Commit caaee623 authored by Jann Horn's avatar Jann Horn Committed by Linus Torvalds

ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks

By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.

To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.

The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g.  by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.

While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.

In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:

 /proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
     should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
 /proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
     directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
     this scenario:
     lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
     drwx------ root root /root
     drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
     -rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret

Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: default avatarJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
parent 3dfb7d8c
......@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
state = *get_task_state(task);
vsize = eip = esp = 0;
permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT);
permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT);
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm) {
vsize = task_vsize(mm);
......
......@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_cmdline_ops = {
static int proc_pid_auxv(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
struct mm_struct *mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
if (mm && !IS_ERR(mm)) {
unsigned int nwords = 0;
do {
......@@ -430,7 +430,8 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
wchan = get_wchan(task);
if (wchan && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) && !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname))
if (wchan && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)
&& !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname))
seq_printf(m, "%s", symname);
else
seq_putc(m, '0');
......@@ -444,7 +445,7 @@ static int lock_trace(struct task_struct *task)
int err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (err)
return err;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)) {
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)) {
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
return -EPERM;
}
......@@ -697,7 +698,7 @@ static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode)
*/
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (task) {
allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
put_task_struct(task);
}
return allowed;
......@@ -732,7 +733,7 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid,
return true;
if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid))
return true;
return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
return ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
}
......@@ -809,7 +810,7 @@ struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)
struct mm_struct *mm = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
if (task) {
mm = mm_access(task, mode);
mm = mm_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm)) {
......@@ -1860,7 +1861,7 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
if (!task)
goto out_notask;
mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm))
goto out;
......@@ -2013,7 +2014,7 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir,
goto out;
result = -EACCES;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
goto out_put_task;
result = -ENOENT;
......@@ -2066,7 +2067,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
goto out;
ret = -EACCES;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS))
goto out_put_task;
ret = 0;
......@@ -2533,7 +2534,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, struct seq_file *m, int wh
if (result)
return result;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
result = -EACCES;
goto out_unlock;
}
......
......@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
if (!task)
return error;
if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
error = ns_get_path(&ns_path, task, ns_ops);
if (!error)
nd_jump_link(&ns_path);
......@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int proc_ns_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int bufl
if (!task)
return res;
if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) {
res = ns_get_name(name, sizeof(name), task, ns_ops);
if (res >= 0)
res = readlink_copy(buffer, buflen, name);
......
......@@ -57,7 +57,29 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead);
#define PTRACE_MODE_READ 0x01
#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 0x02
#define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04
/* Returns true on success, false on denial. */
#define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08
#define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10
/* shorthands for READ/ATTACH and FSCREDS/REALCREDS combinations */
#define PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
#define PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
/**
* ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access
* a target task.
* @task: target task
* @mode: selects type of access and caller credentials
*
* Returns true on success, false on denial.
*
* One of the flags PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS and PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS must
* be set in @mode to specify whether the access was requested through
* a filesystem syscall (should use effective capabilities and fsuid
* of the caller) or through an explicit syscall such as
* process_vm_writev or ptrace (and should use the real credentials).
*/
extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)
......
......@@ -3376,7 +3376,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid)
/* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */
err = -EACCES;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto errout;
return task;
......
......@@ -2884,7 +2884,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
}
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->robust_list;
......
......@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
}
ret = -EPERM;
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->compat_robust_list;
......
......@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
&task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (ret)
goto err;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ) ||
!ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS) ||
!ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto err_unlock;
}
......
......@@ -219,6 +219,14 @@ static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
int dumpable = 0;
kuid_t caller_uid;
kgid_t caller_gid;
if (!(mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) == !(mode & PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)) {
WARN(1, "denying ptrace access check without PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS\n");
return -EPERM;
}
/* May we inspect the given task?
* This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
......@@ -228,18 +236,33 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
* because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship
* or halting the specified task is impossible.
*/
int dumpable = 0;
/* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
if (same_thread_group(task, current))
return 0;
rcu_read_lock();
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) {
caller_uid = cred->fsuid;
caller_gid = cred->fsgid;
} else {
/*
* Using the euid would make more sense here, but something
* in userland might rely on the old behavior, and this
* shouldn't be a security problem since
* PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS implies that the caller explicitly
* used a syscall that requests access to another process
* (and not a filesystem syscall to procfs).
*/
caller_uid = cred->uid;
caller_gid = cred->gid;
}
tcred = __task_cred(task);
if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid))
if (uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->euid) &&
uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->suid) &&
uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->uid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->egid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;
if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
......@@ -306,7 +329,7 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
goto out;
task_lock(task);
retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
task_unlock(task);
if (retval)
goto unlock_creds;
......
......@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static ssize_t process_vm_rw_core(pid_t pid, struct iov_iter *iter,
goto free_proc_pages;
}
mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm)) {
rc = IS_ERR(mm) ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;
/*
......
......@@ -137,12 +137,17 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
int ret = 0;
const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = current_cred();
child_cred = __task_cred(child);
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective;
else
caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted;
if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
goto out;
if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
......
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