[PATCH] kfree cleanup: security

This is the security/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch.

Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in security/.
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

security/keys/key.c

@@ -115,7 +115,6 @@ struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid)
  found:
 	atomic_inc(&user->usage);
 	spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
-	if (candidate)
 	kfree(candidate);
  out:
 	return user;

security/selinux/ss/policydb.c

@@ -632,22 +632,22 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	cond_policydb_destroy(p);
 
 	for (tr = p->role_tr; tr; tr = tr->next) {
-		if (ltr) kfree(ltr);
+		kfree(ltr);
 		ltr = tr;
 	}
-	if (ltr) kfree(ltr);
+	kfree(ltr);
 
 	for (ra = p->role_allow; ra; ra = ra -> next) {
-		if (lra) kfree(lra);
+		kfree(lra);
 		lra = ra;
 	}
-	if (lra) kfree(lra);
+	kfree(lra);
 
 	for (rt = p->range_tr; rt; rt = rt -> next) {
-		if (lrt) kfree(lrt);
+		kfree(lrt);
 		lrt = rt;
 	}
-	if (lrt) kfree(lrt);
+	kfree(lrt);
 
 	if (p->type_attr_map) {
 		for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++)