Commit aebc7b0d authored by Marco Elver's avatar Marco Elver Committed by Kees Cook

list: Introduce CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED

Numerous production kernel configs (see [1, 2]) are choosing to enable
CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST, which is also being recommended by KSPP for hardened
configs [3]. The motivation behind this is that the option can be used
as a security hardening feature (e.g. CVE-2019-2215 and CVE-2019-2025
are mitigated by the option [4]).

The feature has never been designed with performance in mind, yet common
list manipulation is happening across hot paths all over the kernel.

Introduce CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED, which performs list pointer checking
inline, and only upon list corruption calls the reporting slow path.

To generate optimal machine code with CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED:

  1. Elide checking for pointer values which upon dereference would
     result in an immediate access fault (i.e. minimal hardening
     checks).  The trade-off is lower-quality error reports.

  2. Use the __preserve_most function attribute (available with Clang,
     but not yet with GCC) to minimize the code footprint for calling
     the reporting slow path. As a result, function size of callers is
     reduced by avoiding saving registers before calling the rarely
     called reporting slow path.

     Note that all TUs in lib/Makefile already disable function tracing,
     including list_debug.c, and __preserve_most's implied notrace has
     no effect in this case.

  3. Because the inline checks are a subset of the full set of checks in
     __list_*_valid_or_report(), always return false if the inline
     checks failed.  This avoids redundant compare and conditional
     branch right after return from the slow path.

As a side-effect of the checks being inline, if the compiler can prove
some condition to always be true, it can completely elide some checks.

Since DEBUG_LIST is functionally a superset of LIST_HARDENED, the
Kconfig variables are changed to reflect that: DEBUG_LIST selects
LIST_HARDENED, whereas LIST_HARDENED itself has no dependency on
DEBUG_LIST.

Running netperf with CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED (using a Clang compiler with
"preserve_most") shows throughput improvements, in my case of ~7% on
average (up to 20-30% on some test cases).

Link: https://r.android.com/1266735 [1]
Link: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/linux/-/blob/main/config [2]
Link: https://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Kernel_Self_Protection_Project/Recommended_Settings [3]
Link: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/11/bad-binder-android-in-wild-exploit.html [4]
Signed-off-by: default avatarMarco Elver <elver@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230811151847.1594958-3-elver@google.comSigned-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
parent b16c42c8
......@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ hyp-obj-y := timer-sr.o sysreg-sr.o debug-sr.o switch.o tlb.o hyp-init.o host.o
cache.o setup.o mm.o mem_protect.o sys_regs.o pkvm.o stacktrace.o ffa.o
hyp-obj-y += ../vgic-v3-sr.o ../aarch32.o ../vgic-v2-cpuif-proxy.o ../entry.o \
../fpsimd.o ../hyp-entry.o ../exception.o ../pgtable.o
hyp-obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST) += list_debug.o
hyp-obj-$(CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED) += list_debug.o
hyp-obj-y += $(lib-objs)
##
......
......@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ static inline __must_check bool nvhe_check_data_corruption(bool v)
/* The predicates checked here are taken from lib/list_debug.c. */
__list_valid_slowpath
bool __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev,
struct list_head *next)
{
......@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ bool __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev,
return true;
}
__list_valid_slowpath
bool __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(struct list_head *entry)
{
struct list_head *prev, *next;
......
......@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void)
pr_err("Overwrite did not happen, but no BUG?!\n");
else {
pr_err("list_add() corruption not detected!\n");
pr_expected_config(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST);
pr_expected_config(CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED);
}
}
......@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ static void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void)
pr_err("Overwrite did not happen, but no BUG?!\n");
else {
pr_err("list_del() corruption not detected!\n");
pr_expected_config(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST);
pr_expected_config(CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED);
}
}
......
......@@ -38,39 +38,91 @@ static inline void INIT_LIST_HEAD(struct list_head *list)
WRITE_ONCE(list->prev, list);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST
# define __list_valid_slowpath
#else
# define __list_valid_slowpath __cold __preserve_most
#endif
/*
* Performs the full set of list corruption checks before __list_add().
* On list corruption reports a warning, and returns false.
*/
extern bool __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new,
struct list_head *prev,
struct list_head *next);
extern bool __list_valid_slowpath __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new,
struct list_head *prev,
struct list_head *next);
/*
* Performs list corruption checks before __list_add(). Returns false if a
* corruption is detected, true otherwise.
*
* With CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED only, performs minimal list integrity checking
* inline to catch non-faulting corruptions, and only if a corruption is
* detected calls the reporting function __list_add_valid_or_report().
*/
static __always_inline bool __list_add_valid(struct list_head *new,
struct list_head *prev,
struct list_head *next)
{
return __list_add_valid_or_report(new, prev, next);
bool ret = true;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST)) {
/*
* With the hardening version, elide checking if next and prev
* are NULL, since the immediate dereference of them below would
* result in a fault if NULL.
*
* With the reduced set of checks, we can afford to inline the
* checks, which also gives the compiler a chance to elide some
* of them completely if they can be proven at compile-time. If
* one of the pre-conditions does not hold, the slow-path will
* show a report which pre-condition failed.
*/
if (likely(next->prev == prev && prev->next == next && new != prev && new != next))
return true;
ret = false;
}
ret &= __list_add_valid_or_report(new, prev, next);
return ret;
}
/*
* Performs the full set of list corruption checks before __list_del_entry().
* On list corruption reports a warning, and returns false.
*/
extern bool __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(struct list_head *entry);
extern bool __list_valid_slowpath __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(struct list_head *entry);
/*
* Performs list corruption checks before __list_del_entry(). Returns false if a
* corruption is detected, true otherwise.
*
* With CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED only, performs minimal list integrity checking
* inline to catch non-faulting corruptions, and only if a corruption is
* detected calls the reporting function __list_del_entry_valid_or_report().
*/
static __always_inline bool __list_del_entry_valid(struct list_head *entry)
{
return __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(entry);
bool ret = true;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST)) {
struct list_head *prev = entry->prev;
struct list_head *next = entry->next;
/*
* With the hardening version, elide checking if next and prev
* are NULL, LIST_POISON1 or LIST_POISON2, since the immediate
* dereference of them below would result in a fault.
*/
if (likely(prev->next == entry && next->prev == entry))
return true;
ret = false;
}
ret &= __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(entry);
return ret;
}
#else
static inline bool __list_add_valid(struct list_head *new,
......
......@@ -1674,9 +1674,14 @@ menu "Debug kernel data structures"
config DEBUG_LIST
bool "Debug linked list manipulation"
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL || BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
select LIST_HARDENED
help
Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list
walking routines.
Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list walking
routines.
This option trades better quality error reports for performance, and
is more suitable for kernel debugging. If you care about performance,
you should only enable CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED instead.
If unsure, say N.
......
......@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_BTREE) += btree.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE) += interval_tree.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY) += assoc_array.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) += smp_processor_id.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST) += list_debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LIST_HARDENED) += list_debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS) += debugobjects.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BITREVERSE) += bitrev.o
......
......@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
* Copyright 2006, Red Hat, Inc., Dave Jones
* Released under the General Public License (GPL).
*
* This file contains the linked list validation for DEBUG_LIST.
* This file contains the linked list validation and error reporting for
* LIST_HARDENED and DEBUG_LIST.
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
......@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@
* attempt).
*/
__list_valid_slowpath
bool __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev,
struct list_head *next)
{
......@@ -39,6 +41,7 @@ bool __list_add_valid_or_report(struct list_head *new, struct list_head *prev,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__list_add_valid_or_report);
__list_valid_slowpath
bool __list_del_entry_valid_or_report(struct list_head *entry)
{
struct list_head *prev, *next;
......
......@@ -279,6 +279,19 @@ config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS
endmenu
menu "Hardening of kernel data structures"
config LIST_HARDENED
bool "Check integrity of linked list manipulation"
help
Minimal integrity checking in the linked-list manipulation routines
to catch memory corruptions that are not guaranteed to result in an
immediate access fault.
If unsure, say N.
endmenu
config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
def_bool $(cc-option,-frandomize-layout-seed-file=/dev/null)
# Randstruct was first added in Clang 15, but it isn't safe to use until
......
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