- 27 Apr, 2017 25 commits
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Dan Williams authored
commit 11e63f6d upstream. Before we rework the "pmem api" to stop abusing __copy_user_nocache() for memcpy_to_pmem() we need to fix cases where we may strand dirty data in the cpu cache. The problem occurs when copy_from_iter_pmem() is used for arbitrary data transfers from userspace. There is no guarantee that these transfers, performed by dax_iomap_actor(), will have aligned destinations or aligned transfer lengths. Backstop the usage __copy_user_nocache() with explicit cache management in these unaligned cases. Yes, copy_from_iter_pmem() is now too big for an inline, but addressing that is saved for a later patch that moves the entirety of the "pmem api" into the pmem driver directly. Fixes: 5de490da ("pmem: add copy_from_iter_pmem() and clear_pmem()") Cc: <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by:
Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Signed-off-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit 56ef6718 upstream. It may happen that secondary CPUs are still alive and resetting hv_context.tsc_page will cause a consequent crash in read_hv_clock_tsc() as we don't check for it being not NULL there. It is safe as we're not freeing this page anyways. Signed-off-by:
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit cb7a5724 upstream. I'm observing the following hot add requests from the WS2012 host: hot_add_req: start_pfn = 0x108200 count = 330752 hot_add_req: start_pfn = 0x158e00 count = 193536 hot_add_req: start_pfn = 0x188400 count = 239616 As the host doesn't specify hot add regions we're trying to create 128Mb-aligned region covering the first request, we create the 0x108000 - 0x160000 region and we add 0x108000 - 0x158e00 memory. The second request passes the pfn_covered() check, we enlarge the region to 0x108000 - 0x190000 and add 0x158e00 - 0x188200 memory. The problem emerges with the third request as it starts at 0x188400 so there is a 0x200 gap which is not covered. As the end of our region is 0x190000 now it again passes the pfn_covered() check were we just adjust the covered_end_pfn and make it 0x188400 instead of 0x188200 which means that we'll try to online 0x188200-0x188400 pages but these pages were never assigned to us and we crash. We can't react to such requests by creating new hot add regions as it may happen that the whole suggested range falls into the previously identified 128Mb-aligned area so we'll end up adding nothing or create intersecting regions and our current logic doesn't allow that. Instead, create a list of such 'gaps' and check for them in the page online callback. Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit 7cf3b79e upstream. Windows 2012 (non-R2) does not specify hot add region in hot add requests and the logic in hot_add_req() is trying to find a 128Mb-aligned region covering the request. It may also happen that host's requests are not 128Mb aligned and the created ha_region will start before the first specified PFN. We can't online these non-present pages but we don't remember the real start of the region. This is a regression introduced by the commit 5abbbb75 ("Drivers: hv: hv_balloon: don't lose memory when onlining order is not natural"). While the idea of keeping the 'moving window' was wrong (as there is no guarantee that hot add requests come ordered) we should still keep track of covered_start_pfn. This is not a revert, the logic is different. Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit 26840437 upstream. KVP daemon does fork()/exec() (with popen()) so we need to close our fds to avoid sharing them with child processes. The immediate implication of not doing so I see is SELinux complaining about 'ip' trying to access '/dev/vmbus/hv_kvp'. Signed-off-by:
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Suzuki K Poulose authored
commit 8b3405e3 upstream. In kvm_free_stage2_pgd() we don't hold the kvm->mmu_lock while calling unmap_stage2_range() on the entire memory range for the guest. This could cause problems with other callers (e.g, munmap on a memslot) trying to unmap a range. And since we have to unmap the entire Guest memory range holding a spinlock, make sure we yield the lock if necessary, after we unmap each PUD range. Fixes: commit d5d8184d ("KVM: ARM: Memory virtualization setup") Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzin@redhat.com> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> [ Avoid vCPU starvation and lockup detector warnings ] Signed-off-by:
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Yazen Ghannam authored
commit 29f72ce3 upstream. MCA bank 3 is reserved on systems pre-Fam17h, so it didn't have a name. However, MCA bank 3 is defined on Fam17h systems and can be accessed using legacy MSRs. Without a name we get a stack trace on Fam17h systems when trying to register sysfs files for bank 3 on kernels that don't recognize Scalable MCA. Call MCA bank 3 "decode_unit" since this is what it represents on Fam17h. This will allow kernels without SMCA support to see this bank on Fam17h+ and prevent the stack trace. This will not affect older systems since this bank is reserved on them, i.e. it'll be ignored. Tested on AMD Fam15h and Fam17h systems. WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 1 at lib/kobject.c:210 kobject_add_internal kobject: (ffff88085bb256c0): attempted to be registered with empty name! ... Call Trace: kobject_add_internal kobject_add kobject_create_and_add threshold_create_device threshold_init_device Signed-off-by:
Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1490102285-3659-1-git-send-email-Yazen.Ghannam@amd.comSigned-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Ravi Bangoria authored
commit 9e1ba4f2 upstream. If we set a kprobe on a 'stdu' instruction on powerpc64, we see a kernel OOPS: Bad kernel stack pointer cd93c840 at c000000000009868 Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1] ... GPR00: c000001fcd93cb30 00000000cd93c840 c0000000015c5e00 00000000cd93c840 ... NIP [c000000000009868] resume_kernel+0x2c/0x58 LR [c000000000006208] program_check_common+0x108/0x180 On a 64-bit system when the user probes on a 'stdu' instruction, the kernel does not emulate actual store in emulate_step() because it may corrupt the exception frame. So the kernel does the actual store operation in exception return code i.e. resume_kernel(). resume_kernel() loads the saved stack pointer from memory using lwz, which only loads the low 32-bits of the address, causing the kernel crash. Fix this by loading the 64-bit value instead. Fixes: be96f633 ("powerpc: Split out instruction analysis part of emulate_step()") Signed-off-by:
Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> [mpe: Change log massage, add stable tag] Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by:
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Sebastian Siewior authored
commit 9cd9a21c upstream. In commit 6afaf8a4 ("UBI: flush wl before clearing update marker") I managed to trigger and fix a similar bug. Now here is another version of which I assumed it wouldn't matter back then but it turns out UBI has a check for it and will error out like this: |ubi0 warning: validate_vid_hdr: inconsistent used_ebs |ubi0 error: validate_vid_hdr: inconsistent VID header at PEB 592 All you need to trigger this is? "ubiupdatevol /dev/ubi0_0 file" + a powercut in the middle of the operation. ubi_start_update() sets the update-marker and puts all EBs on the erase list. After that userland can proceed to write new data while the old EB aren't erased completely. A powercut at this point is usually not that much of a tragedy. UBI won't give read access to the static volume because it has the update marker. It will most likely set the corrupted flag because it misses some EBs. So we are all good. Unless the size of the image that has been written differs from the old image in the magnitude of at least one EB. In that case UBI will find two different values for `used_ebs' and refuse to attach the image with the error message mentioned above. So in order not to get in the situation, the patch will ensure that we wait until everything is removed before it tries to write any data. The alternative would be to detect such a case and remove all EBs at the attached time after we processed the volume-table and see the update-marker set. The patch looks bigger and I doubt it is worth it since usually the write() will wait from time to time for a new EB since usually there not that many spare EB that can be used. Signed-off-by:
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by:
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Johannes Berg authored
commit 3018e947 upstream. AP/AP_VLAN modes don't accept any real 802.11 multicast data frames, but since they do need to accept broadcast management frames the same is currently permitted for data frames. This opens a security problem because such frames would be decrypted with the GTK, and could even contain unicast L3 frames. Since the spec says that ToDS frames must always have the BSSID as the RA (addr1), reject any other data frames. The problem was originally reported in "Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys" at usenix https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/vanhoef and brought to my attention by Jouni. Reported-by:
Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Haibo Chen authored
commit 9f327845 upstream. Currently for DDR50 card, it need tuning in default. We meet tuning fail issue for DDR50 card and some data CRC error when DDR50 sd card works. This is because the default pad I/O drive strength can't make sure DDR50 card work stable. So increase the pad I/O drive strength for DDR50 card, and use pins_100mhz. This fixes DDR50 card support for IMX since DDR50 tuning was enabled from commit 9faac7b9 ("mmc: sdhci: enable tuning for DDR50") Tested-and-reported-by:
Tim Harvey <tharvey@gateworks.com> Signed-off-by:
Haibo Chen <haibo.chen@nxp.com> Acked-by:
Dong Aisheng <aisheng.dong@nxp.com> Acked-by:
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
commit fe8c470a upstream. gcc -O2 cannot always prove that the loop in acpi_power_get_inferred_state() is enterered at least once, so it assumes that cur_state might not get initialized: drivers/acpi/power.c: In function 'acpi_power_get_inferred_state': drivers/acpi/power.c:222:9: error: 'cur_state' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized] This sets the variable to zero at the start of the loop, to ensure that there is well-defined behavior even for an empty list. This gets rid of the warning. The warning first showed up when the -Os flag got removed in a bug fix patch in linux-4.11-rc5. I would suggest merging this addon patch on top of that bug fix to avoid introducing a new warning in the stable kernels. Fixes: 61b79e16 (ACPI: Fix incompatibility with mcount-based function graph tracing) Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thorsten Leemhuis authored
commit 704de489 upstream. Temporary got a Lifebook E547 into my hands and noticed the touchpad only works after running: echo "1" > /sys/devices/platform/i8042/serio2/crc_enabled Add it to the list of machines that need this workaround. Signed-off-by:
Thorsten Leemhuis <linux@leemhuis.info> Reviewed-by:
Ulrik De Bie <ulrik.debie-os@e2big.org> Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jorgen Hansen authored
commit 8ab18d71 upstream. The check in vmci_transport_peer_detach_cb should only allow a detach when the qp handle of the transport matches the one in the detach message. Testing: Before this change, a detach from a peer on a different socket would cause an active stream socket to register a detach. Reviewed-by:
George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
Jorgen Hansen <jhansen@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
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K. Y. Srinivasan authored
commit 8de0d7e9 upstream. The current delay between retries is unnecessarily high and is negatively affecting the time it takes to boot the system. Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit 396e287f upstream. vmbus_teardown_gpadl() can result in infinite wait when it is called on 5 second timeout in vmbus_open(). The issue is caused by the fact that gpadl teardown operation won't ever succeed for an opened channel and the timeout isn't always enough. As a guest, we can always trust the host to respond to our request (and there is nothing we can do if it doesn't). Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
commit 7cc80c98 upstream. In some cases create_gpadl_header() allocates submessages but we never free them. [sumits] Note for stable: Upstream commit 4d637632: (Drivers: hv: get rid of redundant messagecount in create_gpadl_header()) changes the list usage to initialize list header in all cases; that patch isn't added to stable, so the current patch is modified a little bit from the upstream commit to check if the list is valid or not. Signed-off-by:
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Christian Borntraeger authored
commit a8f60d1f upstream. On heavy paging with KSM I see guest data corruption. Turns out that KSM will add pages to its tree, where the mapping return true for pte_unused (or might become as such later). KSM will unmap such pages and reinstantiate with different attributes (e.g. write protected or special, e.g. in replace_page or write_protect_page)). This uncovered a bug in our pagetable handling: We must remove the unused flag as soon as an entry becomes present again. Signed-of-by:
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Germano Percossi authored
commit a0918f1c upstream. STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME can be received during node failover, causing the flag to be set and making the reconnect thread always unsuccessful, thereafter. Once the only place where it is set is removed, the remaining bits are rendered moot. Removing it does not prevent "mount" from failing when a non existent share is passed. What happens when the share really ceases to exist while the share is mounted is undefined now as much as it was before. Signed-off-by:
Germano Percossi <germano.percossi@citrix.com> Reviewed-by:
Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sachin Prabhu authored
commit 62a6cfdd upstream. commit 4fcd1813 ("Fix reconnect to not defer smb3 session reconnect long after socket reconnect") added support for Negotiate requests to be initiated by echo calls. To avoid delays in calling echo after a reconnect, I added the patch introduced by the commit b8c60012 ("Call echo service immediately after socket reconnect"). This has however caused a regression with cifs shares which do not have support for echo calls to trigger Negotiate requests. On connections which need to call Negotiation, the echo calls trigger an error which triggers a reconnect which in turn triggers another echo call. This results in a loop which is only broken when an operation is performed on the cifs share. For an idle share, it can DOS a server. The patch uses the smb_operation can_echo() for cifs so that it is called only if connection has been already been setup. kernel bz: 194531 Signed-off-by:
Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com> Tested-by:
Jonathan Liu <net147@gmail.com> Acked-by:
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Steven Rostedt (VMware) authored
commit 78f7a45d upstream. I noticed that reading the snapshot file when it is empty no longer gives a status. It suppose to show the status of the snapshot buffer as well as how to allocate and use it. For example: ># cat snapshot # tracer: nop # # # * Snapshot is allocated * # # Snapshot commands: # echo 0 > snapshot : Clears and frees snapshot buffer # echo 1 > snapshot : Allocates snapshot buffer, if not already allocated. # Takes a snapshot of the main buffer. # echo 2 > snapshot : Clears snapshot buffer (but does not allocate or free) # (Doesn't have to be '2' works with any number that # is not a '0' or '1') But instead it just showed an empty buffer: ># cat snapshot # tracer: nop # # entries-in-buffer/entries-written: 0/0 #P:4 # # _-----=> irqs-off # / _----=> need-resched # | / _---=> hardirq/softirq # || / _--=> preempt-depth # ||| / delay # TASK-PID CPU# |||| TIMESTAMP FUNCTION # | | | |||| | | What happened was that it was using the ring_buffer_iter_empty() function to see if it was empty, and if it was, it showed the status. But that function was returning false when it was empty. The reason was that the iter header page was on the reader page, and the reader page was empty, but so was the buffer itself. The check only tested to see if the iter was on the commit page, but the commit page was no longer pointing to the reader page, but as all pages were empty, the buffer is also. Fixes: 651e22f2 ("ring-buffer: Always reset iterator to reader page") Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Steven Rostedt (VMware) authored
commit df62db5b upstream. Currently the snapshot trigger enables the probe and then allocates the snapshot. If the probe triggers before the allocation, it could cause the snapshot to fail and turn tracing off. It's best to allocate the snapshot buffer first, and then enable the trigger. If something goes wrong in the enabling of the trigger, the snapshot buffer is still allocated, but it can also be freed by the user by writting zero into the snapshot buffer file. Also add a check of the return status of alloc_snapshot(). Fixes: 77fd5c15 ("tracing: Add snapshot trigger to function probes") Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
commit c9f838d1 upstream. This fixes CVE-2017-7472. Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel memory by leaking thread keyrings: #include <keyutils.h> int main() { for (;;) keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING); } Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before. To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred() and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding keyring is already present. Fixes: d84f4f99 ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials") Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
commit c1644fe0 upstream. This fixes CVE-2017-6951. Userspace should not be able to do things with the "dead" key type as it doesn't have some of the helper functions set upon it that the kernel needs. Attempting to use it may cause the kernel to crash. Fix this by changing the name of the type to ".dead" so that it's rejected up front on userspace syscalls by key_get_type_from_user(). Though this doesn't seem to affect recent kernels, it does affect older ones, certainly those prior to: commit c06cfb08 Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Date: Tue Sep 16 17:36:06 2014 +0100 KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse which went in before 3.18-rc1. Signed-off-by:
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David Howells authored
commit ee8f844e upstream. This fixes CVE-2016-9604. Keyrings whose name begin with a '.' are special internal keyrings and so userspace isn't allowed to create keyrings by this name to prevent shadowing. However, the patch that added the guard didn't fix KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING. Not only can that create dot-named keyrings, it can also subscribe to them as a session keyring if they grant SEARCH permission to the user. This, for example, allows a root process to set .builtin_trusted_keys as its session keyring, at which point it has full access because now the possessor permissions are added. This permits root to add extra public keys, thereby bypassing module verification. This also affects kexec and IMA. This can be tested by (as root): keyctl session .builtin_trusted_keys keyctl add user a a @s keyctl list @s which on my test box gives me: 2 keys in keyring: 180010936: ---lswrv 0 0 asymmetric: Build time autogenerated kernel key: ae3d4a31b82daa8e1a75b49dc2bba949fd992a05 801382539: --alswrv 0 0 user: a Fix this by rejecting names beginning with a '.' in the keyctl. Signed-off-by:
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Signed-off-by:
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- 21 Apr, 2017 15 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
Commit f017e58d which was commit 3cc3434f upstream, was misapplied to the 4.4 stable kernel. This patch fixes this and moves the chunk to the proper Kconfig area. Reported-by:
"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@linux-mips.org> Cc: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com> Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Marcelo Ricardo Leitner authored
commit dfcb9f4f upstream. commit 2dcab598 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf") attempted to avoid a BUG_ON call when the association being used for a sendmsg() is blocked waiting for more sndbuf and another thread did a peeloff operation on such asoc, moving it to another socket. As Ben Hutchings noticed, then in such case it would return without locking back the socket and would cause two unlocks in a row. Further analysis also revealed that it could allow a double free if the application managed to peeloff the asoc that is created during the sendmsg call, because then sctp_sendmsg() would try to free the asoc that was created only for that call. This patch takes another approach. It will deny the peeloff operation if there is a thread sleeping on the asoc, so this situation doesn't exist anymore. This avoids the issues described above and also honors the syscalls that are already being handled (it can be multiple sendmsg calls). Joint work with Xin Long. Fixes: 2dcab598 ("sctp: avoid BUG_ON on sctp_wait_for_sndbuf") Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mantas M authored
commit c2ed1880 upstream. The protocol field is checked when deleting IPv4 routes, but ignored for IPv6, which causes problems with routing daemons accidentally deleting externally set routes (observed by multiple bird6 users). This can be verified using `ip -6 route del <prefix> proto something`. Signed-off-by:
Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Richard Genoud authored
commit b389f173 upstream. When using RS485 in half duplex, RX should be enabled when TX is finished, and stopped when TX starts. Before commit 0058f087 ("tty/serial: atmel: fix RS485 half duplex with DMA"), RX was not disabled in atmel_start_tx() if the DMA was used. So, collisions could happened. But disabling RX in atmel_start_tx() uncovered another bug: RX was enabled again in the wrong place (in atmel_tx_dma) instead of being enabled when TX is finished (in atmel_complete_tx_dma), so the transmission simply stopped. This bug was not triggered before commit 0058f087 ("tty/serial: atmel: fix RS485 half duplex with DMA") because RX was never disabled before. Moving atmel_start_rx() in atmel_complete_tx_dma() corrects the problem. Reported-by:
Gil Weber <webergil@gmail.com> Fixes: 0058f087Tested-by:
Richard Genoud <richard.genoud@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by:
Bryan Evenson <bevenson@melinkcorp.com> Signed-off-by:
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NeilBrown authored
commit 1cded9d2 upstream. There are two problems with refcounting of auth_gss messages. First, the reference on the pipe->pipe list (taken by a call to rpc_queue_upcall()) is not counted. It seems to be assumed that a message in pipe->pipe will always also be in pipe->in_downcall, where it is correctly reference counted. However there is no guaranty of this. I have a report of a NULL dereferences in rpc_pipe_read() which suggests a msg that has been freed is still on the pipe->pipe list. One way I imagine this might happen is: - message is queued for uid=U and auth->service=S1 - rpc.gssd reads this message and starts processing. This removes the message from pipe->pipe - message is queued for uid=U and auth->service=S2 - rpc.gssd replies to the first message. gss_pipe_downcall() calls __gss_find_upcall(pipe, U, NULL) and it finds the *second* message, as new messages are placed at the head of ->in_downcall, and the service type is not checked. - This second message is removed from ->in_downcall and freed by gss_release_msg() (even though it is still on pipe->pipe) - rpc.gssd tries to read another message, and dereferences a pointer to this message that has just been freed. I fix this by incrementing the reference count before calling rpc_queue_upcall(), and decrementing it if that fails, or normally in gss_pipe_destroy_msg(). It seems strange that the reply doesn't target the message more precisely, but I don't know all the details. In any case, I think the reference counting irregularity became a measureable bug when the extra arg was added to __gss_find_upcall(), hence the Fixes: line below. The second problem is that if rpc_queue_upcall() fails, the new message is not freed. gss_alloc_msg() set the ->count to 1, gss_add_msg() increments this to 2, gss_unhash_msg() decrements to 1, then the pointer is discarded so the memory never gets freed. Fixes: 9130b8db ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service") Link: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1011250Signed-off-by:
NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Falcon authored
commit 94acf164 upstream. Include calculations to compute the number of segments that comprise an aggregated large packet. Signed-off-by:
Thomas Falcon <tlfalcon@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Jonathan Maxwell <jmaxwell37@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit 2d6a0e9d upstream. Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default). Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit d4114914 upstream. Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit 7926aff5 upstream. Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default). Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit 5593523f upstream. Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default). Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556Reported-by:
Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org> Tested-by:
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Omar Sandoval authored
commit c4baad50 upstream. put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes). Signed-off-by:
Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by:
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Stefan Brüns authored
commit 67b0503d upstream. The buffer allocation for the firmware data was changed in commit 43fab979 ("[media] dvb-usb: don't use stack for firmware load") but the same applies for the reset value. Fixes: 43fab979 ("[media] dvb-usb: don't use stack for firmware load") Signed-off-by:
Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by:
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Mauro Carvalho Chehab authored
commit 43fab979 upstream. As reported by Marc Duponcheel <marc@offline.be>, firmware load on dvb-usb is using the stack, with is not allowed anymore on default Kernel configurations: [ 1025.958836] dvb-usb: found a 'WideView WT-220U PenType Receiver (based on ZL353)' in cold state, will try to load a firmware [ 1025.958853] dvb-usb: downloading firmware from file 'dvb-usb-wt220u-zl0353-01.fw' [ 1025.958855] dvb-usb: could not stop the USB controller CPU. [ 1025.958856] dvb-usb: error while transferring firmware (transferred size: -11, block size: 3) [ 1025.958856] dvb-usb: firmware download failed at 8 with -22 [ 1025.958867] usbcore: registered new interface driver dvb_usb_dtt200u [ 2.789902] dvb-usb: downloading firmware from file 'dvb-usb-wt220u-zl0353-01.fw' [ 2.789905] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2.789911] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2196 at drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1584 usb_hcd_map_urb_for_dma+0x430/0x560 [usbcore] [ 2.789912] transfer buffer not dma capable [ 2.789912] Modules linked in: btusb dvb_usb_dtt200u(+) dvb_usb_af9035(+) btrtl btbcm dvb_usb dvb_usb_v2 btintel dvb_core bluetooth rc_core rfkill x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp crc32_pclmul aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul ablk_helper cryptd drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect pcspkr i2c_i801 sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm i2c_smbus i2c_core r8169 lpc_ich mfd_core mii thermal fan rtc_cmos video button acpi_cpufreq processor snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_pcm snd_timer snd crc32c_intel ahci libahci libata xhci_pci ehci_pci xhci_hcd ehci_hcd usbcore usb_common dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [ 2.789936] CPU: 3 PID: 2196 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.9.0-gentoo #1 [ 2.789937] Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H81I-PLUS, BIOS 0401 07/23/2013 [ 2.789938] ffffc9000339b690 ffffffff812bd397 ffffc9000339b6e0 0000000000000000 [ 2.789939] ffffc9000339b6d0 ffffffff81055c86 000006300339b6a0 ffff880116c0c000 [ 2.789941] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 ffff880116c08000 [ 2.789942] Call Trace: [ 2.789945] [<ffffffff812bd397>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66 [ 2.789947] [<ffffffff81055c86>] __warn+0xc6/0xe0 [ 2.789948] [<ffffffff81055cea>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x4a/0x50 [ 2.789952] [<ffffffffa006d460>] usb_hcd_map_urb_for_dma+0x430/0x560 [usbcore] [ 2.789954] [<ffffffff814ed5a8>] ? io_schedule_timeout+0xd8/0x110 [ 2.789956] [<ffffffffa006e09c>] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x9c/0x980 [usbcore] [ 2.789958] [<ffffffff812d0ebf>] ? copy_page_to_iter+0x14f/0x2b0 [ 2.789960] [<ffffffff81126818>] ? pagecache_get_page+0x28/0x240 [ 2.789962] [<ffffffff8118c2a0>] ? touch_atime+0x20/0xa0 [ 2.789964] [<ffffffffa006f7c4>] usb_submit_urb+0x2c4/0x520 [usbcore] [ 2.789967] [<ffffffffa006feca>] usb_start_wait_urb+0x5a/0xe0 [usbcore] [ 2.789969] [<ffffffffa007000c>] usb_control_msg+0xbc/0xf0 [usbcore] [ 2.789970] [<ffffffffa067903d>] usb_cypress_writemem+0x3d/0x40 [dvb_usb] [ 2.789972] [<ffffffffa06791cf>] usb_cypress_load_firmware+0x4f/0x130 [dvb_usb] [ 2.789973] [<ffffffff8109dbbe>] ? console_unlock+0x2fe/0x5d0 [ 2.789974] [<ffffffff8109e10c>] ? vprintk_emit+0x27c/0x410 [ 2.789975] [<ffffffff8109e40a>] ? vprintk_default+0x1a/0x20 [ 2.789976] [<ffffffff81124d76>] ? printk+0x43/0x4b [ 2.789977] [<ffffffffa0679310>] dvb_usb_download_firmware+0x60/0xd0 [dvb_usb] [ 2.789979] [<ffffffffa0679898>] dvb_usb_device_init+0x3d8/0x610 [dvb_usb] [ 2.789981] [<ffffffffa069e302>] dtt200u_usb_probe+0x92/0xd0 [dvb_usb_dtt200u] [ 2.789984] [<ffffffffa007420c>] usb_probe_interface+0xfc/0x270 [usbcore] [ 2.789985] [<ffffffff8138bf95>] driver_probe_device+0x215/0x2d0 [ 2.789986] [<ffffffff8138c0e6>] __driver_attach+0x96/0xa0 [ 2.789987] [<ffffffff8138c050>] ? driver_probe_device+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 2.789988] [<ffffffff81389ffb>] bus_for_each_dev+0x5b/0x90 [ 2.789989] [<ffffffff8138b7b9>] driver_attach+0x19/0x20 [ 2.789990] [<ffffffff8138b33c>] bus_add_driver+0x11c/0x220 [ 2.789991] [<ffffffff8138c91b>] driver_register+0x5b/0xd0 [ 2.789994] [<ffffffffa0072f6c>] usb_register_driver+0x7c/0x130 [usbcore] [ 2.789994] [<ffffffffa06a5000>] ? 0xffffffffa06a5000 [ 2.789996] [<ffffffffa06a501e>] dtt200u_usb_driver_init+0x1e/0x20 [dvb_usb_dtt200u] [ 2.789997] [<ffffffff81000408>] do_one_initcall+0x38/0x140 [ 2.789998] [<ffffffff8116001c>] ? __vunmap+0x7c/0xc0 [ 2.789999] [<ffffffff81124fb0>] ? do_init_module+0x22/0x1d2 [ 2.790000] [<ffffffff81124fe8>] do_init_module+0x5a/0x1d2 [ 2.790002] [<ffffffff810c96b1>] load_module+0x1e11/0x2580 [ 2.790003] [<ffffffff810c68b0>] ? show_taint+0x30/0x30 [ 2.790004] [<ffffffff81177250>] ? kernel_read_file+0x100/0x190 [ 2.790005] [<ffffffff810c9ffa>] SyS_finit_module+0xba/0xc0 [ 2.790007] [<ffffffff814f13e0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94 [ 2.790008] ---[ end trace c78a74e78baec6fc ]--- So, allocate the structure dynamically. Signed-off-by:
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Kees Cook authored
commit a4866aa8 upstream. Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy: usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes) This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel. Reported-by:
Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com> Tested-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by:
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