Commit a43ae4df authored by Marc Zyngier's avatar Marc Zyngier Committed by Catalin Marinas

arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option

On a system where the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_2,
it may be useful to either permanently enable or disable the
workaround for cases where the user decides that they'd rather
not get a trap overhead, and keep the mitigation permanently
on or off instead of switching it on exception entry/exit.

In any case, default to the mitigation being enabled.
Reviewed-by: default avatarJulien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarMark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMarc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarCatalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
parent a725e3dd
...@@ -4047,6 +4047,23 @@ ...@@ -4047,6 +4047,23 @@
expediting. Set to zero to disable automatic expediting. Set to zero to disable automatic
expediting. expediting.
ssbd= [ARM64,HW]
Speculative Store Bypass Disable control
On CPUs that are vulnerable to the Speculative
Store Bypass vulnerability and offer a
firmware based mitigation, this parameter
indicates how the mitigation should be used:
force-on: Unconditionally enable mitigation for
for both kernel and userspace
force-off: Unconditionally disable mitigation for
for both kernel and userspace
kernel: Always enable mitigation in the
kernel, and offer a prctl interface
to allow userspace to register its
interest in being mitigated too.
stack_guard_gap= [MM] stack_guard_gap= [MM]
override the default stack gap protection. The value override the default stack gap protection. The value
is in page units and it defines how many pages prior is in page units and it defines how many pages prior
......
...@@ -537,6 +537,12 @@ static inline u64 read_zcr_features(void) ...@@ -537,6 +537,12 @@ static inline u64 read_zcr_features(void)
return zcr; return zcr;
} }
#define ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN -1
#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE 0
#define ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL 1
#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE 2
#define ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED 3
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif #endif
...@@ -235,6 +235,38 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry) ...@@ -235,6 +235,38 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required); DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL;
static const struct ssbd_options {
const char *str;
int state;
} ssbd_options[] = {
{ "force-on", ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE, },
{ "force-off", ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE, },
{ "kernel", ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL, },
};
static int __init ssbd_cfg(char *buf)
{
int i;
if (!buf || !buf[0])
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssbd_options); i++) {
int len = strlen(ssbd_options[i].str);
if (strncmp(buf, ssbd_options[i].str, len))
continue;
ssbd_state = ssbd_options[i].state;
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
early_param("ssbd", ssbd_cfg);
void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt, void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt,
__le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr, __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr,
int nr_inst) int nr_inst)
...@@ -278,44 +310,83 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, ...@@ -278,44 +310,83 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
int scope) int scope)
{ {
struct arm_smccc_res res; struct arm_smccc_res res;
bool supported = true; bool required = true;
s32 val;
WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
return false; return false;
}
/*
* The probe function return value is either negative
* (unsupported or mitigated), positive (unaffected), or zero
* (requires mitigation). We only need to do anything in the
* last case.
*/
switch (psci_ops.conduit) { switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res); ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
supported = false;
break; break;
case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res); ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
supported = false;
break; break;
default: default:
supported = false; ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
return false;
} }
if (supported) { val = (s32)res.a0;
switch (val) {
case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED:
ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
return false;
case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc);
ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
return false;
case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
required = true;
break;
case 1: /* Mitigation not required on this CPU */
required = false;
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
return false;
}
switch (ssbd_state) {
case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
pr_info_once("%s disabled from command-line\n", entry->desc);
arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(false);
required = false;
break;
case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
if (required) {
__this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1); __this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1);
arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true); arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true);
} }
break;
case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
pr_info_once("%s forced from command-line\n", entry->desc);
arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true);
required = true;
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
break;
}
return supported; return required;
} }
#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */ #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
......
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