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
+	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf,
+			     options->policyhandle ?
+			     options->policyhandle : TPM2_RS_PW,
 			     NULL /* nonce */, 0,
 			     0 /* session_attributes */,
 			     options->blobauth /* hmac */,

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c

@@ -284,17 +284,9 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
 
 	chip->vendor.priv = priv;
 
-	/* Default timeouts and durations */
-	chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A);
-	chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_B);
-	chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_C);
-	chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_D);
-	chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] =
-		msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_SHORT);
-	chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] =
-		msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM);
-	chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] =
-		msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_LONG);
+	rc = tpm_get_timeouts(chip);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
 	chip->acpi_dev_handle = device->handle;
 

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c

@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	sig = wait_event_interruptible(ibmvtpm->wq, ibmvtpm->res_len != 0);
+	sig = wait_event_interruptible(ibmvtpm->wq, !ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd);
 	if (sig)
 		return -EINTR;
 
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
 	struct ibmvtpm_dev *ibmvtpm;
 	struct ibmvtpm_crq crq;
 	__be64 *word = (__be64 *)&crq;
-	int rc;
+	int rc, sig;
 
 	ibmvtpm = (struct ibmvtpm_dev *)TPM_VPRIV(chip);
 
@@ -141,18 +141,35 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
 		return -EIO;
 	}
 
+	if (ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd) {
+		dev_info(ibmvtpm->dev,
+		         "Need to wait for TPM to finish\n");
+		/* wait for previous command to finish */
+		sig = wait_event_interruptible(ibmvtpm->wq, !ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd);
+		if (sig)
+			return -EINTR;
+	}
+
 	spin_lock(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);
+	ibmvtpm->res_len = 0;
 	memcpy((void *)ibmvtpm->rtce_buf, (void *)buf, count);
 	crq.valid = (u8)IBMVTPM_VALID_CMD;
 	crq.msg = (u8)VTPM_TPM_COMMAND;
 	crq.len = cpu_to_be16(count);
 	crq.data = cpu_to_be32(ibmvtpm->rtce_dma_handle);
 
+	/*
+	 * set the processing flag before the Hcall, since we may get the
+	 * result (interrupt) before even being able to check rc.
+	 */
+	ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd = true;
+
 	rc = ibmvtpm_send_crq(ibmvtpm->vdev, be64_to_cpu(word[0]),
 			      be64_to_cpu(word[1]));
 	if (rc != H_SUCCESS) {
 		dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "tpm_ibmvtpm_send failed rc=%d\n", rc);
 		rc = 0;
+		ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd = false;
 	} else
 		rc = count;
 
@@ -515,6 +532,7 @@ static void ibmvtpm_crq_process(struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq,
 		case VTPM_TPM_COMMAND_RES:
 			/* len of the data in rtce buffer */
 			ibmvtpm->res_len = be16_to_cpu(crq->len);
+			ibmvtpm->tpm_processing_cmd = false;
 			wake_up_interruptible(&ibmvtpm->wq);
 			return;
 		default:

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.h

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ struct ibmvtpm_dev {
 	wait_queue_head_t wq;
 	u16 res_len;
 	u32 vtpm_version;
+	bool tpm_processing_cmd;
 };
 
 #define CRQ_RES_BUF_SIZE	PAGE_SIZE

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c

@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static void disable_interrupts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 	iowrite32(intmask,
 		  chip->vendor.iobase +
 		  TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality));
-	free_irq(chip->vendor.irq, chip);
+	devm_free_irq(chip->pdev, chip->vendor.irq, chip);
 	chip->vendor.irq = 0;
 }
 
@@ -461,11 +461,8 @@ static int tpm_tis_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
 	chip->vendor.irq = irq;
 	if (!priv->irq_tested)
 		msleep(1);
-	if (!priv->irq_tested) {
+	if (!priv->irq_tested)
 		disable_interrupts(chip);
-		dev_err(chip->pdev,
-			FW_BUG "TPM interrupt not working, polling instead\n");
-	}
 	priv->irq_tested = true;
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -570,26 +567,6 @@ static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_tis = {
 	.req_canceled = tpm_tis_req_canceled,
 };
 
-static irqreturn_t tis_int_probe(int irq, void *dev_id)
-{
-	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_id;
-	u32 interrupt;
-
-	interrupt = ioread32(chip->vendor.iobase +
-			     TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality));
-
-	if (interrupt == 0)
-		return IRQ_NONE;
-
-	chip->vendor.probed_irq = irq;
-
-	/* Clear interrupts handled with TPM_EOI */
-	iowrite32(interrupt,
-		  chip->vendor.iobase +
-		  TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality));
-	return IRQ_HANDLED;
-}
-
 static irqreturn_t tis_int_handler(int dummy, void *dev_id)
 {
 	struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_id;
@@ -622,6 +599,84 @@ static irqreturn_t tis_int_handler(int dummy, void *dev_id)
 	return IRQ_HANDLED;
 }
 
+/* Register the IRQ and issue a command that will cause an interrupt. If an
+ * irq is seen then leave the chip setup for IRQ operation, otherwise reverse
+ * everything and leave in polling mode. Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+static int tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 intmask,
+				    int flags, int irq)
+{
+	struct priv_data *priv = chip->vendor.priv;
+	u8 original_int_vec;
+
+	if (devm_request_irq(chip->pdev, irq, tis_int_handler, flags,
+			     chip->devname, chip) != 0) {
+		dev_info(chip->pdev, "Unable to request irq: %d for probe\n",
+			 irq);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	chip->vendor.irq = irq;
+
+	original_int_vec = ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase +
+				   TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality));
+	iowrite8(irq,
+		 chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality));
+
+	/* Clear all existing */
+	iowrite32(ioread32(chip->vendor.iobase +
+			   TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)),
+		  chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality));
+
+	/* Turn on */
+	iowrite32(intmask | TPM_GLOBAL_INT_ENABLE,
+		  chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality));
+
+	priv->irq_tested = false;
+
+	/* Generate an interrupt by having the core call through to
+	 * tpm_tis_send
+	 */
+	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+		tpm2_gen_interrupt(chip);
+	else
+		tpm_gen_interrupt(chip);
+
+	/* tpm_tis_send will either confirm the interrupt is working or it
+	 * will call disable_irq which undoes all of the above.
+	 */
+	if (!chip->vendor.irq) {
+		iowrite8(original_int_vec,
+			 chip->vendor.iobase +
+			     TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality));
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Try to find the IRQ the TPM is using. This is for legacy x86 systems that
+ * do not have ACPI/etc. We typically expect the interrupt to be declared if
+ * present.
+ */
+static void tpm_tis_probe_irq(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 intmask)
+{
+	u8 original_int_vec;
+	int i;
+
+	original_int_vec = ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase +
+				   TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality));
+
+	if (!original_int_vec) {
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86))
+			for (i = 3; i <= 15; i++)
+				if (!tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(chip, intmask, 0,
+							      i))
+					return;
+	} else if (!tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(chip, intmask, 0,
+					     original_int_vec))
+		return;
+}
+
 static bool interrupts = true;
 module_param(interrupts, bool, 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(interrupts, "Enable interrupts");
@@ -644,8 +699,7 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info,
 			acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle)
 {
 	u32 vendor, intfcaps, intmask;
-	int rc, i, irq_s, irq_e, probe;
-	int irq_r = -1;
+	int rc, probe;
 	struct tpm_chip *chip;
 	struct priv_data *priv;
 
@@ -677,6 +731,15 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info,
 		goto out_err;
 	}
 
+	/* Take control of the TPM's interrupt hardware and shut it off */
+	intmask = ioread32(chip->vendor.iobase +
+			   TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality));
+	intmask |= TPM_INTF_CMD_READY_INT | TPM_INTF_LOCALITY_CHANGE_INT |
+		   TPM_INTF_DATA_AVAIL_INT | TPM_INTF_STS_VALID_INT;
+	intmask &= ~TPM_GLOBAL_INT_ENABLE;
+	iowrite32(intmask,
+		  chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality));
+
 	if (request_locality(chip, 0) != 0) {
 		rc = -ENODEV;
 		goto out_err;
@@ -731,126 +794,31 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info,
 	if (intfcaps & TPM_INTF_DATA_AVAIL_INT)
 		dev_dbg(dev, "\tData Avail Int Support\n");
 
+	/* Very early on issue a command to the TPM in polling mode to make
+	 * sure it works. May as well use that command to set the proper
+	 *  timeouts for the driver.
+	 */
+	if (tpm_get_timeouts(chip)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Could not get TPM timeouts and durations\n");
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
+
 	/* INTERRUPT Setup */
 	init_waitqueue_head(&chip->vendor.read_queue);
 	init_waitqueue_head(&chip->vendor.int_queue);
-
-	intmask =
-	    ioread32(chip->vendor.iobase +
-		     TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality));
-
-	intmask |= TPM_INTF_CMD_READY_INT
-	    | TPM_INTF_LOCALITY_CHANGE_INT | TPM_INTF_DATA_AVAIL_INT
-	    | TPM_INTF_STS_VALID_INT;
-
-	iowrite32(intmask,
-		  chip->vendor.iobase +
-		  TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality));
-	if (interrupts)
-		chip->vendor.irq = tpm_info->irq;
-	if (interrupts && !chip->vendor.irq) {
-		irq_s =
-		    ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase +
-			    TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality));
-		irq_r = irq_s;
-		if (irq_s) {
-			irq_e = irq_s;
-		} else {
-			irq_s = 3;
-			irq_e = 15;
-		}
-
-		for (i = irq_s; i <= irq_e && chip->vendor.irq == 0; i++) {
-			iowrite8(i, chip->vendor.iobase +
-				 TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality));
-			if (devm_request_irq
-			    (dev, i, tis_int_probe, IRQF_SHARED,
-			     chip->devname, chip) != 0) {
-				dev_info(chip->pdev,
-					 "Unable to request irq: %d for probe\n",
-					 i);
-				continue;
-			}
-
-			/* Clear all existing */
-			iowrite32(ioread32
-				  (chip->vendor.iobase +
-				   TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)),
-				  chip->vendor.iobase +
-				  TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality));
-
-			/* Turn on */
-			iowrite32(intmask | TPM_GLOBAL_INT_ENABLE,
-				  chip->vendor.iobase +
-				  TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality));
-
-			chip->vendor.probed_irq = 0;
-
-			/* Generate Interrupts */
-			if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
-				tpm2_gen_interrupt(chip);
-			else
-				tpm_gen_interrupt(chip);
-
-			chip->vendor.irq = chip->vendor.probed_irq;
-
-			/* free_irq will call into tis_int_probe;
-			   clear all irqs we haven't seen while doing
-			   tpm_gen_interrupt */
-			iowrite32(ioread32
-				  (chip->vendor.iobase +
-				   TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)),
-				  chip->vendor.iobase +
-				  TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality));
-
-			/* Turn off */
-			iowrite32(intmask,
-				  chip->vendor.iobase +
-				  TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality));
-
-			devm_free_irq(dev, i, chip);
-		}
-	}
-	if (chip->vendor.irq) {
-		iowrite8(chip->vendor.irq,
-			 chip->vendor.iobase +
-			 TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality));
-		if (devm_request_irq
-		    (dev, chip->vendor.irq, tis_int_handler, IRQF_SHARED,
-		     chip->devname, chip) != 0) {
-			dev_info(chip->pdev,
-				 "Unable to request irq: %d for use\n",
-				 chip->vendor.irq);
-			chip->vendor.irq = 0;
-		} else {
-			/* Clear all existing */
-			iowrite32(ioread32
-				  (chip->vendor.iobase +
-				   TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality)),
-				  chip->vendor.iobase +
-				  TPM_INT_STATUS(chip->vendor.locality));
-
-			/* Turn on */
-			iowrite32(intmask | TPM_GLOBAL_INT_ENABLE,
-				  chip->vendor.iobase +
-				  TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality));
+	if (interrupts) {
+		if (tpm_info->irq) {
+			tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(chip, intmask, IRQF_SHARED,
+						 tpm_info->irq);
+			if (!chip->vendor.irq)
+				dev_err(chip->pdev, FW_BUG
+					"TPM interrupt not working, polling instead\n");
+		} else
+			tpm_tis_probe_irq(chip, intmask);
 	}
-	} else if (irq_r != -1)
-		iowrite8(irq_r, chip->vendor.iobase +
-			 TPM_INT_VECTOR(chip->vendor.locality));
 
 	if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
-		chip->vendor.timeout_a = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_A);
-		chip->vendor.timeout_b = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_B);
-		chip->vendor.timeout_c = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_C);
-		chip->vendor.timeout_d = msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_TIMEOUT_D);
-		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] =
-			msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_SHORT);
-		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] =
-			msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_MEDIUM);
-		chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] =
-			msecs_to_jiffies(TPM2_DURATION_LONG);
-
 		rc = tpm2_do_selftest(chip);
 		if (rc == TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE) {
 			dev_warn(dev, "Firmware has not started TPM\n");
@@ -866,12 +834,6 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info,
 			goto out_err;
 		}
 	} else {
-		if (tpm_get_timeouts(chip)) {
-			dev_err(dev, "Could not get TPM timeouts and durations\n");
-			rc = -ENODEV;
-			goto out_err;
-		}
-
 		if (tpm_do_selftest(chip)) {
 			dev_err(dev, "TPM self test failed\n");
 			rc = -ENODEV;

fs/gfs2/glops.c

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/gfs2_ondisk.h>
 #include <linux/bio.h>
 #include <linux/posix_acl.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include "gfs2.h"
 #include "incore.h"
@@ -262,6 +263,7 @@ static void inode_go_inval(struct gfs2_glock *gl, int flags)
 		if (ip) {
 			set_bit(GIF_INVALID, &ip->i_flags);
 			forget_all_cached_acls(&ip->i_inode);
+			security_inode_invalidate_secctx(&ip->i_inode);
 			gfs2_dir_hash_inval(ip);
 		}
 	}

include/crypto/hash_info.h

@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
 #define TGR160_DIGEST_SIZE 20
 #define TGR192_DIGEST_SIZE 24
 
+/* not defined in include/crypto/ */
+#define SM3256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
+
 extern const char *const hash_algo_name[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
 extern const int hash_digest_size[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
 

include/keys/system_keyring.h

@@ -35,4 +35,28 @@ extern int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
 			      enum key_being_used_for usage);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING
+extern struct key *ima_mok_keyring;
+extern struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring;
+
+static inline struct key *get_ima_mok_keyring(void)
+{
+	return ima_mok_keyring;
+}
+static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void)
+{
+	return ima_blacklist_keyring;
+}
+#else
+static inline struct key *get_ima_mok_keyring(void)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+static inline struct key *get_ima_blacklist_keyring(void)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING */
+
+
 #endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */

include/keys/trusted-type.h

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE			128
 #define MAX_BLOB_SIZE			512
 #define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE		64
+#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE			64
 
 struct trusted_key_payload {
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
@@ -36,6 +37,10 @@ struct trusted_key_options {
 	uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
 	unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
 	int pcrlock;
+	uint32_t hash;
+	uint32_t digest_len;
+	unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	uint32_t policyhandle;
 };
 
 extern struct key_type key_type_trusted;

include/linux/audit.h

@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ extern void __audit_getname(struct filename *name);
 extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 				unsigned int flags);
 extern void __audit_file(const struct file *);
-extern void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
+extern void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 				const struct dentry *dentry,
 				const unsigned char type);
 extern void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code);
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name,
 		__audit_inode(name, dentry,
 				AUDIT_INODE_PARENT | AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN);
 }
-static inline void audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
+static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 				     const struct dentry *dentry,
 				     const unsigned char type) {
 	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static inline void __audit_inode(struct filename *name,
 					const struct dentry *dentry,
 					unsigned int flags)
 { }
-static inline void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
+static inline void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 					const struct dentry *dentry,
 					const unsigned char type)
 { }
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ static inline void audit_file(struct file *file)
 static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name,
 				const struct dentry *dentry)
 { }
-static inline void audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
+static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 				     const struct dentry *dentry,
 				     const unsigned char type)
 { }

include/linux/capability.h

@@ -145,24 +145,24 @@ static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(const kernel_cap_t c)
 	return dest;
 }
 
-static inline int cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
+static inline bool cap_isclear(const kernel_cap_t a)
 {
 	unsigned __capi;
 	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
 		if (a.cap[__capi] != 0)
-			return 0;
+			return false;
 	}
-	return 1;
+	return true;
 }
 
 /*
  * Check if "a" is a subset of "set".
- * return 1 if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
- *	cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return 1
- * return 0 if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
- *	cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return 0
+ * return true if ALL of the capabilities in "a" are also in "set"
+ *	cap_issubset(0101, 1111) will return true
+ * return false if ANY of the capabilities in "a" are not in "set"
+ *	cap_issubset(1111, 0101) will return false
  */
-static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
+static inline bool cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
 {
 	kernel_cap_t dest;
 	dest = cap_drop(a, set);
@@ -171,12 +171,6 @@ static inline int cap_issubset(const kernel_cap_t a, const kernel_cap_t set)
 
 /* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
 
-static inline int cap_is_fs_cap(int cap)
-{
-	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;
-	return !!(CAP_TO_MASK(cap) & __cap_fs_set.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)]);
-}
-
 static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop_fs_set(const kernel_cap_t a)
 {
 	const kernel_cap_t __cap_fs_set = CAP_FS_SET;

include/linux/evm.h

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 struct integrity_iint_cache;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EVM
+extern int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen);
 extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 					     const char *xattr_name,
 					     void *xattr_value,
@@ -42,6 +43,12 @@ static inline int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname)
 }
 #endif
 #else
+
+static inline int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY
 static inline enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 						    const char *xattr_name,

include/linux/key.h

@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ struct key {
 #define KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY	9	/* set if keyring only accepts links to trusted keys */
 #define KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN	10	/* set if key is builtin */
 #define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL	11	/* set if key can be invalidated by root without permission */
+#define KEY_FLAG_KEEP		12	/* set if key should not be removed */
 
 	/* the key type and key description string
 	 * - the desc is used to match a key against search criteria

include/linux/lsm_hooks.h

@@ -1261,6 +1261,10 @@
  *	audit_rule_init.
  *	@rule contains the allocated rule
  *
+ * @inode_invalidate_secctx:
+ *	Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context
+ *	of an inode.
+ *
  * @inode_notifysecctx:
  *	Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode
  *	should be.  Initializes the incore security context managed by the
@@ -1413,14 +1417,14 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*inode_removexattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
 	int (*inode_need_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry);
 	int (*inode_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+	int (*inode_getsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 					void **buffer, bool alloc);
 	int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 					const void *value, size_t size,
 					int flags);
 	int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
 					size_t buffer_size);
-	void (*inode_getsecid)(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+	void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
 
 	int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask);
 	int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);
@@ -1516,6 +1520,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 	void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
+	void (*inode_invalidate_secctx)(struct inode *inode);
 	int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 	int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 	int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
@@ -1757,6 +1762,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
 	struct list_head secid_to_secctx;
 	struct list_head secctx_to_secid;
 	struct list_head release_secctx;
+	struct list_head inode_invalidate_secctx;
 	struct list_head inode_notifysecctx;
 	struct list_head inode_setsecctx;
 	struct list_head inode_getsecctx;

include/linux/security.h

@@ -270,10 +270,10 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
-int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
+int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
 void security_file_free(struct file *file);
@@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
+void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
@@ -719,7 +720,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return cap_inode_killpriv(dentry);
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
+static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
@@ -734,7 +735,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 {
 	*secid = 0;
 }
@@ -1093,6 +1094,10 @@ static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+static inline void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
+{
+}
+
 static inline int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;

include/uapi/linux/hash_info.h

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ enum hash_algo {
 	HASH_ALGO_TGR_128,
 	HASH_ALGO_TGR_160,
 	HASH_ALGO_TGR_192,
+	HASH_ALGO_SM3_256,
 	HASH_ALGO__LAST
 };
 

kernel/audit.c

@@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 
 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
 void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
-		      const struct inode *inode)
+		      struct inode *inode)
 {
 	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
 	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;

kernel/audit.h

@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ extern u32 audit_ever_enabled;
 
 extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
 			     const struct dentry *dentry,
-			     const struct inode *inode);
+			     struct inode *inode);
 extern void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
 			  kernel_cap_t *cap);
 extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context,

kernel/auditsc.c

@@ -1754,7 +1754,7 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 		   unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-	const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	struct audit_names *n;
 	bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
 
@@ -1848,12 +1848,12 @@ void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
  * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
  * unsuccessful attempts.
  */
-void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
+void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 			 const struct dentry *dentry,
 			 const unsigned char type)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-	const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 	const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
 	struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
 

security/integrity/Kconfig

@@ -41,6 +41,17 @@ config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 	  This option enables digital signature verification using
 	  asymmetric keys.
 
+config INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	bool "Require all keys on the integrity keyrings be signed"
+	depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
+	default y
+	help
+	   This option requires that all keys added to the .ima and
+	   .evm keyrings be signed by a key on the system trusted
+	   keyring.
+
 config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
 	bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
 	depends on AUDIT

security/integrity/digsig.c

@@ -24,15 +24,22 @@
 static struct key *keyring[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX];
 
 static const char *keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
+#ifndef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	"_evm",
-	"_module",
-#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	"_ima",
 #else
+	".evm",
 	".ima",
 #endif
+	"_module",
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+static bool init_keyring __initdata = true;
+#else
+static bool init_keyring __initdata;
+#endif
+
 int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
 			    const char *digest, int digestlen)
 {
@@ -68,6 +75,9 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (!init_keyring)
+		return 0;
+
 	keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0),
 				    KGIDT_INIT(0), cred,
 				    ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |

security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 
 #include "integrity.h"
 
@@ -32,9 +33,22 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid)
 
 	pr_debug("key search: \"%s\"\n", name);
 
+	key = get_ima_blacklist_keyring();
+	if (key) {
+		key_ref_t kref;
+
+		kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(key, 1),
+				     &key_type_asymmetric, name);
+		if (!IS_ERR(kref)) {
+			pr_err("Key '%s' is in ima_blacklist_keyring\n", name);
+			return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (keyring) {
 		/* search in specific keyring */
 		key_ref_t kref;
+
 		kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
 				      &key_type_asymmetric, name);
 		if (IS_ERR(kref))

security/integrity/evm/Kconfig

@@ -42,3 +42,20 @@ config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
 	  additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
 	  labeled file systems to be relabeled.
 
+config EVM_LOAD_X509
+	bool "Load an X509 certificate onto the '.evm' trusted keyring"
+	depends on EVM && INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default n
+	help
+	   Load an X509 certificate onto the '.evm' trusted keyring.
+
+	   This option enables X509 certificate loading from the kernel
+	   onto the '.evm' trusted keyring.  A public key can be used to
+	   verify EVM integrity starting from the 'init' process.
+
+config EVM_X509_PATH
+	string "EVM X509 certificate path"
+	depends on EVM_LOAD_X509
+	default "/etc/keys/x509_evm.der"
+	help
+	   This option defines X509 certificate path.

security/integrity/evm/evm.h

@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
 
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
+#define EVM_INIT_HMAC	0x0001
+#define EVM_INIT_X509	0x0002
+
 extern int evm_initialized;
 extern char *evm_hmac;
 extern char *evm_hash;

security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include "evm.h"
@@ -32,6 +33,44 @@ struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
 
+#define EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY 0
+
+static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;
+
+/**
+ * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
+ * @key: pointer to a buffer with the key data
+ * @size: length of the key data
+ *
+ * This function allows setting the EVM HMAC key from the kernel
+ * without using the "encrypted" key subsystem keys. It can be used
+ * by the crypto HW kernel module which has its own way of managing
+ * keys.
+ *
+ * key length should be between 32 and 128 bytes long
+ */
+int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = -EBUSY;
+	if (test_and_set_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags))
+		goto busy;
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
+		goto inval;
+	memcpy(evmkey, key, keylen);
+	evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_HMAC;
+	pr_info("key initialized\n");
+	return 0;
+inval:
+	clear_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags);
+busy:
+	pr_err("key initialization failed\n");
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key);
+
 static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type)
 {
 	long rc;
@@ -40,6 +79,10 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type)
 	struct shash_desc *desc;
 
 	if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
+		if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) {
+			pr_err("HMAC key is not set\n");
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		}
 		tfm = &hmac_tfm;
 		algo = evm_hmac;
 	} else {
@@ -240,7 +283,7 @@ int evm_init_key(void)
 {
 	struct key *evm_key;
 	struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
-	int rc = 0;
+	int rc;
 
 	evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(evm_key))
@@ -248,12 +291,9 @@ int evm_init_key(void)
 
 	down_read(&evm_key->sem);
 	ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0];
-	if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
-		rc = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	memcpy(evmkey, ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
-out:
+
+	rc = evm_set_key(ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
+
 	/* burn the original key contents */
 	memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
 	up_read(&evm_key->sem);

security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c

@@ -358,6 +358,15 @@ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
+static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+
+	iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
+	if (iint)
+		iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
 /**
  * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes
  * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry
@@ -378,6 +387,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 				 && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)))
 		return;
 
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
 }
 
@@ -396,6 +407,8 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
 	if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
 		return;
 
+	evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode);
+
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
 }
 
@@ -472,21 +485,34 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
+void __init evm_load_x509(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH);
+	if (!rc)
+		evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509;
+}
+#endif
+
 static int __init init_evm(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
 	evm_init_config();
 
+	error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
 	error = evm_init_secfs();
 	if (error < 0) {
 		pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
-		goto err;
+		return error;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
-err:
-	return error;
 }
 
 /*

security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c

@@ -62,9 +62,9 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	char temp[80];
-	int i, error;
+	int i;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_initialized)
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
@@ -78,12 +78,8 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if ((sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) || (i != 1))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	error = evm_init_key();
-	if (!error) {
-		evm_initialized = 1;
-		pr_info("initialized\n");
-	} else
-		pr_err("initialization failed\n");
+	evm_init_key();
+
 	return count;
 }
 

security/integrity/iint.c

@@ -255,4 +255,5 @@ int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data)
 void __init integrity_load_keys(void)
 {
 	ima_load_x509();
+	evm_load_x509();
 }

security/integrity/ima/Kconfig

@@ -107,6 +107,27 @@ config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH
 	default "sha512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512
 	default "wp512" if IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512
 
+config IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+	bool "Enable multiple writes to the IMA policy"
+	depends on IMA
+	default n
+	help
+	  IMA policy can now be updated multiple times.  The new rules get
+	  appended to the original policy.  Have in mind that the rules are
+	  scanned in FIFO order so be careful when you design and add new ones.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
+config IMA_READ_POLICY
+	bool "Enable reading back the current IMA policy"
+	depends on IMA
+	default y if IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+	default n if !IMA_WRITE_POLICY
+	help
+	   It is often useful to be able to read back the IMA policy.  It is
+	   even more important after introducing CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
+	   This option allows the root user to see the current policy rules.
+
 config IMA_APPRAISE
 	bool "Appraise integrity measurements"
 	depends on IMA
@@ -123,14 +144,35 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
 config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-	bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed"
+	bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed (deprecated)"
 	depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+	select INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	default y
 	help
 	   This option requires that all keys added to the .ima
 	   keyring be signed by a key on the system trusted keyring.
 
+	   This option is deprecated in favor of INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+
+config IMA_MOK_KEYRING
+	bool "Create IMA machine owner keys (MOK) and blacklist keyrings"
+	depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+	default n
+	help
+	   This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings.  IMA MOK is an
+	   intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings,
+	   effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy.  To successfully import a
+	   key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system
+	   keyring.  On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be
+	   signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty
+	   at kernel boot.
+
+	   IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys.  It is consulted
+	   before any other keyring.  If the search is successful the requested
+	   operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller.
+
 config IMA_LOAD_X509
 	bool "Load X509 certificate onto the '.ima' trusted keyring"
 	depends on IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING

security/integrity/ima/Makefile

@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_MOK_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o

security/integrity/ima/ima.h

@@ -166,6 +166,11 @@ void ima_update_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
 void ima_delete_rules(void);
+int ima_check_policy(void);
+void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);
+void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos);
+void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
+int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
 
 /* Appraise integrity measurements */
 #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE	0x01
@@ -250,17 +255,12 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING
-static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
-{
-	return integrity_init_keyring(id);
-}
+#ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
+#define	POLICY_FILE_FLAGS	(S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
 #else
-static inline int ima_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
-#endif
+#define	POLICY_FILE_FLAGS	S_IWUSR
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY */
+
+#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */

security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c

@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_write_mutex);
+
 static int valid_policy = 1;
 #define TMPBUFLEN 12
 static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count,
@@ -259,7 +261,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
 static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	char *data = NULL;
+	char *data;
 	ssize_t result;
 
 	if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE)
@@ -279,13 +281,20 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	result = -EFAULT;
 	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, datalen))
-		goto out;
+		goto out_free;
 
+	result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex);
+	if (result < 0)
+		goto out_free;
 	result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+	mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
+
+out_free:
+	kfree(data);
 out:
 	if (result < 0)
 		valid_policy = 0;
-	kfree(data);
+
 	return result;
 }
 
@@ -302,14 +311,31 @@ enum ima_fs_flags {
 
 static unsigned long ima_fs_flags;
 
+#ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
+static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = {
+		.start = ima_policy_start,
+		.next = ima_policy_next,
+		.stop = ima_policy_stop,
+		.show = ima_policy_show,
+};
+#endif
+
 /*
  * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
  */
 static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
-	/* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
-	if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
+	if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) {
+#ifndef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
+		return -EACCES;
+#else
+		if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY)
 			return -EACCES;
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			return -EPERM;
+		return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops);
+#endif
+	}
 	if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags))
 		return -EBUSY;
 	return 0;
@@ -326,6 +352,14 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
 	const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed";
 
+	if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) {
+		cause = "failed";
+		valid_policy = 0;
+	}
+
 	pr_info("IMA: policy update %s\n", cause);
 	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
 			    "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0);
@@ -336,15 +370,21 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 		clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
+
 	ima_update_policy();
+#ifndef	CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
 	securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
 	ima_policy = NULL;
+#else
+	clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
+#endif
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
 	.open = ima_open_policy,
 	.write = ima_write_policy,
+	.read = seq_read,
 	.release = ima_release_policy,
 	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
 };
@@ -382,8 +422,7 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 	if (IS_ERR(violations))
 		goto out;
 
-	ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy",
-					    S_IWUSR,
+	ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS,
 					    ima_dir, NULL,
 					    &ima_measure_policy_ops);
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_policy))

security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c

@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
 		pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
 
-	rc = ima_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
+	rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 

security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c

+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Juniper Networks, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Petko Manolov <petko.manolov@konsulko.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
+
+
+struct key *ima_mok_keyring;
+struct key *ima_blacklist_keyring;
+
+/*
+ * Allocate the IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings
+ */
+__init int ima_mok_init(void)
+{
+	pr_notice("Allocating IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings.\n");
+
+	ima_mok_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_mok",
+			      KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
+			      (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
+			      KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
+			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+
+	ima_blacklist_keyring = keyring_alloc(".ima_blacklist",
+				KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
+				(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
+				KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
+				KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
+				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
+
+	if (IS_ERR(ima_mok_keyring) || IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring))
+		panic("Can't allocate IMA MOK or blacklist keyrings.");
+	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &ima_mok_keyring->flags);
+
+	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags);
+	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags);
+	return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(ima_mok_init);

security/integrity/integrity.h

@@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
 int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data);
 
 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM		0
-#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE	1
-#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA		2
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA		1
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE	2
 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX		3
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
@@ -149,7 +149,6 @@ static inline int integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
@@ -171,6 +170,14 @@ static inline void ima_load_x509(void)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
+void __init evm_load_x509(void);
+#else
+static inline void evm_load_x509(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
 /* declarations */
 void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,

security/keys/Kconfig

@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS
 	select CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
+	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
 	help
 	  This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing
 	  keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,

security/keys/key.c

@@ -429,8 +429,11 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 				awaken = 1;
 
 			/* and link it into the destination keyring */
-			if (keyring)
+			if (keyring) {
+				set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags);
+
 				__key_link(key, _edit);
+			}
 
 			/* disable the authorisation key */
 			if (authkey)

security/keys/keyctl.c

@@ -358,11 +358,14 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
  * and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after a
  * certain amount of time (/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay).
  *
+ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be revoked.
+ *
  * If successful, 0 is returned.
  */
 long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
 {
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	struct key *key;
 	long ret;
 
 	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
@@ -377,8 +380,12 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
 		}
 	}
 
-	key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 	ret = 0;
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else
+		key_revoke(key);
 
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
 error:
@@ -392,11 +399,14 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
  * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
  * immediately.
  *
+ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be invalidated.
+ *
  * If successful, 0 is returned.
  */
 long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
 {
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
+	struct key *key;
 	long ret;
 
 	kenter("%d", id);
@@ -420,8 +430,12 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
 	}
 
 invalidate:
-	key_invalidate(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 	ret = 0;
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else
+		key_invalidate(key);
 error_put:
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
 error:
@@ -433,12 +447,13 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
  * Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the
  * special keyring IDs is used.
  *
- * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work.  If
- * successful, 0 will be returned.
+ * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission and not have
+ * KEY_FLAG_KEEP set for this to work.  If successful, 0 will be returned.
  */
 long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
 {
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref;
+	struct key *keyring;
 	long ret;
 
 	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
@@ -460,7 +475,11 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
 	}
 
 clear:
-	ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref));
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else
+		ret = keyring_clear(keyring);
 error_put:
 	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
 error:
@@ -511,11 +530,14 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
  * itself need not grant the caller anything.  If the last link to a key is
  * removed then that key will be scheduled for destruction.
  *
+ * Keys or keyrings with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be unlinked.
+ *
  * If successful, 0 will be returned.
  */
 long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 {
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
+	struct key *keyring, *key;
 	long ret;
 
 	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
@@ -530,7 +552,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 		goto error2;
 	}
 
-	ret = key_unlink(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
+	keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref);
+	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &keyring->flags) &&
+	    test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else
+		ret = key_unlink(keyring, key);
 
 	key_ref_put(key_ref);
 error2:
@@ -1289,6 +1317,8 @@ long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
  * the current time.  The key and any links to the key will be automatically
  * garbage collected after the timeout expires.
  *
+ * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be timed out.
+ *
  * If successful, 0 is returned.
  */
 long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
@@ -1320,10 +1350,13 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
 
 okay:
 	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	ret = 0;
+	if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &key->flags))
+		ret = -EPERM;
+	else
 		key_set_timeout(key, timeout);
 	key_put(key);
 
-	ret = 0;
 error:
 	return ret;
 }

security/keys/trusted.c

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
  * See Documentation/security/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt
  */
 
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
@@ -710,7 +711,10 @@ enum {
 	Opt_err = -1,
 	Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update,
 	Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth,
-	Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable
+	Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable,
+	Opt_hash,
+	Opt_policydigest,
+	Opt_policyhandle,
 };
 
 static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
@@ -723,6 +727,9 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
 	{Opt_pcrinfo, "pcrinfo=%s"},
 	{Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"},
 	{Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"},
+	{Opt_hash, "hash=%s"},
+	{Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"},
+	{Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -736,11 +743,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
 	int res;
 	unsigned long handle;
 	unsigned long lock;
+	unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+	int i;
+	int tpm2;
+
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM);
+	if (tpm2 < 0)
+		return tpm2;
+
+	opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+	opt->digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
 
 	while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
 		if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
 			continue;
 		token = match_token(p, key_tokens, args);
+		if (test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask))
+			return -EINVAL;
 
 		switch (token) {
 		case Opt_pcrinfo:
@@ -787,6 +806,41 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
 				return -EINVAL;
 			opt->pcrlock = lock;
 			break;
+		case Opt_hash:
+			if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
+				if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
+					opt->hash = i;
+					opt->digest_len =
+						hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			if  (!tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
+				pr_info("trusted_key: TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			break;
+		case Opt_policydigest:
+			if (!tpm2 ||
+			    strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * opt->digest_len))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
+				      opt->digest_len);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		case Opt_policyhandle:
+			if (!tpm2)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
+			if (res < 0)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			opt->policyhandle = handle;
+			break;
 		default:
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}

security/security.c

@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, dentry);
 }
 
-int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
+int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
 
-void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 {
 	call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
 }
@@ -1161,6 +1161,12 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
+void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
+
 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
@@ -1763,6 +1769,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid),
 	.release_secctx =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.release_secctx),
+	.inode_invalidate_secctx =
+		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_invalidate_secctx),
 	.inode_notifysecctx =
 		LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_notifysecctx),
 	.inode_setsecctx =

security/selinux/include/classmap.h

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	  { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member",
 	    "check_context", "load_policy", "compute_relabel",
 	    "compute_user", "setenforce", "setbool", "setsecparam",
-	    "setcheckreqprot", "read_policy", NULL } },
+	    "setcheckreqprot", "read_policy", "validate_trans", NULL } },
 	{ "process",
 	  { "fork", "transition", "sigchld", "sigkill",
 	    "sigstop", "signull", "signal", "ptrace", "getsched", "setsched",

security/selinux/include/objsec.h

@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ struct task_security_struct {
 	u32 sockcreate_sid;	/* fscreate SID */
 };
 
+enum label_initialized {
+	LABEL_MISSING,		/* not initialized */
+	LABEL_INITIALIZED,	/* inizialized */
+	LABEL_INVALID		/* invalid */
+};
+
 struct inode_security_struct {
 	struct inode *inode;	/* back pointer to inode object */
 	union {

security/selinux/include/security.h

@@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 				 u16 tclass);
 
+int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				      u16 tclass);
+
 int security_bounded_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid);
 
 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);

security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ enum sel_inos {
 	SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */
 	SEL_STATUS,	/* export current status using mmap() */
 	SEL_POLICY,	/* allow userspace to read the in kernel policy */
+	SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS, /* compute validatetrans decision */
 	SEL_INO_NEXT,	/* The next inode number to use */
 };
 
@@ -632,6 +633,83 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
+static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
+					const char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *oldcon = NULL, *newcon = NULL, *taskcon = NULL;
+	char *req = NULL;
+	u32 osid, nsid, tsid;
+	u16 tclass;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__VALIDATE_TRANS);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* No partial writes. */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	req = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(req, buf, count))
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+	oldcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!oldcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	newcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!newcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	taskcon = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!taskcon)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (sscanf(req, "%s %s %hu %s", oldcon, newcon, &tclass, taskcon) != 4)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(oldcon, &osid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(newcon, &nsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(taskcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out;
+
+	rc = security_validate_transition_user(osid, nsid, tsid, tclass);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = count;
+out:
+	kfree(req);
+	kfree(oldcon);
+	kfree(newcon);
+	kfree(taskcon);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_transition_ops = {
+	.write		= sel_write_validatetrans,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
 /*
  * Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c
  */
@@ -1727,6 +1805,8 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 		[SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
 		[SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
 		[SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO},
+		[SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops,
+					S_IWUGO},
 		/* last one */ {""}
 	};
 	ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);

security/selinux/ss/services.c

@@ -778,8 +778,8 @@ static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
-int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
-				 u16 orig_tclass)
+static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+					  u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
 {
 	struct context *ocontext;
 	struct context *ncontext;
@@ -794,11 +794,12 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 
 	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
+	if (!user)
 		tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+	else
+		tclass = orig_tclass;
 
 	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
-		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %d\n",
-			__func__, tclass);
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -832,8 +833,13 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 	while (constraint) {
 		if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
 					  constraint->expr)) {
-			rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
-							     tcontext, tclass);
+			if (user)
+				rc = -EPERM;
+			else
+				rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext,
+								     ncontext,
+								     tcontext,
+								     tclass);
 			goto out;
 		}
 		constraint = constraint->next;
@@ -844,6 +850,20 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+					u16 tclass)
+{
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+						tclass, true);
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				 u16 orig_tclass)
+{
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+						orig_tclass, false);
+}
+
 /*
  * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
  * transition is directed to bounded, or not.

security/smack/smack_lsm.c

@@ -1465,7 +1465,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
  *
  * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
  */
-static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
+static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode,
 				   const char *name, void **buffer,
 				   bool alloc)
 {
@@ -1536,7 +1536,7 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
  * @inode: inode to extract the info from
  * @secid: where result will be saved
  */
-static void smack_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
 {
 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
 
@@ -1858,12 +1858,34 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
 	int may = 0;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
 
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+
+	if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
+		sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
+		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		tsp = current_security();
+		/*
+		 * If the receiving process can't write to the
+		 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
+		 * write to the receiving process don't accept
+		 * the passed socket.
+		 */
+		rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			return rc;
+		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * This code relies on bitmasks.
 	 */
@@ -3756,7 +3778,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	if (sip == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
-	switch (sip->sin_family) {
+	switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
 	case AF_INET:
 		rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
 		break;