Commit ccf70ddc authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds

Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
 "(Relatively) a lot of reverts, mostly.

  Bugs have trickled in for a new feature in 4.2 (MTRR support in
  guests) so I'm reverting it all; let's not make this -rc period busier
  for KVM than it's been so far.  This covers the four reverts from me.

  The fifth patch is being reverted because Radim found a bug in the
  implementation of stable scheduler clock, *but* also managed to
  implement the feature entirely without hypervisor support.  So instead
  of fixing the hypervisor side we can remove it completely; 4.4 will
  get the new implementation"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
  Use WARN_ON_ONCE for missing X86_FEATURE_NRIPS
  Update KVM homepage Url
  Revert "KVM: SVM: use NPT page attributes"
  Revert "KVM: svm: handle KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED in svm_get_mt_mask"
  Revert "KVM: SVM: Sync g_pat with guest-written PAT value"
  Revert "KVM: x86: apply guest MTRR virtualization on host reserved pages"
  Revert "KVM: x86: zero kvmclock_offset when vcpu0 initializes kvmclock system MSR"
parents 46c8217c d2922422
......@@ -5957,7 +5957,7 @@ F: virt/kvm/
KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE (KVM) FOR AMD-V
M: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
L: kvm@vger.kernel.org
W: http://kvm.qumranet.com
W: http://www.linux-kvm.org/
S: Maintained
F: arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
F: arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
......@@ -5965,7 +5965,7 @@ F: arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE (KVM) FOR POWERPC
M: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.com>
L: kvm-ppc@vger.kernel.org
W: http://kvm.qumranet.com
W: http://www.linux-kvm.org/
T: git git://github.com/agraf/linux-2.6.git
S: Supported
F: arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm*
......
......@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ struct pvclock_wall_clock {
#define PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT (1 << 0)
#define PVCLOCK_GUEST_STOPPED (1 << 1)
/* PVCLOCK_COUNTS_FROM_ZERO broke ABI and can't be used anymore. */
#define PVCLOCK_COUNTS_FROM_ZERO (1 << 2)
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_PVCLOCK_ABI_H */
......@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ static void skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
if (svm->vmcb->control.next_rip != 0) {
WARN_ON(!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS));
WARN_ON_ONCE(!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS));
svm->next_rip = svm->vmcb->control.next_rip;
}
......@@ -866,64 +866,6 @@ static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 0, 0);
}
#define MTRR_TYPE_UC_MINUS 7
#define MTRR2PROTVAL_INVALID 0xff
static u8 mtrr2protval[8];
static u8 fallback_mtrr_type(int mtrr)
{
/*
* WT and WP aren't always available in the host PAT. Treat
* them as UC and UC- respectively. Everything else should be
* there.
*/
switch (mtrr)
{
case MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH:
return MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
case MTRR_TYPE_WRPROT:
return MTRR_TYPE_UC_MINUS;
default:
BUG();
}
}
static void build_mtrr2protval(void)
{
int i;
u64 pat;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
mtrr2protval[i] = MTRR2PROTVAL_INVALID;
/* Ignore the invalid MTRR types. */
mtrr2protval[2] = 0;
mtrr2protval[3] = 0;
/*
* Use host PAT value to figure out the mapping from guest MTRR
* values to nested page table PAT/PCD/PWT values. We do not
* want to change the host PAT value every time we enter the
* guest.
*/
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, pat);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
u8 mtrr = pat >> (8 * i);
if (mtrr2protval[mtrr] == MTRR2PROTVAL_INVALID)
mtrr2protval[mtrr] = __cm_idx2pte(i);
}
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (mtrr2protval[i] == MTRR2PROTVAL_INVALID) {
u8 fallback = fallback_mtrr_type(i);
mtrr2protval[i] = mtrr2protval[fallback];
BUG_ON(mtrr2protval[i] == MTRR2PROTVAL_INVALID);
}
}
}
static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
{
int cpu;
......@@ -990,7 +932,6 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
} else
kvm_disable_tdp();
build_mtrr2protval();
return 0;
err:
......@@ -1145,43 +1086,6 @@ static u64 svm_compute_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 target_tsc)
return target_tsc - tsc;
}
static void svm_set_guest_pat(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 *g_pat)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
/* Unlike Intel, AMD takes the guest's CR0.CD into account.
*
* AMD does not have IPAT. To emulate it for the case of guests
* with no assigned devices, just set everything to WB. If guests
* have assigned devices, however, we cannot force WB for RAM
* pages only, so use the guest PAT directly.
*/
if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
*g_pat = 0x0606060606060606;
else
*g_pat = vcpu->arch.pat;
}
static u64 svm_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
{
u8 mtrr;
/*
* 1. MMIO: trust guest MTRR, so same as item 3.
* 2. No passthrough: always map as WB, and force guest PAT to WB as well
* 3. Passthrough: can't guarantee the result, try to trust guest.
*/
if (!is_mmio && !kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
return 0;
if (!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED) &&
kvm_read_cr0(vcpu) & X86_CR0_CD)
return _PAGE_NOCACHE;
mtrr = kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type(vcpu, gfn);
return mtrr2protval[mtrr];
}
static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool init_event)
{
struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
......@@ -1278,7 +1182,6 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool init_event)
clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
save->g_pat = svm->vcpu.arch.pat;
svm_set_guest_pat(svm, &save->g_pat);
save->cr3 = 0;
save->cr4 = 0;
}
......@@ -1673,10 +1576,13 @@ static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
if (!vcpu->fpu_active)
cr0 |= X86_CR0_TS;
/* These are emulated via page tables. */
/*
* re-enable caching here because the QEMU bios
* does not do it - this results in some delay at
* reboot
*/
if (kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
cr0 &= ~(X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_NW);
svm->vmcb->save.cr0 = cr0;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
update_cr0_intercept(svm);
......@@ -3351,16 +3257,6 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
case MSR_VM_IGNNE:
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented wrmsr: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", ecx, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
if (npt_enabled) {
if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.pat = data;
svm_set_guest_pat(svm, &svm->vmcb->save.g_pat);
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
break;
}
/* fall through */
default:
return kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
}
......@@ -4195,6 +4091,11 @@ static bool svm_has_high_real_mode_segbase(void)
return true;
}
static u64 svm_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
{
return 0;
}
static void svm_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
}
......
......@@ -8617,17 +8617,22 @@ static u64 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
u64 ipat = 0;
/* For VT-d and EPT combination
* 1. MMIO: guest may want to apply WC, trust it.
* 1. MMIO: always map as UC
* 2. EPT with VT-d:
* a. VT-d without snooping control feature: can't guarantee the
* result, try to trust guest. So the same as item 1.
* result, try to trust guest.
* b. VT-d with snooping control feature: snooping control feature of
* VT-d engine can guarantee the cache correctness. Just set it
* to WB to keep consistent with host. So the same as item 3.
* 3. EPT without VT-d: always map as WB and set IPAT=1 to keep
* consistent with host MTRR
*/
if (!is_mmio && !kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm)) {
if (is_mmio) {
cache = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
goto exit;
}
if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm)) {
ipat = VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
cache = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
goto exit;
......
......@@ -1708,8 +1708,6 @@ static int kvm_guest_time_update(struct kvm_vcpu *v)
vcpu->pvclock_set_guest_stopped_request = false;
}
pvclock_flags |= PVCLOCK_COUNTS_FROM_ZERO;
/* If the host uses TSC clocksource, then it is stable */
if (use_master_clock)
pvclock_flags |= PVCLOCK_TSC_STABLE_BIT;
......@@ -2007,8 +2005,6 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
&vcpu->requests);
ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock = tmp;
ka->kvmclock_offset = -get_kernel_ns();
}
vcpu->arch.time = data;
......
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