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  1. 16 Jun, 2021 12 commits
  3. 15 Jun, 2021 6 commits
    • David S. Miller's avatar
      Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf · a4f0377d
      David S. Miller authored 
      Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
pull-request: bpf 2021-06-15

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.

We've added 5 non-merge commits during the last 11 day(s) which contain
a total of 10 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Fix marking incorrect umem ring as done in libbpf's
   xsk_socket__create_shared() helper, from Kev Jackson.

2) Fix oob leakage under a spectre v1 type confusion
   attack, from Daniel Borkmann.
====================
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      a4f0377d
    • Aleksander Jan Bajkowski's avatar
      lantiq: net: fix duplicated skb in rx descriptor ring · 7ea6cd16
      Aleksander Jan Bajkowski authored 
      The previous commit didn't fix the bug properly. By mistake, it replaces
the pointer of the next skb in the descriptor ring instead of the current
one. As a result, the two descriptors are assigned the same SKB. The error
is seen during the iperf test when skb_put tries to insert a second packet
and exceeds the available buffer.

Fixes: c7718ee9 ("net: lantiq: fix memory corruption in RX ring ")
Signed-off-by: default avatarAleksander Jan Bajkowski <olek2@wp.pl>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7ea6cd16
    • Kristian Evensen's avatar
      qmi_wwan: Do not call netif_rx from rx_fixup · 057d4933
      Kristian Evensen authored 
      When the QMI_WWAN_FLAG_PASS_THROUGH is set, netif_rx() is called from
qmi_wwan_rx_fixup(). When the call to netif_rx() is successful (which is
most of the time), usbnet_skb_return() is called (from rx_process()).
usbnet_skb_return() will then call netif_rx() a second time for the same
skb.

Simplify the code and avoid the redundant netif_rx() call by changing
qmi_wwan_rx_fixup() to always return 1 when QMI_WWAN_FLAG_PASS_THROUGH
is set. We then leave it up to the existing infrastructure to call
netif_rx().
Suggested-by: default avatarBjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKristian Evensen <kristian.evensen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      057d4933
    • Maciej Żenczykowski's avatar
      net: cdc_ncm: switch to eth%d interface naming · c1a3d406
      Maciej Żenczykowski authored 
      This is meant to make the host side cdc_ncm interface consistently
named just like the older CDC protocols: cdc_ether & cdc_ecm
(and even rndis_host), which all use 'FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_POINTTOPOINT'.

include/linux/usb/usbnet.h:
  #define FLAG_ETHER	0x0020		/* maybe use "eth%d" names */
  #define FLAG_WLAN	0x0080		/* use "wlan%d" names */
  #define FLAG_WWAN	0x0400		/* use "wwan%d" names */
  #define FLAG_POINTTOPOINT 0x1000	/* possibly use "usb%d" names */

drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c @ line 1711:
  strcpy (net->name, "usb%d");
  ...
  // heuristic:  "usb%d" for links we know are two-host,
  // else "eth%d" when there's reasonable doubt.  userspace
  // can rename the link if it knows better.
  if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_ETHER) != 0 &&
      ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_POINTTOPOINT) == 0 ||
       (net->dev_addr [0] & 0x02) == 0))
          strcpy (net->name, "eth%d");
  /* WLAN devices should always be named "wlan%d" */
  if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WLAN) != 0)
          strcpy(net->name, "wlan%d");
  /* WWAN devices should always be named "wwan%d" */
  if ((dev->driver_info->flags & FLAG_WWAN) != 0)
          strcpy(net->name, "wwan%d");

So by using ETHER | POINTTOPOINT the interface naming is
either usb%d or eth%d based on the global uniqueness of the
mac address of the device.

Without this 2.5gbps ethernet dongles which all seem to use the cdc_ncm
driver end up being called usb%d instead of eth%d even though they're
definitely not two-host.  (All 1gbps & 5gbps ethernet usb dongles I've
tested don't hit this problem due to use of different drivers, primarily
r8152 and aqc111)

Fixes tag is based purely on git blame, and is really just here to make
sure this hits LTS branches newer than v4.5.

Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Fixes: 4d06dd53 ("cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind")
Signed-off-by: default avatarMaciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      c1a3d406
    • Changbin Du's avatar
      net: inline function get_net_ns_by_fd if NET_NS is disabled · e34492de
      Changbin Du authored 
      The function get_net_ns_by_fd() could be inlined when NET_NS is not
enabled.
Signed-off-by: default avatarChangbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e34492de
    • Jakub Kicinski's avatar
      ptp: improve max_adj check against unreasonable values · 475b92f9
      Jakub Kicinski authored 
      Scaled PPM conversion to PPB may (on 64bit systems) result
in a value larger than s32 can hold (freq/scaled_ppm is a long).
This means the kernel will not correctly reject unreasonably
high ->freq values (e.g. > 4294967295ppb, 281474976645 scaled PPM).

The conversion is equivalent to a division by ~66 (65.536),
so the value of ppb is always smaller than ppm, but not small
enough to assume narrowing the type from long -> s32 is okay.

Note that reasonable user space (e.g. ptp4l) will not use such
high values, anyway, 4289046510ppb ~= 4.3x, so the fix is
somewhat pedantic.

Fixes: d39a7435 ("ptp: validate the requested frequency adjustment.")
Fixes: d94ba80e ("ptp: Added a brand new class driver for ptp clocks.")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarRichard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      475b92f9
  5. 14 Jun, 2021 16 commits
    • Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan's avatar
      net: mhi_net: Update the transmit handler prototype · 2214fb53
      Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan authored 
      Update the function prototype of mhi_ndo_xmit to match
ndo_start_xmit. This otherwise leads to run time failures when
CFI is enabled in kernel.

Fixes: 3ffec6a1 ("net: Add mhi-net driver")
Signed-off-by: default avatarSubash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2214fb53
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf, selftests: Adjust few selftest outcomes wrt unreachable code · 973377ff
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      In almost all cases from test_verifier that have been changed in here, we've
had an unreachable path with a load from a register which has an invalid
address on purpose. This was basically to make sure that we never walk this
path and to have the verifier complain if it would otherwise. Change it to
match on the right error for unprivileged given we now test these paths
under speculative execution.

There's one case where we match on exact # of insns_processed. Due to the
extra path, this will of course mismatch on unprivileged. Thus, restrict the
test->insn_processed check to privileged-only.

In one other case, we result in a 'pointer comparison prohibited' error. This
is similarly due to verifying an 'invalid' branch where we end up with a value
pointer on one side of the comparison.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      973377ff
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches · 9183671a
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      The verifier only enumerates valid control-flow paths and skips paths that
are unreachable in the non-speculative domain. And so it can miss issues
under speculative execution on mispredicted branches.

For example, a type confusion has been demonstrated with the following
crafted program:

  // r0 = pointer to a map array entry
  // r6 = pointer to readable stack slot
  // r9 = scalar controlled by attacker
  1: r0 = *(u64 *)(r0) // cache miss
  2: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 4
  3: r6 = r9
  4: if r0 != 0x1 goto line 6
  5: r9 = *(u8 *)(r6)
  6: // leak r9

Since line 3 runs iff r0 == 0 and line 5 runs iff r0 == 1, the verifier
concludes that the pointer dereference on line 5 is safe. But: if the
attacker trains both the branches to fall-through, such that the following
is speculatively executed ...

  r6 = r9
  r9 = *(u8 *)(r6)
  // leak r9

... then the program will dereference an attacker-controlled value and could
leak its content under speculative execution via side-channel. This requires
to mistrain the branch predictor, which can be rather tricky, because the
branches are mutually exclusive. However such training can be done at
congruent addresses in user space using different branches that are not
mutually exclusive. That is, by training branches in user space ...

  A:  if r0 != 0x0 goto line C
  B:  ...
  C:  if r0 != 0x0 goto line D
  D:  ...

... such that addresses A and C collide to the same CPU branch prediction
entries in the PHT (pattern history table) as those of the BPF program's
lines 2 and 4, respectively. A non-privileged attacker could simply brute
force such collisions in the PHT until observing the attack succeeding.

Alternative methods to mistrain the branch predictor are also possible that
avoid brute forcing the collisions in the PHT. A reliable attack has been
demonstrated, for example, using the following crafted program:

  // r0 = pointer to a [control] map array entry
  // r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0), training/attack phase
  // r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 8), oob address
  // [...]
  // r0 = pointer to a [data] map array entry
  1: if r7 == 0x3 goto line 3
  2: r8 = r0
  // crafted sequence of conditional jumps to separate the conditional
  // branch in line 193 from the current execution flow
  3: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 5
  4: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
  5: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 7
  6: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
  [...]
  187: if r0 != 0x0 goto line 189
  188: if r0 == 0x0 goto exit
  // load any slowly-loaded value (due to cache miss in phase 3) ...
  189: r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0x1200)
  // ... and turn it into known zero for verifier, while preserving slowly-
  // loaded dependency when executing:
  190: r3 &= 1
  191: r3 &= 2
  // speculatively bypassed phase dependency
  192: r7 += r3
  193: if r7 == 0x3 goto exit
  194: r4 = *(u8 *)(r8 + 0)
  // leak r4

As can be seen, in training phase (phase != 0x3), the condition in line 1
turns into false and therefore r8 with the oob address is overridden with
the valid map value address, which in line 194 we can read out without
issues. However, in attack phase, line 2 is skipped, and due to the cache
miss in line 189 where the map value is (zeroed and later) added to the
phase register, the condition in line 193 takes the fall-through path due
to prior branch predictor training, where under speculation, it'll load the
byte at oob address r8 (unknown scalar type at that point) which could then
be leaked via side-channel.

One way to mitigate these is to 'branch off' an unreachable path, meaning,
the current verification path keeps following the is_branch_taken() path
and we push the other branch to the verification stack. Given this is
unreachable from the non-speculative domain, this branch's vstate is
explicitly marked as speculative. This is needed for two reasons: i) if
this path is solely seen from speculative execution, then we later on still
want the dead code elimination to kick in in order to sanitize these
instructions with jmp-1s, and ii) to ensure that paths walked in the
non-speculative domain are not pruned from earlier walks of paths walked in
the speculative domain. Additionally, for robustness, we mark the registers
which have been part of the conditional as unknown in the speculative path
given there should be no assumptions made on their content.

The fix in here mitigates type confusion attacks described earlier due to
i) all code paths in the BPF program being explored and ii) existing
verifier logic already ensuring that given memory access instruction
references one specific data structure.

An alternative to this fix that has also been looked at in this scope was to
mark aux->alu_state at the jump instruction with a BPF_JMP_TAKEN state as
well as direction encoding (always-goto, always-fallthrough, unknown), such
that mixing of different always-* directions themselves as well as mixing of
always-* with unknown directions would cause a program rejection by the
verifier, e.g. programs with constructs like 'if ([...]) { x = 0; } else
{ x = 1; }' with subsequent 'if (x == 1) { [...] }'. For unprivileged, this
would result in only single direction always-* taken paths, and unknown taken
paths being allowed, such that the former could be patched from a conditional
jump to an unconditional jump (ja). Compared to this approach here, it would
have two downsides: i) valid programs that otherwise are not performing any
pointer arithmetic, etc, would potentially be rejected/broken, and ii) we are
required to turn off path pruning for unprivileged, where both can be avoided
in this work through pushing the invalid branch to the verification stack.

The issue was originally discovered by Adam and Ofek, and later independently
discovered and reported as a result of Benedict and Piotr's research work.

Fixes: b2157399 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: default avatarAdam Morrison <mad@cs.tau.ac.il>
Reported-by: default avatarOfek Kirzner <ofekkir@gmail.com>
Reported-by: default avatarBenedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reported-by: default avatarPiotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarBenedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarPiotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      9183671a
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative path verification · fe9a5ca7
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      ... in such circumstances, we do not want to mark the instruction as seen given
the goal is still to jmp-1 rewrite/sanitize dead code, if it is not reachable
from the non-speculative path verification. We do however want to verify it for
safety regardless.

With the patch as-is all the insns that have been marked as seen before the
patch will also be marked as seen after the patch (just with a potentially
different non-zero count). An upcoming patch will also verify paths that are
unreachable in the non-speculative domain, hence this extension is needed.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarBenedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarPiotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      fe9a5ca7
    • Daniel Borkmann's avatar
      bpf: Inherit expanded/patched seen count from old aux data · d203b0fd
      Daniel Borkmann authored 
      Instead of relying on current env->pass_cnt, use the seen count from the
old aux data in adjust_insn_aux_data(), and expand it to the new range of
patched instructions. This change is valid given we always expand 1:n
with n>=1, so what applies to the old/original instruction needs to apply
for the replacement as well.

Not relying on env->pass_cnt is a prerequisite for a later change where we
want to avoid marking an instruction seen when verified under speculative
execution path.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJohn Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarBenedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Reviewed-by: default avatarPiotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: default avatarAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
      d203b0fd
    • David S. Miller's avatar
      Merge tag 'for-net-2021-06-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bluetooth/bluetooth · 45deacc7
      David S. Miller authored 
      Luiz Augusto von Dentz says:

====================
bluetooth pull request for net:

 - Fix crash on SMP when debug is enabled
====================
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      45deacc7
    • Luiz Augusto von Dentz's avatar
      Bluetooth: SMP: Fix crash when receiving new connection when debug is enabled · 995fca15
      Luiz Augusto von Dentz authored 
      When receiving a new connection pchan->conn won't be initialized so the
code cannot use bt_dev_dbg as the pointer to hci_dev won't be
accessible.

Fixes: 2e1614f7 ("Bluetooth: SMP: Convert BT_ERR/BT_DBG to bt_dev_err/bt_dev_dbg")
Signed-off-by: default avatarLuiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
      995fca15
    • Pavel Skripkin's avatar
      net: qrtr: fix OOB Read in qrtr_endpoint_post · ad9d24c9
      Pavel Skripkin authored 
      Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds Read in
qrtr_endpoint_post. The problem was in wrong
_size_ type:

	if (len != ALIGN(size, 4) + hdrlen)
		goto err;

If size from qrtr_hdr is 4294967293 (0xfffffffd), the result of
ALIGN(size, 4) will be 0. In case of len == hdrlen and size == 4294967293
in header this check won't fail and

	skb_put_data(skb, data + hdrlen, size);

will read out of bound from data, which is hdrlen allocated block.

Fixes: 194ccc88 ("net: qrtr: Support decoding incoming v2 packets")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1917d778024161609247@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: default avatarPavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarBjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ad9d24c9
    • David Ahern's avatar
      ipv4: Fix device used for dst_alloc with local routes · b87b04f5
      David Ahern authored 
      Oliver reported a use case where deleting a VRF device can hang
waiting for the refcnt to drop to 0. The root cause is that the dst
is allocated against the VRF device but cached on the loopback
device.

The use case (added to the selftests) has an implicit VRF crossing
due to the ordering of the FIB rules (lookup local is before the
l3mdev rule, but the problem occurs even if the FIB rules are
re-ordered with local after l3mdev because the VRF table does not
have a default route to terminate the lookup). The end result is
is that the FIB lookup returns the loopback device as the nexthop,
but the ingress device is in a VRF. The mismatch causes the dst
alloc against the VRF device but then cached on the loopback.

The fix is to bring the trick used for IPv6 (see ip6_rt_get_dev_rcu):
pick the dst alloc device based the fib lookup result but with checks
that the result has a nexthop device (e.g., not an unreachable or
prohibit entry).

Fixes: f5a0aab8 ("net: ipv4: dst for local input routes should use l3mdev if relevant")
Reported-by: default avatarOliver Herms <oliver.peter.herms@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b87b04f5
    • Pavel Skripkin's avatar
      net: caif: fix memory leak in ldisc_open · 58af3d3d
      Pavel Skripkin authored 
      Syzbot reported memory leak in tty_init_dev().
The problem was in unputted tty in ldisc_open()

static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
...
	ser->tty = tty_kref_get(tty);
...
	result = register_netdevice(dev);
	if (result) {
		rtnl_unlock();
		free_netdev(dev);
		return -ENODEV;
	}
...
}

Ser pointer is netdev private_data, so after free_netdev()
this pointer goes away with unputted tty reference. So, fix
it by adding tty_kref_put() before freeing netdev.

Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+f303e045423e617d2cad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: default avatarPavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      58af3d3d
    • Rahul Lakkireddy's avatar
      cxgb4: fix wrong ethtool n-tuple rule lookup · 09427c19
      Rahul Lakkireddy authored 
      The TID returned during successful filter creation is relative to
the region in which the filter is created. Using it directly always
returns Hi Prio/Normal filter region's entry for the first couple of
entries, even though the rule is actually inserted in Hash region.
Fix by analyzing in which region the filter has been inserted and
save the absolute TID to be used for lookup later.

Fixes: db43b30c ("cxgb4: add ethtool n-tuple filter deletion")
Signed-off-by: default avatarRahul Lakkireddy <rahul.lakkireddy@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      09427c19
    • Christophe JAILLET's avatar
      netxen_nic: Fix an error handling path in 'netxen_nic_probe()' · 49a10c7b
      Christophe JAILLET authored 
      If an error occurs after a 'pci_enable_pcie_error_reporting()' call, it
must be undone by a corresponding 'pci_disable_pcie_error_reporting()'
call, as already done in the remove function.

Fixes: e87ad553 ("netxen: support pci error handlers")
Signed-off-by: default avatarChristophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      49a10c7b
    • Christophe JAILLET's avatar
      qlcnic: Fix an error handling path in 'qlcnic_probe()' · cb337660
      Christophe JAILLET authored 
      If an error occurs after a 'pci_enable_pcie_error_reporting()' call, it
must be undone by a corresponding 'pci_disable_pcie_error_reporting()'
call, as already done in the remove function.

Fixes: 451724c8 ("qlcnic: aer support")
Signed-off-by: default avatarChristophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      cb337660
    • Jakub Kicinski's avatar
      ethtool: strset: fix message length calculation · e175aef9
      Jakub Kicinski authored 
      Outer nest for ETHTOOL_A_STRSET_STRINGSETS is not accounted for.
This may result in ETHTOOL_MSG_STRSET_GET producing a warning like:

    calculated message payload length (684) not sufficient
    WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 30967 at net/ethtool/netlink.c:369 ethnl_default_doit+0x87a/0xa20

and a splat.

As usually with such warnings three conditions must be met for the warning
to trigger:
 - there must be no skb size rounding up (e.g. reply_size of 684);
 - string set must be per-device (so that the header gets populated);
 - the device name must be at least 12 characters long.

all in all with current user space it looks like reading priv flags
is the only place this could potentially happen. Or with syzbot :)

Reported-by: syzbot+59aa77b92d06cd5a54f2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 71921690 ("ethtool: provide string sets with STRSET_GET request")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      e175aef9
    • Alex Elder's avatar
      net: qualcomm: rmnet: don't over-count statistics · 994c393b
      Alex Elder authored 
      The purpose of the loop using u64_stats_fetch_*_irq() is to ensure
statistics on a given CPU are collected atomically. If one of the
statistics values gets updated within the begin/retry window, the
loop will run again.

Currently the statistics totals are updated inside that window.
This means that if the loop ever retries, the statistics for the
CPU will be counted more than once.

Fix this by taking a snapshot of a CPU's statistics inside the
protected window, and then updating the counters with the snapshot
values after exiting the loop.

(Also add a newline at the end of this file...)

Fixes: 192c4b5d ("net: qualcomm: rmnet: Add support for 64 bit stats")
Signed-off-by: default avatarAlex Elder <elder@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      994c393b
    • Tyson Moore's avatar
      sch_cake: revise docs for RFC 8622 LE PHB support · 4f667b8e
      Tyson Moore authored 
      Commit b8392808 ("sch_cake: add RFC 8622 LE PHB support to CAKE
diffserv handling") added the LE mark to the Bulk tin. Update the
comments to reflect the change.
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyson Moore <tyson@tyson.me>
Acked-by: default avatarToke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@toke.dk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      4f667b8e
  7. 12 Jun, 2021 1 commit
    • Changbin Du's avatar
      net: make get_net_ns return error if NET_NS is disabled · ea6932d7
      Changbin Du authored 
      There is a panic in socket ioctl cmd SIOCGSKNS when NET_NS is not enabled.
The reason is that nsfs tries to access ns->ops but the proc_ns_operations
is not implemented in this case.

[7.670023] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000010
[7.670268] pgd = 32b54000
[7.670544] [00000010] *pgd=00000000
[7.671861] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM
[7.672315] Modules linked in:
[7.672918] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3-00375-g6799d4f2 #16
[7.673309] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
[7.673642] PC is at nsfs_evict+0x24/0x30
[7.674486] LR is at clear_inode+0x20/0x9c

The same to tun SIOCGSKNS command.

To fix this problem, we make get_net_ns() return -EINVAL when NET_NS is
disabled. Meanwhile move it to right place net/core/net_namespace.c.
Signed-off-by: default avatarChangbin Du <changbin.du@gmail.com>
Fixes: c62cce2c ("net: add an ioctl to get a socket network namespace")
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Suggested-by: default avatarJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarChristian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      ea6932d7
  9. 11 Jun, 2021 5 commits
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