Commit f8f84af5 authored by Alexander Larkin's avatar Alexander Larkin Committed by Dmitry Torokhov

Input: joydev - prevent use of not validated data in JSIOCSBTNMAP ioctl

Even though we validate user-provided inputs we then traverse past
validated data when applying the new map. The issue was originally
discovered by Murray McAllister with this simple POC (if the following
is executed by an unprivileged user it will instantly panic the system):

int main(void) {
	int fd, ret;
	unsigned int buffer[10000];

	fd = open("/dev/input/js0", O_RDONLY);
	if (fd == -1)
		printf("Error opening file\n");

	ret = ioctl(fd, JSIOCSBTNMAP & ~IOCSIZE_MASK, &buffer);
	printf("%d\n", ret);
}

The solution is to traverse internal buffer which is guaranteed to only
contain valid date when constructing the map.

Fixes: 182d679b ("Input: joydev - prevent potential read overflow in ioctl")
Fixes: 999b874f ("Input: joydev - validate axis/button maps before clobbering current ones")
Reported-by: default avatarMurray McAllister <murray.mcallister@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlexander Larkin <avlarkin82@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210620120030.1513655-1-avlarkin82@gmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarDmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
parent cac7100d
...@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static int joydev_handle_JSIOCSBTNMAP(struct joydev *joydev, ...@@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ static int joydev_handle_JSIOCSBTNMAP(struct joydev *joydev,
memcpy(joydev->keypam, keypam, len); memcpy(joydev->keypam, keypam, len);
for (i = 0; i < joydev->nkey; i++) for (i = 0; i < joydev->nkey; i++)
joydev->keymap[keypam[i] - BTN_MISC] = i; joydev->keymap[joydev->keypam[i] - BTN_MISC] = i;
out: out:
kfree(keypam); kfree(keypam);
......
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