- 05 Apr, 2017 22 commits
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in sound/drivers/. Suggested-by:
Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com> cc: alsa-devel@alsa-project.org
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in fs/pstore/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/watchdog/. Suggested-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@iguana.be> cc: Zwane Mwaikambo <zwanem@gmail.com> cc: linux-watchdog@vger.kernel.org
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/video/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/tty/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/vme/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/speakup/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/media/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/scsi/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/pcmcia/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/pci/hotplug/. Suggested-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> cc: Scott Murray <scott@spiteful.org> cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/parport/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/wireless/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/wan/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/irda/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/hamradio/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/ethernet/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/can/. Suggested-by:
Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com> cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/arcnet/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/appletalk/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/mmc/host/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/misc/. Suggested-by:
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- 04 Apr, 2017 13 commits
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/media/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/isdn/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/input/. Suggested-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/iio/. Suggested-by:
William Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org> cc: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/i2c/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/gpio/. Suggested-by:
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> cc: Alexandre Courbot <gnurou@gmail.com> cc: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/cpufreq/. Suggested-by:
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/clocksource/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/mwave/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/ipmi/. Suggested-by:
Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> cc: openipmi-developer@lists.sourceforge.net
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David Howells authored
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a device to access or modify the kernel image. To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down. The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the default values for those parameters is. Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition to manually coded parameters. This patch annotates drivers in arch/x86/mm/. Suggested-by:
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David Howells authored
Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed dma buffers and other types). This will enable such parameters to be locked down in the core parameter parser for secure boot support. I've also included annotations as to what sort of hardware configuration each module is dealing with for future use. Some of these are straightforward (ioport, iomem, irq, dma), but there are also: (1) drivers that switch the semantics of a parameter between ioport and iomem depending on a second parameter, (2) drivers that appear to reserve a CPU memory buffer at a fixed address, (3) other parameters, such as bus types and irq selection bitmasks. For the moment, the hardware configuration type isn't actually stored, though its validity is checked. Signed-off-by:
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- 03 Apr, 2017 2 commits
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Elena Reshetova authored
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free situations. Signed-off-by:
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by:
David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com> Acked-by:
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Elena Reshetova authored
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free situations. Signed-off-by:
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- 30 Mar, 2017 1 commit
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Kees Cook authored
Prepare to mark sensitive kernel structures for randomization by making sure they're using designated initializers. These were identified during allyesconfig builds of x86, arm, and arm64, with most initializer fixes extracted from grsecurity. Signed-off-by:
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by:
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- 28 Mar, 2017 2 commits
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Tetsuo Handa authored
We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change. TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob, security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob. We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"-> security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged this patch. Signed-off-by:
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by:
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Tested-by:
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> Acked-by:
José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Signed-off-by:
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James Morris authored
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