Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "Certain AMD processors are vulnerable to a cross-thread return address
  predictions bug. When running in SMT mode and one of the sibling
  threads transitions out of C0 state, the other thread gets access to
  twice as many entries in the RSB, but unfortunately the predictions of
  the now-halted logical processor are not purged. Therefore, the
  executing processor could speculatively execute from locations that
  the now-halted processor had trained the RSB on.

  The Spectre v2 mitigations cover the Linux kernel, as it fills the RSB
  when context switching to the idle thread. However, KVM allows a VMM
  to prevent exiting guest mode when transitioning out of C0 using the
  KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS capability can be used by a VMM to change
  this behavior. To mitigate the cross-thread return address predictions
  bug, a VMM must not be allowed to override the default behavior to
  intercept C0 transitions.

  These patches introduce a KVM module parameter that, if set, will
  prevent the user from disabling the HLT, MWAIT and CSTATE exits"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  Documentation/hw-vuln: Add documentation for Cross-Thread Return Predictions
  KVM: x86: Mitigate the cross-thread return address predictions bug
  x86/speculation: Identify processors vulnerable to SMT RSB predictions

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/cross-thread-rsb.rst

+
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions
+=======================================
+
+Certain AMD and Hygon processors are subject to a cross-thread return address
+predictions vulnerability. When running in SMT mode and one sibling thread
+transitions out of C0 state, the other sibling thread could use return target
+predictions from the sibling thread that transitioned out of C0.
+
+The Spectre v2 mitigations protect the Linux kernel, as it fills the return
+address prediction entries with safe targets when context switching to the idle
+thread. However, KVM does allow a VMM to prevent exiting guest mode when
+transitioning out of C0. This could result in a guest-controlled return target
+being consumed by the sibling thread.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+The following CPUs are vulnerable:
+
+    - AMD Family 17h processors
+    - Hygon Family 18h processors
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this issue:
+
+   ==============  =======================================
+   CVE-2022-27672  Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions
+   ==============  =======================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+Affected SMT-capable processors support 1T and 2T modes of execution when SMT
+is enabled. In 2T mode, both threads in a core are executing code. For the
+processor core to enter 1T mode, it is required that one of the threads
+requests to transition out of the C0 state. This can be communicated with the
+HLT instruction or with an MWAIT instruction that requests non-C0.
+When the thread re-enters the C0 state, the processor transitions back
+to 2T mode, assuming the other thread is also still in C0 state.
+
+In affected processors, the return address predictor (RAP) is partitioned
+depending on the SMT mode. For instance, in 2T mode each thread uses a private
+16-entry RAP, but in 1T mode, the active thread uses a 32-entry RAP. Upon
+transition between 1T/2T mode, the RAP contents are not modified but the RAP
+pointers (which control the next return target to use for predictions) may
+change. This behavior may result in return targets from one SMT thread being
+used by RET predictions in the sibling thread following a 1T/2T switch. In
+particular, a RET instruction executed immediately after a transition to 1T may
+use a return target from the thread that just became idle. In theory, this
+could lead to information disclosure if the return targets used do not come
+from trustworthy code.
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+An attack can be mounted on affected processors by performing a series of CALL
+instructions with targeted return locations and then transitioning out of C0
+state.
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+
+Before entering idle state, the kernel context switches to the idle thread. The
+context switch fills the RAP entries (referred to as the RSB in Linux) with safe
+targets by performing a sequence of CALL instructions.
+
+Prevent a guest VM from directly putting the processor into an idle state by
+intercepting HLT and MWAIT instructions.
+
+Both mitigations are required to fully address this issue.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+Use existing Spectre v2 mitigations that will fill the RSB on context switch.
+
+Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
+---------------------------------------------
+
+By default, the KVM hypervisor mitigates this issue by intercepting guest
+attempts to transition out of C0. A VMM can use the KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS
+capability to override those interceptions, but since this is not common, the
+mitigation that covers this path is not enabled by default.
+
+The mitigation for the KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS capability can be turned on
+using the boolean module parameter mitigate_smt_rsb, e.g.:
+        kvm.mitigate_smt_rsb=1

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    core-scheduling.rst
    l1d_flush.rst
    processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
+   cross-thread-rsb.rst

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

@@ -466,5 +466,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
 #define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
 #define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB			X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c

@@ -1256,6 +1256,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 #define MMIO_SBDS	BIT(2)
 /* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */
 #define RETBLEED	BIT(3)
+/* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */
+#define SMT_RSB		BIT(4)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
@@ -1287,8 +1289,8 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB),
+	VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -1406,6 +1408,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
 
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SMT_RSB))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 

arch/x86/kvm/x86.c

@@ -191,6 +191,10 @@ module_param(enable_pmu, bool, 0444);
 bool __read_mostly eager_page_split = true;
 module_param(eager_page_split, bool, 0644);
 
+/* Enable/disable SMT_RSB bug mitigation */
+bool __read_mostly mitigate_smt_rsb;
+module_param(mitigate_smt_rsb, bool, 0444);
+
 /*
  * Restoring the host value for MSRs that are only consumed when running in
  * usermode, e.g. SYSCALL MSRs and TSC_AUX, can be deferred until the CPU
@@ -4448,10 +4452,15 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 		r = KVM_CLOCK_VALID_FLAGS;
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS:
-		r |=  KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT | KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE |
+		r = KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE;
+
+		if (!mitigate_smt_rsb) {
+			r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT |
 			     KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE;
-		if(kvm_can_mwait_in_guest())
+
+			if (kvm_can_mwait_in_guest())
 				r |= KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT;
+		}
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_X86_SMM:
 		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM))
@@ -6227,15 +6236,26 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
 		if (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_DISABLE_VALID_EXITS)
 			break;
 
+		if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE)
+			kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
+
+#define SMT_RSB_MSG "This processor is affected by the Cross-Thread Return Predictions vulnerability. " \
+		    "KVM_CAP_X86_DISABLE_EXITS should only be used with SMT disabled or trusted guests."
+
+		if (!mitigate_smt_rsb) {
+			if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB) && cpu_smt_possible() &&
+			    (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE))
+				pr_warn_once(SMT_RSB_MSG);
+
 			if ((cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_MWAIT) &&
 			    kvm_can_mwait_in_guest())
 				kvm->arch.mwait_in_guest = true;
 			if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_HLT)
 				kvm->arch.hlt_in_guest = true;
-		if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_PAUSE)
-			kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
 			if (cap->args[0] & KVM_X86_DISABLE_EXITS_CSTATE)
 				kvm->arch.cstate_in_guest = true;
+		}
+
 		r = 0;
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_MSR_PLATFORM_INFO:
@@ -13456,6 +13476,7 @@ EXPORT_TRACEPOINT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit);
 static int __init kvm_x86_init(void)
 {
 	kvm_mmu_x86_module_init();
+	mitigate_smt_rsb &= boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB) && cpu_smt_possible();
 	return 0;
 }
 module_init(kvm_x86_init);