- 08 Apr, 2017 1 commit
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Ilya Dryomov authored
commit 633ee407 upstream. sock_alloc_inode() allocates socket+inode and socket_wq with GFP_KERNEL, which is not allowed on the writeback path: Workqueue: ceph-msgr con_work [libceph] ffff8810871cb018 0000000000000046 0000000000000000 ffff881085d40000 0000000000012b00 ffff881025cad428 ffff8810871cbfd8 0000000000012b00 ffff880102fc1000 ffff881085d40000 ffff8810871cb038 ffff8810871cb148 Call Trace: [<ffffffff816dd629>] schedule+0x29/0x70 [<ffffffff816e066d>] schedule_timeout+0x1bd/0x200 [<ffffffff81093ffc>] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x2c/0x120 [<ffffffff81094266>] ? ttwu_do_activate.constprop.135+0x66/0x70 [<ffffffff816deb5f>] wait_for_completion+0xbf/0x180 [<ffffffff81097cd0>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x390/0x390 [<ffffffff81086335>] flush_work+0x165/0x250 [<ffffffff81082940>] ? worker_detach_from_pool+0xd0/0xd0 [<ffffffffa03b65b1>] xlog_cil_force_lsn+0x81/0x200 [xfs] [<ffffffff816d6b42>] ? __slab_free+0xee/0x234 [<ffffffffa03b4b1d>] _xfs_log_force_lsn+0x4d/0x2c0 [xfs] [<ffffffff811adc1e>] ? lookup_page_cgroup_used+0xe/0x30 [<ffffffffa039a723>] ? xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03b4dcf>] xfs_log_force_lsn+0x3f/0xf0 [xfs] [<ffffffffa039a723>] ? xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03a62c6>] xfs_iunpin_wait+0xc6/0x1a0 [xfs] [<ffffffff810aa250>] ? wake_atomic_t_function+0x40/0x40 [<ffffffffa039a723>] xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs] [<ffffffffa039ac07>] xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag+0x257/0x3d0 [xfs] [<ffffffffa039bb13>] xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr+0x33/0x40 [xfs] [<ffffffffa03ab745>] xfs_fs_free_cached_objects+0x15/0x20 [xfs] [<ffffffff811c0c18>] super_cache_scan+0x178/0x180 [<ffffffff8115912e>] shrink_slab_node+0x14e/0x340 [<ffffffff811afc3b>] ? mem_cgroup_iter+0x16b/0x450 [<ffffffff8115af70>] shrink_slab+0x100/0x140 [<ffffffff8115e425>] do_try_to_free_pages+0x335/0x490 [<ffffffff8115e7f9>] try_to_free_pages+0xb9/0x1f0 [<ffffffff816d56e4>] ? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0x69/0x1be [<ffffffff81150cba>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x69a/0xb40 [<ffffffff8119743e>] alloc_pages_current+0x9e/0x110 [<ffffffff811a0ac5>] new_slab+0x2c5/0x390 [<ffffffff816d71c4>] __slab_alloc+0x33b/0x459 [<ffffffff815b906d>] ? sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0 [<ffffffff8164bda1>] ? inet_sendmsg+0x71/0xc0 [<ffffffff815b906d>] ? sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0 [<ffffffff811a21f2>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1a2/0x1b0 [<ffffffff815b906d>] sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0 [<ffffffff811d8566>] alloc_inode+0x26/0xa0 [<ffffffff811da04a>] new_inode_pseudo+0x1a/0x70 [<ffffffff815b933e>] sock_alloc+0x1e/0x80 [<ffffffff815ba855>] __sock_create+0x95/0x220 [<ffffffff815baa04>] sock_create_kern+0x24/0x30 [<ffffffffa04794d9>] con_work+0xef9/0x2050 [libceph] [<ffffffffa04aa9ec>] ? rbd_img_request_submit+0x4c/0x60 [rbd] [<ffffffff81084c19>] process_one_work+0x159/0x4f0 [<ffffffff8108561b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x530 [<ffffffff81085500>] ? create_worker+0x1d0/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8108b6f9>] kthread+0xc9/0xe0 [<ffffffff8108b630>] ? flush_kthread_worker+0x90/0x90 [<ffffffff816e1b98>] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90 [<ffffffff8108b630>] ? flush_kthread_worker+0x90/0x90 Use memalloc_noio_{save,restore}() to temporarily force GFP_NOIO here. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/19309Reported-by:
Sergey Jerusalimov <wintchester@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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- 31 Mar, 2017 15 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Sebastian Andrzej Siewior authored
commit 619bd4a7 upstream. Since the change in commit: fd7a4bed ("sched, rt: Convert switched_{from, to}_rt() / prio_changed_rt() to balance callbacks") ... we don't reschedule a task under certain circumstances: Lets say task-A, SCHED_OTHER, is running on CPU0 (and it may run only on CPU0) and holds a PI lock. This task is removed from the CPU because it used up its time slice and another SCHED_OTHER task is running. Task-B on CPU1 runs at RT priority and asks for the lock owned by task-A. This results in a priority boost for task-A. Task-B goes to sleep until the lock has been made available. Task-A is already runnable (but not active), so it receives no wake up. The reality now is that task-A gets on the CPU once the scheduler decides to remove the current task despite the fact that a high priority task is enqueued and waiting. This may take a long time. The desired behaviour is that CPU0 immediately reschedules after the priority boost which made task-A the task with the lowest priority. Suggested-by:
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
commit 1b53cf98 upstream. Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become "locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently. This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse. This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead, an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely. This change is not expected to break any applications. In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations --- waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations, and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed. This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them. Fixes: b7236e21 ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode") Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by:
Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dave Martin authored
commit 7195ee31 upstream. It's not clear what behaviour is sensible when doing partial write of NT_METAG_RPIPE, so just don't bother. This patch assumes that userspace will never rely on a partial SETREGSET in this case, since it's not clear what should happen anyway. Signed-off-by:
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Acked-by:
James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dave Martin authored
commit 5fe81fe9 upstream. Ensure that if userspace supplies insufficient data to PTRACE_SETREGSET to fill TXSTATUS, a well-defined default value is used, based on the task's current value. Suggested-by:
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Dave Martin authored
commit a78ce80d upstream. Ensure that if userspace supplies insufficient data to PTRACE_SETREGSET to fill all the registers, the thread's old registers are preserved. Signed-off-by:
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Dave Martin authored
commit d3805c54 upstream. Ensure that if userspace supplies insufficient data to PTRACE_SETREGSET to fill all the registers, the thread's old registers are preserved. Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Dave Martin authored
commit d614fd58 upstream. Ensure that if userspace supplies insufficient data to PTRACE_SETREGSET to fill all the registers, the thread's old registers are preserved. Signed-off-by:
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Dave Martin authored
commit 502585c7 upstream. regs_set() and regs_get() are vulnerable to an off-by-1 buffer overrun if CONFIG_CPU_H8S is set, since this adds an extra entry to register_offset[] but not to user_regs_struct. So, iterate over user_regs_struct based on its actual size, not based on the length of register_offset[]. Signed-off-by:
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Dave Martin authored
commit fb411b83 upstream. gpr_set won't work correctly and can never have been tested, and the correct behaviour is not clear due to the endianness-dependent task layout. So, just remove it. The core code will now return -EOPNOTSUPPORT when trying to set NT_PRSTATUS on this architecture until/unless a correct implementation is supplied. Signed-off-by:
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Bjorn Andersson authored
commit a6566710 upstream. Clearing the status bit on irq_unmask will discard any pending interrupt that did arrive after the irq_ack, i.e. while the IRQ handler function was executing. Fixes: f365be09 ("pinctrl: Add Qualcomm TLMM driver") Cc: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org> Reported-by:
Timur Tabi <timur@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Ladi Prosek authored
commit fc865322 upstream. When init_vqs runs, virtio_balloon.stats is either uninitialized or contains stale values. The host updates its state with garbage data because it has no way of knowing that this is just a marker buffer used for signaling. This patch updates the stats before pushing the initial buffer. Alternative fixes: * Push an empty buffer in init_vqs. Not easily done with the current virtio implementation and violates the spec "Driver MUST supply the same subset of statistics in all buffers submitted to the statsq". * Push a buffer with invalid tags in init_vqs. Violates the same spec clause, plus "invalid tag" is not really defined. Note: the spec says: When using the legacy interface, the device SHOULD ignore all values in the first buffer in the statsq supplied by the driver after device initialization. Note: Historically, drivers supplied an uninitialized buffer in the first buffer. Unfortunately QEMU does not seem to implement the recommendation even for the legacy interface. Signed-off-by:
Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Whitcroft authored
commit f843ee6d upstream. Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by:
Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com> Acked-by:
Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andy Whitcroft authored
commit 677e806d upstream. When a new xfrm state is created during an XFRM_MSG_NEWSA call we validate the user supplied replay_esn to ensure that the size is valid and to ensure that the replay_window size is within the allocated buffer. However later it is possible to update this replay_esn via a XFRM_MSG_NEWAE call. There we again validate the size of the supplied buffer matches the existing state and if so inject the contents. We do not at this point check that the replay_window is within the allocated memory. This leads to out-of-bounds reads and writes triggered by netlink packets. This leads to memory corruption and the potential for priviledge escalation. We already attempt to validate the incoming replay information in xfrm_new_ae() via xfrm_replay_verify_len(). This confirms that the user is not trying to change the size of the replay state buffer which includes the replay_esn. It however does not check the replay_window remains within that buffer. Add validation of the contained replay_window. CVE-2017-7184 Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
commit c282222a upstream. Dmitry reports following splat: INFO: trying to register non-static key. the code is fine but needs lockdep annotation. turning off the locking correctness validator. CPU: 0 PID: 13059 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc7-next-20170207 #1 [..] spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:304 [inline] xfrm_policy_flush+0x32/0x470 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:963 xfrm_policy_fini+0xbf/0x560 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3041 xfrm_net_init+0x79f/0x9e0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3091 ops_init+0x10a/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:115 setup_net+0x2ed/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:291 copy_net_ns+0x26c/0x530 net/core/net_namespace.c:396 create_new_namespaces+0x409/0x860 kernel/nsproxy.c:106 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x1e0 kernel/nsproxy.c:205 SYSC_unshare kernel/fork.c:2281 [inline] Problem is that when we get error during xfrm_net_init we will call xfrm_policy_fini which will acquire xfrm_policy_lock before it was initialized. Just move it around so locks get set up first. Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Fixes: 283bc9f3 ("xfrm: Namespacify xfrm state/policy locks") Signed-off-by:
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by:
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- 30 Mar, 2017 24 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Jiri Slaby authored
commit 62071194 upstream. With this reproducer: struct sockaddr_alg alg = { .salg_family = 0x26, .salg_type = "hash", .salg_feat = 0xf, .salg_mask = 0x5, .salg_name = "digest_null", }; int sock, sock2; sock = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&alg, sizeof(alg)); sock2 = accept(sock, NULL, NULL); setsockopt(sock, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, "\x9b\xca", 2); accept(sock2, NULL, NULL); ==== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ==== one can immediatelly see an UBSAN warning: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/algif_hash.c:187:7 variable length array bound value 0 <= 0 CPU: 0 PID: 15949 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G E 4.4.30-0-default #1 ... Call Trace: ... [<ffffffff81d598fd>] ? __ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive+0x13d/0x188 [<ffffffff81d597c0>] ? __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x1bc/0x1bc [<ffffffffa0e2204d>] ? hash_accept+0x5bd/0x7d0 [algif_hash] [<ffffffffa0e2293f>] ? hash_accept_nokey+0x3f/0x51 [algif_hash] [<ffffffffa0e206b0>] ? hash_accept_parent_nokey+0x4a0/0x4a0 [algif_hash] [<ffffffff8235c42b>] ? SyS_accept+0x2b/0x40 It is a correct warning, as hash state is propagated to accept as zero, but creating a zero-length variable array is not allowed in C. Fix this as proposed by Herbert -- do "?: 1" on that site. No sizeof or similar happens in the code there, so we just allocate one byte even though we do not use the array. Signed-off-by:
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> (maintainer:CRYPTO API) Reported-by:
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 8aac7f34 upstream. fbcon can deal with vc_hi_font_mask (the upper 256 chars) and adjust the vc attrs dynamically when vc_hi_font_mask is changed at fbcon_init(). When the vc_hi_font_mask is set, it remaps the attrs in the existing console buffer with one bit shift up (for 9 bits), while it remaps with one bit shift down (for 8 bits) when the value is cleared. It works fine as long as the font gets updated after fbcon was initialized. However, we hit a bizarre problem when the console is switched to another fb driver (typically from vesafb or efifb to drmfb). At switching to the new fb driver, we temporarily rebind the console to the dummy console, then rebind to the new driver. During the switching, we leave the modified attrs as is. Thus, the new fbcon takes over the old buffer as if it were to contain 8 bits chars (although the attrs are still shifted for 9 bits), and effectively this results in the yellow color texts instead of the original white color, as found in the bugzilla entry below. An easy fix for this is to re-adjust the attrs before leaving the fbcon at con_deinit callback. Since the code to adjust the attrs is already present in the current fbcon code, in this patch, we simply factor out the relevant code, and call it from fbcon_deinit(). Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1000619Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> [ Upstream commit f209fa03 ] During a PCI error recovery, like the ones provoked by EEH in the ppc64 platform, all IO to the device must be blocked while the recovery is completed. Current 8250_pci implementation only suspends the port instead of detaching it, which doesn't prevent incoming accesses like TIOCMGET and TIOCMSET calls from reaching the device. Those end up racing with the EEH recovery, crashing it. Similar races were also observed when opening the device and when shutting it down during recovery. This patch implements a more robust IO blockage for the 8250_pci recovery by unregistering the port at the beginning of the procedure and re-adding it afterwards. Since the port is detached from the uart layer, we can be sure that no request will make through to the device during recovery. This is similar to the solution used by the JSM serial driver. I thank Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> for valuable input on this one over one year ago. Signed-off-by:
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by:
Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Michael Pobega <mpobega@neverware.com> [ Upstream commit 708f5dcc ] The Dell Latitude 3350's ethernet card attempts to use a reserved IRQ (18), resulting in ACPI being unable to enable the ethernet. Adding it to acpi_rev_dmi_table[] helps to work around this problem. Signed-off-by:
Michael Pobega <mpobega@neverware.com> [ rjw: Changelog ] Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Alex Hung <alex.hung@canonical.com> [ Upstream commit 9523b9bf ] Precision 5520 and 3520 either hang at login and during suspend or reboot. It turns out that that adding them to acpi_rev_dmi_table[] helps to work around those issues. Signed-off-by:
Alex Hung <alex.hung@canonical.com> [ rjw: Changelog ] Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Henrik Ingo <henrik.ingo@avoinelama.fi> [ Upstream commit e950267a ] Some devices have invalid baSourceID references, causing uvc_scan_chain() to fail, but if we just take the entities we can find and put them together in the most sensible chain we can think of, turns out they do work anyway. Note: This heuristic assumes there is a single chain. At the time of writing, devices known to have such a broken chain are - Acer Integrated Camera (5986:055a) - Realtek rtl157a7 (0bda:57a7) Signed-off-by:
Henrik Ingo <henrik.ingo@avoinelama.fi> Signed-off-by:
Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com> [ Upstream commit b3e8652b ] Signed-off-by:
Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> [ Upstream commit 25cdb645 ] The WRITE_SAME commands are not present in the blk_default_cmd_filter write_ok list, and thus are failed with -EPERM when the SG_IO ioctl() is executed without CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability (e.g., unprivileged users). [ sg_io() -> blk_fill_sghdr_rq() > blk_verify_command() -> -EPERM ] The problem can be reproduced with the sg_write_same command # sg_write_same --num 1 --xferlen 512 /dev/sda # # capsh --drop=cap_sys_rawio -- -c \ 'sg_write_same --num 1 --xferlen 512 /dev/sda' Write same: pass through os error: Operation not permitted # For comparison, the WRITE_VERIFY command does not observe this problem, since it is in that list: # capsh --drop=cap_sys_rawio -- -c \ 'sg_write_verify --num 1 --ilen 512 --lba 0 /dev/sda' # So, this patch adds the WRITE_SAME commands to the list, in order for the SG_IO ioctl to finish successfully: # capsh --drop=cap_sys_rawio -- -c \ 'sg_write_same --num 1 --xferlen 512 /dev/sda' # That case happens to be exercised by QEMU KVM guests with 'scsi-block' devices (qemu "-device scsi-block" [1], libvirt "<disk type='block' device='lun'>" [2]), which employs the SG_IO ioctl() and runs as an unprivileged user (libvirt-qemu). In that scenario, when a filesystem (e.g., ext4) performs its zero-out calls, which are translated to write-same calls in the guest kernel, and then into SG_IO ioctls to the host kernel, SCSI I/O errors may be observed in the guest: [...] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#0 FAILED Result: hostbyte=DID_OK driverbyte=DRIVER_SENSE [...] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#0 Sense Key : Aborted Command [current] [...] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#0 Add. Sense: I/O process terminated [...] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] tag#0 CDB: Write Same(10) 41 00 01 04 e0 78 00 00 08 00 [...] blk_update_request: I/O error, dev sda, sector 17096824 Links: [1] http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=336a6915bc7089fb20fea4ba99972ad9a97c5f52 [2] https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#elementsDisks (see 'disk' -> 'device') Signed-off-by:
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Brahadambal Srinivasan <latha@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by:
Manjunatha H R <manjuhr1@in.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> [ Upstream commit 39701e56 ] The iommu_table struct manages a hardware TCE table and a vmalloc'd table with corresponding userspace addresses. Both are allocated when the default DMA window is created and this happens when the very first group is attached to a container. As we are going to allow the userspace to configure container in one memory context and pas container fd to another, we have to postpones such allocations till a container fd is passed to the destination user process so we would account locked memory limit against the actual container user constrainsts. This postpones the it_userspace array allocation till it is used first time for mapping. The unmapping patch already checks if the array is allocated. Signed-off-by:
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Reviewed-by:
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Acked-by:
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> [ Upstream commit f40ec3c7 ] Previously we enabled VFs and enable their memory space before calling pcibios_sriov_enable(). But pcibios_sriov_enable() may update the VF BARs: for example, on PPC PowerNV we may change them to manage the association of VFs to PEs. Because 64-bit BARs cannot be updated atomically, it's unsafe to update them while they're enabled. The half-updated state may conflict with other devices in the system. Call pcibios_sriov_enable() before enabling the VFs so any BAR updates happen while the VF BARs are disabled. [bhelgaas: changelog] Tested-by:
Carol Soto <clsoto@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [ Upstream commit 63880b23 ] VF BARs are read-only zero, so updating VF BARs will not have any effect. See the SR-IOV spec r1.1, sec 3.4.1.11. We already ignore these updates because of 70675e0b ("PCI: Don't try to restore VF BARs"); this merely restructures it slightly to make it easier to split updates for standard and SR-IOV BARs. Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [ Upstream commit 45d004f4 ] The BAR property bits (0-3 for memory BARs, 0-1 for I/O BARs) are supposed to be read-only, but we do save them in res->flags and include them when updating the BAR. Mask the I/O property bits with ~PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_IO_MASK (0x3) instead of PCI_REGION_FLAG_MASK (0xf) to make it obvious that we can't corrupt bits 2-3 of I/O addresses. Use PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_MASK for ROM BARs. This means we'll only check the top 21 bits (instead of the 28 bits we used to check) of a ROM BAR to see if the update was successful. Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [ Upstream commit 546ba9f8 ] If we update a VF BAR while it's enabled, there are two potential problems: 1) Any driver that's using the VF has a cached BAR value that is stale after the update, and 2) We can't update 64-bit BARs atomically, so the intermediate state (new lower dword with old upper dword) may conflict with another device, and an access by a driver unrelated to the VF may cause a bus error. Warn about attempts to update VF BARs while they are enabled. This is a programming error, so use dev_WARN() to get a backtrace. Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [ Upstream commit 7a6d312b ] Remove the assumption that IORESOURCE_ROM_ENABLE == PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_ENABLE. PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_ENABLE is the ROM enable bit defined by the PCI spec, so if we're reading or writing a BAR register value, that's what we should use. IORESOURCE_ROM_ENABLE is a corresponding bit in struct resource flags. Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [ Upstream commit 0b457dde ] pci_update_resource() updates a hardware BAR so its address matches the kernel's struct resource UNLESS it's a disabled ROM BAR. We only update those when we enable the ROM. It's not obvious from the code why ROM BARs should be handled specially. Apparently there are Matrox devices with defective ROM BARs that read as zero when disabled. That means that if pci_enable_rom() reads the disabled BAR, sets PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_ENABLE (without re-inserting the address), and writes it back, it would enable the ROM at address zero. Add comments and references to explain why we can't make the code look more rational. The code changes are from 755528c8 ("Ignore disabled ROM resources at setup") and 8085ce08 ("[PATCH] Fix PCI ROM mapping"). Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2005/8/30/138Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [ Upstream commit 286c2378 ] pci_std_update_resource() only deals with standard BARs, so we don't have to worry about the complications of VF BARs in an SR-IOV capability. Compute the BAR address inline and remove pci_resource_bar(). That makes pci_iov_resource_bar() unused, so remove that as well. Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [ Upstream commit 6ffa2489 ] Previously pci_update_resource() used the same code path for updating standard BARs and VF BARs in SR-IOV capabilities. Split the VF BAR update into a new pci_iov_update_resource() internal interface, which makes it simpler to compute the BAR address (we can get rid of pci_resource_bar() and pci_iov_resource_bar()). This patch: - Renames pci_update_resource() to pci_std_update_resource(), - Adds pci_iov_update_resource(), - Makes pci_update_resource() a wrapper that calls the appropriate one, No functional change intended. Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> [ Upstream commit 59107e2f ] There is a feature in Hyper-V ('Debug-VM --InjectNonMaskableInterrupt') which injects NMI to the guest. We may want to crash the guest and do kdump on this NMI by enabling unknown_nmi_panic. To make kdump succeed we need to allow the kdump kernel to re-establish VMBus connection so it will see VMBus devices (storage, network,..). To properly unload VMBus making it possible to start over during kdump we need to do the following: - Send an 'unload' message to the hypervisor. This can be done on any CPU so we do this the crashing CPU. - Receive the 'unload finished' reply message. WS2012R2 delivers this message to the CPU which was used to establish VMBus connection during module load and this CPU may differ from the CPU sending 'unload'. Receiving a VMBus message means the following: - There is a per-CPU slot in memory for one message. This slot can in theory be accessed by any CPU. - We get an interrupt on the CPU when a message was placed into the slot. - When we read the message we need to clear the slot and signal the fact to the hypervisor. In case there are more messages to this CPU pending the hypervisor will deliver the next message. The signaling is done by writing to an MSR so this can only be done on the appropriate CPU. To avoid doing cross-CPU work on crash we have vmbus_wait_for_unload() function which checks message slots for all CPUs in a loop waiting for the 'unload finished' messages. However, there is an issue which arises when these conditions are met: - We're crashing on a CPU which is different from the one which was used to initially contact the hypervisor. - The CPU which was used for the initial contact is blocked with interrupts disabled and there is a message pending in the message slot. In this case we won't be able to read the 'unload finished' message on the crashing CPU. This is reproducible when we receive unknown NMIs on all CPUs simultaneously: the first CPU entering panic() will proceed to crash and all other CPUs will stop themselves with interrupts disabled. The suggested solution is to handle unknown NMIs for Hyper-V guests on the first CPU which gets them only. This will allow us to rely on VMBus interrupt handler being able to receive the 'unload finish' message in case it is delivered to a different CPU. The issue is not reproducible on WS2016 as Debug-VM delivers NMI to the boot CPU only, WS2012R2 and earlier Hyper-V versions are affected. Signed-off-by:
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Acked-by:
K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161202100720.28121-1-vkuznets@redhat.comSigned-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Todd Fujinaka <todd.fujinaka@intel.com> [ Upstream commit 5bc8c230 ] i210 and i211 share the same PHY but have different PCI IDs. Don't forget i211 for any i210 workarounds. Signed-off-by:
Todd Fujinaka <todd.fujinaka@intel.com> Tested-by:
Aaron Brown <aaron.f.brown@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Chris J Arges <christopherarges@gmail.com> [ Upstream commit 4e684f59 ] Sometimes firmware may not properly initialize I347AT4_PAGE_SELECT causing the probe of an igb i210 NIC to fail. This patch adds an addition zeroing of this register during igb_get_phy_id to workaround this issue. Thanks for Jochen Henneberg for the idea and original patch. Signed-off-by:
Chris J Arges <christopherarges@gmail.com> Tested-by:
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Sumit Semwal authored
From: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org> [ Upstream commit c74fd80f ] Revert the main part of commit: af42b8d1 ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests") That commit introduced reading the pci device's msi message data to see if a pirq was previously configured for the device's msi/msix, and re-use that pirq. At the time, that was the correct behavior. However, a later change to Qemu caused it to call into the Xen hypervisor to unmap all pirqs for a pci device, when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX vectors; specifically the Qemu commit: c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad ("qemu-xen: free all the pirqs for msi/msix when driver unload") Once Qemu added this pirq unmapping, it was no longer correct for the kernel to re-use the pirq number cached in the pci device msi message data. All Qemu releases since 2.1.0 contain the patch that unmaps the pirqs when the pci device disables its MSI/MSIX vectors. This bug is causing failures to initialize multiple NVMe controllers under Xen, because the NVMe driver sets up a single MSIX vector for each controller (concurrently), and then after using that to talk to the controller for some configuration data, it disables the single MSIX vector and re-configures all the MSIX vectors it needs. So the MSIX setup code tries to re-use the cached pirq from the first vector for each controller, but the hypervisor has already given away that pirq to another controller, and its initialization fails. This is discussed in more detail at: https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-01/msg00447.html Fixes: af42b8d1 ("xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests") Signed-off-by:
Dan Streetman <dan.streetman@canonical.com> Reviewed-by:
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Darrick J. Wong authored
commit 2aa6ba7b upstream. If we try to allocate memory pages to back an xfs_buf that we're trying to read, it's possible that we'll be so short on memory that the page allocation fails. For a blocking read we'll just wait, but for readahead we simply dump all the pages we've collected so far. Unfortunately, after dumping the pages we neglect to clear the _XBF_PAGES state, which means that the subsequent call to xfs_buf_free thinks that b_pages still points to pages we own. It then double-frees the b_pages pages. This results in screaming about negative page refcounts from the memory manager, which xfs oughtn't be triggering. To reproduce this case, mount a filesystem where the size of the inodes far outweighs the availalble memory (a ~500M inode filesystem on a VM with 300MB memory did the trick here) and run bulkstat in parallel with other memory eating processes to put a huge load on the system. The "check summary" phase of xfs_scrub also works for this purpose. Signed-off-by:
Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Cc: Ivan Kozik <ivan@ludios.org> Signed-off-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 687e0687 upstream. USBTMC devices are required to have a bulk-in and a bulk-out endpoint, but the driver failed to verify this, something which could lead to the endpoint addresses being taken from uninitialised memory. Make sure to zero all private data as part of allocation, and add the missing endpoint sanity check. Note that this also addresses a more recently introduced issue, where the interrupt-in-presence flag would also be uninitialised whenever the optional interrupt-in endpoint is not present. This in turn could lead to an interrupt urb being allocated, initialised and submitted based on uninitialised values. Fixes: dbf3e7f6 ("Implement an ioctl to support the USMTMC-USB488 READ_STATUS_BYTE operation.") Fixes: 5b775f67 ("USB: add USB test and measurement class driver") Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> [ johan: backport to v4.4 ] Signed-off-by:
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