Commit 59a6dc26 authored by Jeremy Linton's avatar Jeremy Linton Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman

arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation

[ Upstream commit e5ce5e72 ]

There are various reasons, such as benchmarking, to disable spectrev2
mitigation on a machine. Provide a command-line option to do so.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarSuzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tested-by: default avatarStefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent c131623b
...@@ -2866,10 +2866,10 @@ ...@@ -2866,10 +2866,10 @@
(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks (bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks
are possible in the system. are possible in the system.
nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E,ARM64] Disable all mitigations for
(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may the Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch prediction)
allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent vulnerability. System may allow data leaks with this
to spectre_v2=off. option.
nospec_store_bypass_disable nospec_store_bypass_disable
[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability [HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
......
...@@ -189,6 +189,14 @@ static void qcom_link_stack_sanitization(void) ...@@ -189,6 +189,14 @@ static void qcom_link_stack_sanitization(void)
: "=&r" (tmp)); : "=&r" (tmp));
} }
static bool __nospectre_v2;
static int __init parse_nospectre_v2(char *str)
{
__nospectre_v2 = true;
return 0;
}
early_param("nospectre_v2", parse_nospectre_v2);
static void static void
enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
{ {
...@@ -200,6 +208,11 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) ...@@ -200,6 +208,11 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) if (!entry->matches(entry, SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU))
return; return;
if (__nospectre_v2) {
pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
return;
}
if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
return; return;
......
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