Commit c82ffab9 authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'for-linus' of...

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
  SELinux: do not destroy the avc_cache_nodep
  KEYS: Have the garbage collector set its timer for live expired keys
  tpm-fixup-pcrs-sysfs-file-update
  creds_are_invalid() needs to be exported for use by modules:
  include/linux/cred.h: fix build

Fix trivial BUILD_BUG_ON-induced conflicts in drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
parents a724eada 5224ee08
......@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
* the module usage count.
*/
#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20)
#define EXTEND_PCR_SIZE 34
#define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 34
static struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
.length = cpu_to_be32(34),
......@@ -760,10 +760,9 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
return -ENODEV;
cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
BUG_ON(be32_to_cpu(cmd.header.in.length) > EXTEND_PCR_SIZE);
cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, cmd.header.in.length,
rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
"attempting extend a PCR value");
module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner);
......
......@@ -176,23 +176,7 @@ extern void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *, const char *, unsigned);
extern void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *,
const char *, unsigned);
static inline bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
{
if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
return true;
if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) < atomic_read(&cred->subscribers))
return true;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
if (selinux_is_enabled()) {
if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
return true;
if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
(POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
extern bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred);
static inline void __validate_creds(const struct cred *cred,
const char *file, unsigned line)
......
......@@ -782,6 +782,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
{
if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
return true;
if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) < atomic_read(&cred->subscribers))
return true;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
if (selinux_is_enabled()) {
if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
return true;
if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
(POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid);
/*
* dump invalid credentials
*/
......
......@@ -169,9 +169,9 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
/* trawl through the keys looking for keyrings */
for (;;) {
if (key->expiry > now && key->expiry < new_timer) {
if (key->expiry > limit && key->expiry < new_timer) {
kdebug("will expire %x in %ld",
key_serial(key), key->expiry - now);
key_serial(key), key->expiry - limit);
new_timer = key->expiry;
}
......
......@@ -868,8 +868,19 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
void avc_disable(void)
{
avc_flush();
synchronize_rcu();
if (avc_node_cachep)
kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep);
/*
* If you are looking at this because you have realized that we are
* not destroying the avc_node_cachep it might be easy to fix, but
* I don't know the memory barrier semantics well enough to know. It's
* possible that some other task dereferenced security_ops when
* it still pointed to selinux operations. If that is the case it's
* possible that it is about to use the avc and is about to need the
* avc_node_cachep. I know I could wrap the security.c security_ops call
* in an rcu_lock, but seriously, it's not worth it. Instead I just flush
* the cache and get that memory back.
*/
if (avc_node_cachep) {
avc_flush();
/* kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep); */
}
}
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