bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
commit 979d63d5 upstream. Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access: While b2157399 only focussed on masking array map access for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for example: - Load a map value pointer into R6 - Load an index into R7 - Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy) - Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch) - Load R0 = R6[R7] - Load R0 = R6[R0] For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar, for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm> followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit) would be filled with many dependent computations such that the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a different execution port, or any other form of mistraining as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under speculation. In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation, there are three options that were considered: i) new insn for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF. Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii) have both in common that a temporary register is needed in order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push / pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there) and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints. The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped into extending the register set with hidden ax register and reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter, and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions. The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the map value or stack pointer currently holds. There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows: ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be sanitized could reside either in source or in destination register, and the limit is different depending on whether the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at verification time whether the actual runtime value would be either negative or positive. For example, we have a derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val, or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source register if the value was in source. The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could happen ... PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm) PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON [...] ... which under speculation could end up as ... PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] PTR += 0x1000 PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ] [...] ... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore "branch off" and push the current verification state after the ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification state from speculative execution simulation must never prune a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will reject such program. Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests. For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none. balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and 7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed after the change. Other programs from that object file had similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes (634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access, thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under given constraints. With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows: # bpftool prog dump xlated id 282 [...] 28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) 29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8) 30: (57) r1 &= 15 31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608) 32: (57) r3 &= 1 33: (47) r3 |= 1 34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19 35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 | 36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer 37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers 38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known 39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent 40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation. 41: (0f) r4 += r11 | 42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0) 43: (6f) r4 <<= r1 [...] For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted for the above example: [...] 16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 17: (1f) r11 -= r2 18: (4f) r11 |= r2 19: (87) r11 = -r11 20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 21: (5f) r2 &= r11 22: (0f) r2 += r0 23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) [...] JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10: [...] d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _ d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi | da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f. e7: and %r10,%rdi |_ ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d | f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10 f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.) 100: add %rax,%rdi |_ 103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax [...] Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully. [0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf [1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens, Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf Fixes: b2157399 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") Reported-by:Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Vallish Vaidyeshwara <vallish@amazon.com> [some checkpatch cleanups and backported to 4.14 by sblbir] Signed-off-by:
Balbir Singh <sblbir@amzn.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Showing
Please register or sign in to comment