- 08 Jul, 2021 30 commits
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-16-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-15-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-14-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-13-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-12-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-11-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-10-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-9-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-8-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by:
Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-7-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-6-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-5-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-4-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Use setup_initial_init_mm() helper to simplify code. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-3-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Kefeng Wang authored
Patch series "init_mm: cleanup ARCH's text/data/brk setup code", v3. Add setup_initial_init_mm() helper, then use it to cleanup the text, data and brk setup code. This patch (of 15): Add setup_initial_init_mm() helper to setup kernel text, data and brk. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608083418.137226-2-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Zhen Lei authored
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments: successfull ==> successful potentialy ==> potentially alloced ==> allocated indicies ==> indices wont ==> won't resposible ==> responsible dirtyness ==> dirtiness droppped ==> dropped alread ==> already occured ==> occurred interupts ==> interrupts extention ==> extension slighly ==> slightly Dont't ==> Don't Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210531034849.9549-2-thunder.leizhen@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
The test verifies that file descriptor created with memfd_secret does not allow read/write operations, that secret memory mappings respect RLIMIT_MEMLOCK and that remote accesses with process_vm_read() and ptrace() to the secret memory fail. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-8-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by:
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-7-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by:
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings. Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-6-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well. The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly enable it at the boot time. Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes that have access to the file descriptor. Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the "traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says: "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse." memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user visible APIs. The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that belongs to the secret memory area. Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e0 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page migration. Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings. However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA. A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page. The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error handling is omitted): fd = memfd_secret(0); ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE); ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ [akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
On arm64, set_direct_map_*() functions may return 0 without actually changing the linear map. This behaviour can be controlled using kernel parameters, so we need a way to determine at runtime whether calls to set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() and set_direct_map_default_noflush() have any effect. Extend set_memory API with can_set_direct_map() function that allows checking if calling set_direct_map_*() will actually change the page table, replace several occurrences of open coded checks in arm64 with the new function and provide a generic stub for architectures that always modify page tables upon calls to set_direct_map APIs. [arnd@arndb.de: arm64: kfence: fix header inclusion ] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-4-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP and ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY configuration options have no meaning when CONFIG_MMU is disabled and there is no point to enable them for the nommu case. Add an explicit dependency on MMU for these options. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-3-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
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Mike Rapoport authored
Patch series "mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas", v20. This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm. Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants mappings. It's designed to provide the following protections: * Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work. Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most standard attacks. * Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP. * Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem, a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform secrets exfiltration using ptrace. In the future the secret mappings may be used as a mean to protect guest memory in a virtual machine host. For demonstration of secret memory usage we've created a userspace library https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/secret-memory-preloader.git that does two things: the first is act as a preloader for openssl to redirect all the OPENSSL_malloc calls to secret memory meaning any secret keys get automatically protected this way and the other thing it does is expose the API to the user who needs it. We anticipate that a lot of the use cases would be like the openssl one: many toolkits that deal with secret keys already have special handling for the memory to try to give them greater protection, so this would simply be pluggable into the toolkits without any need for user application modification. Hiding secret memory mappings behind an anonymous file allows usage of the page cache for tracking pages allocated for the "secret" mappings as well as using address_space_operations for e.g. page migration callbacks. The anonymous file may be also used implicitly, like hugetlb files, to implement mmap(MAP_SECRET) and use the secret memory areas with "native" mm ABIs in the future. Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e0 ("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "... although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system administrator to enable it at boot time. In addition, there is also a long term goal to improve management of the direct map. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/ This patch (of 7): It will be used by the upcoming secret memory implementation. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-1-rppt@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-2-rppt@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
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Oliver Glitta authored
Many stack traces are similar so there are many similar arrays. Stackdepot saves each unique stack only once. Replace field addrs in struct track with depot_stack_handle_t handle. Use stackdepot to save stack trace. The benefits are smaller memory overhead and possibility to aggregate per-cache statistics in the future using the stackdepot handle instead of matching stacks manually. [rdunlap@infradead.org: rename save_stack_trace()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210513051920.29320-1-rdunlap@infradead.org [vbabka@suse.cz: fix lockdep splat] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210516195150.26740-1-vbabka@suse.czLink: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210414163434.4376-1-glittao@gmail.comSigned-off-by:
Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by:
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Chancellor authored
Now that we handle all of the sections in a Hexagon defconfig, select ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN so that unhandled sections are warned about by default. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521011239.1332345-4-nathan@kernel.orgSigned-off-by:
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Acked-by:
Brian Cain <bcain@codeaurora.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Chancellor authored
ld.lld warns that the '.modinfo' section is not currently handled: ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(workqueue.o):(.modinfo) is being placed in '.modinfo' ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(printk/printk.o):(.modinfo) is being placed in '.modinfo' ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(irq/spurious.o):(.modinfo) is being placed in '.modinfo' ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(rcu/update.o):(.modinfo) is being placed in '.modinfo' The '.modinfo' section was added in commit 898490c0 ("moduleparam: Save information about built-in modules in separate file") to the DISCARDS macro but Hexagon has never used that macro. The unification of DISCARDS happened in commit 023bf6f1 ("linker script: unify usage of discard definition") in 2009, prior to Hexagon being added in 2011. Switch Hexagon over to the DISCARDS macro so that anything that is expected to be discarded gets discarded. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521011239.1332345-3-nathan@kernel.org Fixes: e95bf452 ("Hexagon: Add configuration and makefiles for the Hexagon architecture.") Signed-off-by:
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Nathan Chancellor authored
Patch series "hexagon: Fix build error with CONFIG_STACKDEPOT and select CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN". This series fixes an error with ARCH=hexagon that was pointed out by the patch "mm/slub: use stackdepot to save stack trace in objects". The first patch fixes that error by handling the '.irqentry.text' and '.softirqentry.text' sections. The second patch switches Hexagon over to the common DISCARDS macro, which should have been done when Hexagon was merged into the tree to match commit 023bf6f1 ("linker script: unify usage of discard definition"). The third patch selects CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN so that something like this does not happen again. This patch (of 3): Patch "mm/slub: use stackdepot to save stack trace in objects" in -mm selects CONFIG_STACKDEPOT when CONFIG_STACKTRACE_SUPPORT is selected and CONFIG_STACKDEPOT requires IRQENTRY_TEXT and SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT to be handled after commit 505a0ef1 ("kasan: stackdepot: move filter_irq_stacks() to stackdepot.c") due to the use of the __{,soft}irqentry_text_{start,end} section symbols. If those sections are not handled, the build is broken. $ make ARCH=hexagon CROSS_COMPILE=hexagon-linux- LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 defconfig all ... ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: __irqentry_text_start >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: __irqentry_text_end >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: __softirqentry_text_start >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: __softirqentry_text_end >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a >>> referenced by stackdepot.c >>> stackdepot.o:(filter_irq_stacks) in archive lib/built-in.a ... Add these sections to the Hexagon linker script so the build continues to work. ld.lld's orphan section warning would have caught this prior to the -mm commit mentioned above: ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(softirq.o):(.softirqentry.text) is being placed in '.softirqentry.text' ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(softirq.o):(.softirqentry.text) is being placed in '.softirqentry.text' ld.lld: warning: kernel/built-in.a(softirq.o):(.softirqentry.text) is being placed in '.softirqentry.text' Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521011239.1332345-1-nathan@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521011239.1332345-2-nathan@kernel.org Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1381 Fixes: 505a0ef1 ("kasan: stackdepot: move filter_irq_stacks() to stackdepot.c") Signed-off-by:
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Zhen Lei authored
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments found by "codespell": Hoever ==> However poiter ==> pointer representaion ==> representation uppon ==> upon independend ==> independent aquired ==> acquired mis-match ==> mismatch scrach ==> scratch struture ==> structure Analagous ==> Analogous interation ==> iteration And some were discovered manually by Joe Perches and Christoph Lameter: stroed ==> stored arch independent ==> an architecture independent A example structure for ==> Example structure for Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210609150027.14805-2-thunder.leizhen@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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Zhen Lei authored
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments: permanentely ==> permanently wont ==> won't remaning ==> remaining succed ==> succeed shouldnt ==> shouldn't alpha-numeric ==> alphanumeric storeing ==> storing funtion ==> function documenation ==> documentation Determin ==> Determine intepreted ==> interpreted ammount ==> amount obious ==> obvious interupts ==> interrupts occured ==> occurred asssociated ==> associated taking into acount ==> taking into account squence ==> sequence stil ==> still contiguos ==> contiguous matchs ==> matches Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210607072555.12416-1-thunder.leizhen@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Zhen Lei authored
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments found by "codespell": thats ==> that's unitialized ==> uninitialized panicing ==> panicking sucess ==> success possitive ==> positive intepreted ==> interpreted Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210607133036.12525-2-thunder.leizhen@huawei.comSigned-off-by:
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- 07 Jul, 2021 6 commits
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linuxLinus Torvalds authored
Pull module updates from Jessica Yu: - Fix incorrect logic in module_kallsyms_on_each_symbol() - Fix for a Coccinelle warning * tag 'modules-for-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux: module: correctly exit module_kallsyms_on_each_symbol when fn() != 0 kernel/module: Use BUG_ON instead of if condition followed by BUG
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull x86 fpu updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Fixes and improvements for FPU handling on x86: - Prevent sigaltstack out of bounds writes. The kernel unconditionally writes the FPU state to the alternate stack without checking whether the stack is large enough to accomodate it. Check the alternate stack size before doing so and in case it's too small force a SIGSEGV instead of silently corrupting user space data. - MINSIGSTKZ and SIGSTKSZ are constants in signal.h and have never been updated despite the fact that the FPU state which is stored on the signal stack has grown over time which causes trouble in the field when AVX512 is available on a CPU. The kernel does not expose the minimum requirements for the alternate stack size depending on the available and enabled CPU features. ARM already added an aux vector AT_MINSIGSTKSZ for the same reason. Add it to x86 as well. - A major cleanup of the x86 FPU code. The recent discoveries of XSTATE related issues unearthed quite some inconsistencies, duplicated code and other issues. The fine granular overhaul addresses this, makes the code more robust and maintainable, which allows to integrate upcoming XSTATE related features in sane ways" * tag 'x86-fpu-2021-07-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (74 commits) x86/fpu/xstate: Clear xstate header in copy_xstate_to_uabi_buf() again x86/fpu/signal: Let xrstor handle the features to init x86/fpu/signal: Handle #PF in the direct restore path x86/fpu: Return proper error codes from user access functions x86/fpu/signal: Split out the direct restore code x86/fpu/signal: Sanitize copy_user_to_fpregs_zeroing() x86/fpu/signal: Sanitize the xstate check on sigframe x86/fpu/signal: Remove the legacy alignment check x86/fpu/signal: Move initial checks into fpu__restore_sig() x86/fpu: Mark init_fpstate __ro_after_init x86/pkru: Remove xstate fiddling from write_pkru() x86/fpu: Don't store PKRU in xstate in fpu_reset_fpstate() x86/fpu: Remove PKRU handling from switch_fpu_finish() x86/fpu: Mask PKRU from kernel XRSTOR[S] operations x86/fpu: Hook up PKRU into ptrace() x86/fpu: Add PKRU storage outside of task XSAVE buffer x86/fpu: Dont restore PKRU in fpregs_restore_userspace() x86/fpu: Rename xfeatures_mask_user() to xfeatures_mask_uabi() x86/fpu: Move FXSAVE_LEAK quirk info __copy_kernel_to_fpregs() x86/fpu: Rename __fpregs_load_activate() to fpregs_restore_userregs() ... -
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull xen updates from Juergen Gross: "Only two minor patches this time: one cleanup patch and one patch refreshing a Xen header" * tag 'for-linus-5.14-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip: xen: sync include/xen/interface/io/ring.h with Xen's newest version xen: Use DEVICE_ATTR_*() macro
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Linus Torvalds authored
Merge tag 'Wimplicit-fallthrough-clang-5.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gustavoars/linux Pull more fallthrough fixes from Gustavo Silva: "Fix maore fall-through warnings when building the kernel with clang and '-Wimplicit-fallthrough'" * tag 'Wimplicit-fallthrough-clang-5.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gustavoars/linux: Input: Fix fall-through warning for Clang scsi: aic94xx: Fix fall-through warning for Clang i3c: master: cdns: Fix fall-through warning for Clang net/mlx4: Fix fall-through warning for Clang
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/andersson/remoteprocLinus Torvalds authored
Pull hwspinlock updates from Bjorn Andersson: "This adds a driver for the hardware spinlock in Allwinner sun6i" * tag 'hwlock-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/andersson/remoteproc: dt-bindings: hwlock: sun6i: Fix various warnings in binding hwspinlock: add sun6i hardware spinlock support dt-bindings: hwlock: add sun6i_hwspinlock
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/andersson/remoteprocLinus Torvalds authored
Pull remoteproc updates from Bjorn Andersson: "This adds support for controlling the PRU and R5F clusters on the TI AM64x, the remote processor in i.MX7ULP, i.MX8MN/P and i.MX8ULP NXP and the audio, compute and modem remoteprocs in the Qualcomm SC8180x platform. It fixes improper ordering of cdev and device creation of the remoteproc control interface and it fixes resource leaks in the error handling path of rproc_add() and the Qualcomm modem and wifi remoteproc drivers. Lastly it fixes a few build warnings and replace the dummy parameter passed in the mailbox api of the stm32 driver to something not living on the stack" * tag 'rproc-v5.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/andersson/remoteproc: (32 commits) remoteproc: qcom: pas: Add SC8180X adsp, cdsp and mpss dt-bindings: remoteproc: qcom: pas: Add SC8180X adsp, cdsp and mpss remoteproc: imx_rproc: support i.MX8ULP dt-bindings: remoteproc: imx_rproc: support i.MX8ULP remoteproc: stm32: fix mbox_send_message call remoteproc: core: Cleanup device in case of failure remoteproc: core: Fix cdev remove and rproc del remoteproc: core: Move validate before device add remoteproc: core: Move cdev add before device add remoteproc: pru: Add support for various PRU cores on K3 AM64x SoCs dt-bindings: remoteproc: pru: Update bindings for K3 AM64x SoCs remoteproc: qcom_wcnss: Use devm_qcom_smem_state_get() remoteproc: qcom_q6v5: Use devm_qcom_smem_state_get() to fix missing put() soc: qcom: smem_state: Add devm_qcom_smem_state_get() dt-bindings: remoteproc: qcom: pas: Fix indentation warnings remoteproc: imx-rproc: Fix IMX_REMOTEPROC configuration remoteproc: imx_rproc: support i.MX8MN/P remoteproc: imx_rproc: support i.MX7ULP remoteproc: imx_rproc: make clk optional remoteproc: imx_rproc: initial support for mutilple start/stop method ...
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- 06 Jul, 2021 4 commits
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a warning by explicitly adding a fallthrough; statement. Notice that this seems to be a Duff device for performance[1]. So, although the code looks a bit _funny_, I didn't want to refactor or modify it beyond merely adding a fallthrough marking, which might be the least disruptive way to fix this issue. [1] https://www.drdobbs.com/a-reusable-duff-device/184406208 Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115Signed-off-by:
Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a warning by explicitly adding a fallthrough; statement. Notice that this seems to be a Duff device for performance[1]. So, although the code looks a bit _funny_, I didn't want to refactor or modify it beyond merely adding a fallthrough marking, which might be the least disruptive way to fix this issue. [1] https://www.drdobbs.com/a-reusable-duff-device/184406208 Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115Signed-off-by:
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git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-armLinus Torvalds authored
Pull ARM development updates from Russell King: - Make it clear __swp_entry_to_pte() uses PTE_TYPE_FAULT - Updates for setting vmalloc size via command line to resolve an issue with the 8MiB hole not properly being accounted for, and clean up the code. - ftrace support for module PLTs - Spelling fixes - kbuild updates for removing generated files and pattern rules for generating files - Clang/llvm updates - Change the way the kernel is mapped, placing it in vmalloc space instead. - Remove arm_pm_restart from arm and aarch64. * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm: (29 commits) ARM: 9098/1: ftrace: MODULE_PLT: Fix build problem without DYNAMIC_FTRACE ARM: 9097/1: mmu: Declare section start/end correctly ARM: 9096/1: Remove arm_pm_restart() ARM: 9095/1: ARM64: Remove arm_pm_restart() ARM: 9094/1: Register with kernel restart handler ARM: 9093/1: drivers: firmwapsci: Register with kernel restart handler ARM: 9092/1: xen: Register with kernel restart handler ARM: 9091/1: Revert "mm: qsd8x50: Fix incorrect permission faults" ARM: 9090/1: Map the lowmem and kernel separately ARM: 9089/1: Define kernel physical section start and end ARM: 9088/1: Split KERNEL_OFFSET from PAGE_OFFSET ARM: 9087/1: kprobes: test-thumb: fix for LLVM_IAS=1 ARM: 9086/1: syscalls: use pattern rules to generate syscall headers ARM: 9085/1: remove unneeded abi parameter to syscallnr.sh ARM: 9084/1: simplify the build rule of mach-types.h ARM: 9083/1: uncompress: atags_to_fdt: Spelling s/REturn/Return/ ARM: 9082/1: [v2] mark prepare_page_table as __init ARM: 9079/1: ftrace: Add MODULE_PLTS support ARM: 9078/1: Add warn suppress parameter to arm_gen_branch_link() ARM: 9077/1: PLT: Move struct plt_entries definition to header ...
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git://github.com/openrisc/linuxLinus Torvalds authored
Pull OpenRISC updates from Stafford Horne: "One change to simplify Litex CSR (MMIO register) access by limiting them to 32-bit offsets. Now that this is agreed on among Litex hardware and kernel developers it will allow us to start upstreaming other Litex peripheral drivers" * tag 'for-linus' of git://github.com/openrisc/linux: drivers/soc/litex: remove 8-bit subregister option
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