Commit cec84e75 authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds

Merge tag 's390-5.19-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux

Pull s390 fixes from Alexander Gordeev:

 - Fix purgatory build process so bin2c tool does not get built
   unnecessarily and the Makefile is more consistent with other
   architectures.

 - Return earlier simple design of arch_get_random_seed_long|int() and
   arch_get_random_long|int() callbacks as result of changes in generic
   RNG code.

 - Fix minor comment typos and spelling mistakes.

* tag 's390-5.19-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
  s390/qdio: Fix spelling mistake
  s390/sclp: Fix typo in comments
  s390/archrandom: simplify back to earlier design and initialize earlier
  s390/purgatory: remove duplicated build rule of kexec-purgatory.o
  s390/purgatory: hard-code obj-y in Makefile
  s390: remove unneeded 'select BUILD_BIN2C'
parents 76ff294e d7d488f4
......@@ -484,7 +484,6 @@ config KEXEC
config KEXEC_FILE
bool "kexec file based system call"
select KEXEC_CORE
select BUILD_BIN2C
depends on CRYPTO
depends on CRYPTO_SHA256
depends on CRYPTO_SHA256_S390
......
......@@ -4,232 +4,15 @@
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2020
* Author(s): Harald Freudenberger
*
* The s390_arch_random_generate() function may be called from random.c
* in interrupt context. So this implementation does the best to be very
* fast. There is a buffer of random data which is asynchronously checked
* and filled by a workqueue thread.
* If there are enough bytes in the buffer the s390_arch_random_generate()
* just delivers these bytes. Otherwise false is returned until the
* worker thread refills the buffer.
* The worker fills the rng buffer by pulling fresh entropy from the
* high quality (but slow) true hardware random generator. This entropy
* is then spread over the buffer with an pseudo random generator PRNG.
* As the arch_get_random_seed_long() fetches 8 bytes and the calling
* function add_interrupt_randomness() counts this as 1 bit entropy the
* distribution needs to make sure there is in fact 1 bit entropy contained
* in 8 bytes of the buffer. The current values pull 32 byte entropy
* and scatter this into a 2048 byte buffer. So 8 byte in the buffer
* will contain 1 bit of entropy.
* The worker thread is rescheduled based on the charge level of the
* buffer but at least with 500 ms delay to avoid too much CPU consumption.
* So the max. amount of rng data delivered via arch_get_random_seed is
* limited to 4k bytes per second.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/static_key.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <asm/cpacf.h>
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available);
atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter = ATOMIC64_INIT(0);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_counter);
#define ARCH_REFILL_TICKS (HZ/2)
#define ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE 32
#define ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE 2048
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(arch_rng_lock);
static u8 *arch_rng_buf;
static unsigned int arch_rng_buf_idx;
static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *);
static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(arch_rng_work, arch_rng_refill_buffer);
bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes)
{
/* max hunk is ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE */
if (nbytes > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE)
return false;
/* lock rng buffer */
if (!spin_trylock(&arch_rng_lock))
return false;
/* try to resolve the requested amount of bytes from the buffer */
arch_rng_buf_idx -= nbytes;
if (arch_rng_buf_idx < ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) {
memcpy(buf, arch_rng_buf + arch_rng_buf_idx, nbytes);
atomic64_add(nbytes, &s390_arch_random_counter);
spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
return true;
}
/* not enough bytes in rng buffer, refill is done asynchronously */
spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
return false;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_random_generate);
static void arch_rng_refill_buffer(struct work_struct *unused)
{
unsigned int delay = ARCH_REFILL_TICKS;
spin_lock(&arch_rng_lock);
if (arch_rng_buf_idx > ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE) {
/* buffer is exhausted and needs refill */
u8 seed[ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE];
u8 prng_wa[240];
/* fetch ARCH_PRNG_SEED_SIZE bytes of entropy */
cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
/* blow this entropy up to ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE with PRNG */
memset(prng_wa, 0, sizeof(prng_wa));
cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
&prng_wa, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN,
&prng_wa, arch_rng_buf, ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, NULL, 0);
arch_rng_buf_idx = ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE;
}
delay += (ARCH_REFILL_TICKS * arch_rng_buf_idx) / ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE;
spin_unlock(&arch_rng_lock);
/* kick next check */
queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq, &arch_rng_work, delay);
}
/*
* Here follows the implementation of s390_arch_get_random_long().
*
* The random longs to be pulled by arch_get_random_long() are
* prepared in an 4K buffer which is filled from the NIST 800-90
* compliant s390 drbg. By default the random long buffer is refilled
* 256 times before the drbg itself needs a reseed. The reseed of the
* drbg is done with 32 bytes fetched from the high quality (but slow)
* trng which is assumed to deliver 100% entropy. So the 32 * 8 = 256
* bits of entropy are spread over 256 * 4KB = 1MB serving 131072
* arch_get_random_long() invocations before reseeded.
*
* How often the 4K random long buffer is refilled with the drbg
* before the drbg is reseeded can be adjusted. There is a module
* parameter 's390_arch_rnd_long_drbg_reseed' accessible via
* /sys/module/arch_random/parameters/rndlong_drbg_reseed
* or as kernel command line parameter
* arch_random.rndlong_drbg_reseed=<value>
* This parameter tells how often the drbg fills the 4K buffer before
* it is re-seeded by fresh entropy from the trng.
* A value of 16 results in reseeding the drbg at every 16 * 4 KB = 64
* KB with 32 bytes of fresh entropy pulled from the trng. So a value
* of 16 would result in 256 bits entropy per 64 KB.
* A value of 256 results in 1MB of drbg output before a reseed of the
* drbg is done. So this would spread the 256 bits of entropy among 1MB.
* Setting this parameter to 0 forces the reseed to take place every
* time the 4K buffer is depleted, so the entropy rises to 256 bits
* entropy per 4K or 0.5 bit entropy per arch_get_random_long(). With
* setting this parameter to negative values all this effort is
* disabled, arch_get_random long() returns false and thus indicating
* that the arch_get_random_long() feature is disabled at all.
*/
static unsigned long rndlong_buf[512];
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rndlong_lock);
static int rndlong_buf_index;
static int rndlong_drbg_reseed = 256;
module_param_named(rndlong_drbg_reseed, rndlong_drbg_reseed, int, 0600);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(rndlong_drbg_reseed, "s390 arch_get_random_long() drbg reseed");
static inline void refill_rndlong_buf(void)
{
static u8 prng_ws[240];
static int drbg_counter;
if (--drbg_counter < 0) {
/* need to re-seed the drbg */
u8 seed[32];
/* fetch seed from trng */
cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
/* seed drbg */
memset(prng_ws, 0, sizeof(prng_ws));
cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_SEED,
&prng_ws, NULL, 0, seed, sizeof(seed));
/* re-init counter for drbg */
drbg_counter = rndlong_drbg_reseed;
}
/* fill the arch_get_random_long buffer from drbg */
cpacf_prno(CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN, &prng_ws,
(u8 *) rndlong_buf, sizeof(rndlong_buf),
NULL, 0);
}
bool s390_arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
bool rc = false;
unsigned long flags;
/* arch_get_random_long() disabled ? */
if (rndlong_drbg_reseed < 0)
return false;
/* try to lock the random long lock */
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&rndlong_lock, flags))
return false;
if (--rndlong_buf_index >= 0) {
/* deliver next long value from the buffer */
*v = rndlong_buf[rndlong_buf_index];
rc = true;
goto out;
}
/* buffer is depleted and needs refill */
if (in_interrupt()) {
/* delay refill in interrupt context to next caller */
rndlong_buf_index = 0;
goto out;
}
/* refill random long buffer */
refill_rndlong_buf();
rndlong_buf_index = ARRAY_SIZE(rndlong_buf);
/* and provide one random long */
*v = rndlong_buf[--rndlong_buf_index];
rc = true;
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rndlong_lock, flags);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(s390_arch_get_random_long);
static int __init s390_arch_random_init(void)
{
/* all the needed PRNO subfunctions available ? */
if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG) &&
cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_SHA512_DRNG_GEN)) {
/* alloc arch random working buffer */
arch_rng_buf = kmalloc(ARCH_RNG_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!arch_rng_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
/* kick worker queue job to fill the random buffer */
queue_delayed_work(system_long_wq,
&arch_rng_work, ARCH_REFILL_TICKS);
/* enable arch random to the outside world */
static_branch_enable(&s390_arch_random_available);
}
return 0;
}
arch_initcall(s390_arch_random_init);
......@@ -15,17 +15,13 @@
#include <linux/static_key.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <asm/cpacf.h>
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(s390_arch_random_available);
extern atomic64_t s390_arch_random_counter;
bool s390_arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v);
bool s390_arch_random_generate(u8 *buf, unsigned int nbytes);
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
{
if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available))
return s390_arch_get_random_long(v);
return false;
}
......@@ -37,7 +33,9 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
{
if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) {
return s390_arch_random_generate((u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, (u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
atomic64_add(sizeof(*v), &s390_arch_random_counter);
return true;
}
return false;
}
......@@ -45,7 +43,9 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
{
if (static_branch_likely(&s390_arch_random_available)) {
return s390_arch_random_generate((u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
cpacf_trng(NULL, 0, (u8 *)v, sizeof(*v));
atomic64_add(sizeof(*v), &s390_arch_random_counter);
return true;
}
return false;
}
......
......@@ -133,9 +133,9 @@ struct slibe {
* @sb_count: number of storage blocks
* @sba: storage block element addresses
* @dcount: size of storage block elements
* @user0: user defineable value
* @res4: reserved paramater
* @user1: user defineable value
* @user0: user definable value
* @res4: reserved parameter
* @user1: user definable value
*/
struct qaob {
u64 res0[6];
......
......@@ -875,6 +875,11 @@ static void __init setup_randomness(void)
if (stsi(vmms, 3, 2, 2) == 0 && vmms->count)
add_device_randomness(&vmms->vm, sizeof(vmms->vm[0]) * vmms->count);
memblock_free(vmms, PAGE_SIZE);
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
if (cpacf_query_func(CPACF_PRNO, CPACF_PRNO_TRNG))
static_branch_enable(&s390_arch_random_available);
#endif
}
/*
......
......@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ OBJCOPYFLAGS_purgatory.ro += --remove-section='.note.*'
$(obj)/purgatory.ro: $(obj)/purgatory $(obj)/purgatory.chk FORCE
$(call if_changed,objcopy)
$(obj)/kexec-purgatory.o: $(obj)/kexec-purgatory.S $(obj)/purgatory.ro FORCE
$(call if_changed_rule,as_o_S)
$(obj)/kexec-purgatory.o: $(obj)/purgatory.ro
obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY) += kexec-purgatory.o
obj-y += kexec-purgatory.o
......@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static LIST_HEAD(sclp_reg_list);
/* List of queued requests. */
static LIST_HEAD(sclp_req_queue);
/* Data for read and and init requests. */
/* Data for read and init requests. */
static struct sclp_req sclp_read_req;
static struct sclp_req sclp_init_req;
static void *sclp_read_sccb;
......
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