- 03 Feb, 2018 5 commits
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
[ Based on a patch from Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> ] Add direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests. This is needed for guests that will only mitigate Spectre V2 through IBRS+IBPB and will not be using a retpoline+IBPB based approach. To avoid the overhead of saving and restoring the MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for guests that do not actually use the MSR, only start saving and restoring when a non-zero is written to it. No attempt is made to handle STIBP here, intentionally. Filtering STIBP may be added in a future patch, which may require trapping all writes if we don't want to pass it through directly to the guest. [dwmw2: Clean up CPUID bits, save/restore manually, handle reset] Signed-off-by:
KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by:
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by:
Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517522386-18410-5-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
Intel processors use MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR to indicate RDCL_NO (bit 0) and IBRS_ALL (bit 1). This is a read-only MSR. By default the contents will come directly from the hardware, but user-space can still override it. [dwmw2: The bit in kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features can be unconditional] Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
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Ashok Raj authored
The Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) is an indirect branch control mechanism. It keeps earlier branches from influencing later ones. Unlike IBRS and STIBP, IBPB does not define a new mode of operation. It's a command that ensures predicted branch targets aren't used after the barrier. Although IBRS and IBPB are enumerated by the same CPUID enumeration, IBPB is very different. IBPB helps mitigate against three potential attacks: * Mitigate guests from being attacked by other guests. - This is addressed by issing IBPB when we do a guest switch. * Mitigate attacks from guest/ring3->host/ring3. These would require a IBPB during context switch in host, or after VMEXIT. The host process has two ways to mitigate - Either it can be compiled with retpoline - If its going through context switch, and has set !dumpable then there is a IBPB in that path. (Tim's patch: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10192871) - The case where after a VMEXIT you return back to Qemu might make Qemu attackable from guest when Qemu isn't compiled with retpoline. There are issues reported when doing IBPB on every VMEXIT that resulted in some tsc calibration woes in guest. * Mitigate guest/ring0->host/ring0 attacks. When host kernel is using retpoline it is safe against these attacks. If host kernel isn't using retpoline we might need to do a IBPB flush on every VMEXIT. Even when using retpoline for indirect calls, in certain conditions 'ret' can use the BTB on Skylake-era CPUs. There are other mitigations available like RSB stuffing/clearing. * IBPB is issued only for SVM during svm_free_vcpu(). VMX has a vmclear and SVM doesn't. Follow discussion here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/15/146 Please refer to the following spec for more details on the enumeration and control. Refer here to get documentation about mitigations. https://software.intel.com/en-us/side-channel-security-support [peterz: rebase and changelog rewrite] [karahmed: - rebase - vmx: expose PRED_CMD if guest has it in CPUID - svm: only pass through IBPB if guest has it in CPUID - vmx: support !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()] - vmx: support nested] [dwmw2: Expose CPUID bit too (AMD IBPB only for now as we lack IBRS) PRED_CMD is a write-only MSR] Signed-off-by:Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
[dwmw2: Stop using KF() for bits in it, too] Signed-off-by:
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmThomas Gleixner authored
Pull the KVM prerequisites so the IBPB patches apply.
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- 02 Feb, 2018 4 commits
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Darren Kenny authored
Fixes: 117cc7a9 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit") Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
I'm seeing build failures from the two newly introduced arrays that are marked 'const' and '__initdata', which are mutually exclusive: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:882:43: error: 'cpu_no_speculation' causes a section type conflict with 'e820_table_firmware_init' arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:895:43: error: 'cpu_no_meltdown' causes a section type conflict with 'e820_table_firmware_init' The correct annotation is __initconst. Fixes: fec9434a ("x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown") Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
[dwmw2: Use ARRAY_SIZE] Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
There's no point in building init code with retpolines, since it runs before any potentially hostile userspace does. And before the retpoline is actually ALTERNATIVEd into place, for much of it. Signed-off-by:
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- 01 Feb, 2018 1 commit
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Dan Williams authored
Commit 75f139aa "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup" added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of 'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'. The lfence can be avoided in this path by using the array_index_nospec() helper designed for these types of fixes. Signed-off-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 31 Jan, 2018 2 commits
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Paolo Bonzini authored
Place the MSR bitmap in struct loaded_vmcs, and update it in place every time the x2apic or APICv state can change. This is rare and the loop can handle 64 MSRs per iteration, in a similar fashion as nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. This prepares for choosing, on a per-VM basis, whether to intercept the SPEC_CTRL and PRED_CMD MSRs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # prereq for Spectre mitigation Suggested-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
The 'noreplace-paravirt' option disables paravirt patching, leaving the original pv indirect calls in place. That's highly incompatible with retpolines, unless we want to uglify paravirt even further and convert the paravirt calls to retpolines. As far as I can tell, the option doesn't seem to be useful for much other than introducing surprising corner cases and making the kernel vulnerable to Spectre v2. It was probably a debug option from the early paravirt days. So just remove it. Signed-off-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131041333.2x6blhxirc2kclrq@treble
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- 30 Jan, 2018 24 commits
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Tim Chen authored
Flush indirect branches when switching into a process that marked itself non dumpable. This protects high value processes like gpg better, without having too high performance overhead. If done naïvely, we could switch to a kernel idle thread and then back to the original process, such as: process A -> idle -> process A In such scenario, we do not have to do IBPB here even though the process is non-dumpable, as we are switching back to the same process after a hiatus. To avoid the redundant IBPB, which is expensive, we track the last mm user context ID. The cost is to have an extra u64 mm context id to track the last mm we were using before switching to the init_mm used by idle. Avoiding the extra IBPB is probably worth the extra memory for this common scenario. For those cases where tlb_defer_switch_to_init_mm() returns true (non PCID), lazy tlb will defer switch to init_mm, so we will not be changing the mm for the process A -> idle -> process A switch. So IBPB will be skipped for this case. Thanks to the reviewers and Andy Lutomirski for the suggestion of using ctx_id which got rid of the problem of mm pointer recycling. Signed-off-by:Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
Despite the fact that all the other code there seems to be doing it, just using set_cpu_cap() in early_intel_init() doesn't actually work. For CPUs with PKU support, setup_pku() calls get_cpu_cap() after c->c_init() has set those feature bits. That resets those bits back to what was queried from the hardware. Turning the bits off for bad microcode is easy to fix. That can just use setup_clear_cpu_cap() to force them off for all CPUs. I was less keen on forcing the feature bits *on* that way, just in case of inconsistencies. I appreciate that the kernel is going to get this utterly wrong if CPU features are not consistent, because it has already applied alternatives by the time secondary CPUs are brought up. But at least if setup_force_cpu_cap() isn't being used, we might have a chance of *detecting* the lack of the corresponding bit and either panicking or refusing to bring the offending CPU online. So ensure that the appropriate feature bits are set within get_cpu_cap() regardless of how many extra times it's called. Fixes: 2961298e ("x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags") Signed-off-by:
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Colin Ian King authored
Trivial fix to spelling mistake in pr_err error message text. Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by:
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that txq_params->ac is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level driver's ->conf_tx() handler is called. Use a new helper, array_index_nospec(), to sanitize txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that any speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS). Reported-by:
Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727419584.33451.7700736761686184303.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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Dan Williams authored
'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to read from the 'fdt->fd' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from __fcheck_files. Co-developed-by:
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Dan Williams authored
The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache behavior. Reported-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e. array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by: cmp %limit, %ptr sbb %mask, %mask and %mask, %ptr With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit or NULL. Co-developed-by: -
Dan Williams authored
Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. __uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try. Suggested-by:Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
In preparation for converting some __uaccess_begin() instances to __uacess_begin_nospec(), make sure all 'from user' uaccess paths are using the _begin(), _end() helpers rather than open-coded stac() and clac(). No functional changes. Suggested-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
For __get_user() paths, do not allow the kernel to speculate on the value of a user controlled pointer. In addition to the 'stac' instruction for Supervisor Mode Access Protection (SMAP), a barrier_nospec() causes the access_ok() result to resolve in the pipeline before the CPU might take any speculative action on the pointer value. Given the cost of 'stac' the speculation barrier is placed after 'stac' to hopefully overlap the cost of disabling SMAP with the cost of flushing the instruction pipeline. Since __get_user is a major kernel interface that deals with user controlled pointers, the __uaccess_begin_nospec() mechanism will prevent speculative execution past an access_ok() permission check. While speculative execution past access_ok() is not enough to lead to a kernel memory leak, it is a necessary precondition. To be clear, __uaccess_begin_nospec() is addressing a class of potential problems near __get_user() usages. Note, that while the barrier_nospec() in __uaccess_begin_nospec() is used to protect __get_user(), pointer masking similar to array_index_nospec() will be used for get_user() since it incorporates a bounds check near the usage. uaccess_try_nospec provides the same mechanism for get_user_try. No functional changes. Suggested-by:
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Dan Williams authored
Rename the open coded form of this instruction sequence from rdtsc_ordered() into a generic barrier primitive, barrier_nospec(). One of the mitigations for Spectre variant1 vulnerabilities is to fence speculative execution after successfully validating a bounds check. I.e. force the result of a bounds check to resolve in the instruction pipeline to ensure speculative execution honors that result before potentially operating on out-of-bounds data. No functional changes. Suggested-by:
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Dan Williams authored
array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software. The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the control flow. Suggested-by:
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Dan Williams authored
array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec() implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across multiple architectures (ARM, x86). Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation. Co-developed-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Suggested-by:
Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mark Rutland authored
Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper. Signed-off-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727413645.33451.15878817161436755393.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
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Andy Lutomirski authored
The TS_COMPAT bit is very hot and is accessed from code paths that mostly also touch thread_info::flags. Move it into struct thread_info to improve cache locality. The only reason it was in thread_struct is that there was a brief period during which arch-specific fields were not allowed in struct thread_info. Linus suggested further changing: ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); to: if (unlikely(ti->status & (TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED))) ti->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT|TS_I386_REGS_POKED); on the theory that frequently dirtying the cacheline even in pure 64-bit code that never needs to modify status hurts performance. That could be a reasonable followup patch, but I suspect it matters less on top of this patch. Suggested-by:Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
With the fast path removed there is no point in splitting the push of the normal and the extra register set. Just push the extra regs right away. [ tglx: Split out from 'x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path' ] Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
The SYCALLL64 fast path was a nice, if small, optimization back in the good old days when syscalls were actually reasonably fast. Now there is PTI to slow everything down, and indirect branches are verboten, making everything messier. The retpoline code in the fast path is particularly nasty. Just get rid of the fast path. The slow path is barely slower. [ tglx: Split out the 'push all extra regs' part ] Signed-off-by:
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Dou Liyang authored
The spectre_v2 option 'auto' does not check whether CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. As a consequence it fails to emit the appropriate warning and sets feature flags which have no effect at all. Add the missing IS_ENABLED() check. Fixes: da285121 ("x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation") Signed-off-by:
Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by:
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William Grant authored
Since commit 92a0f81d ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap"), i386's CPU_ENTRY_AREA has been mapped to the memory area just below FIXADDR_START. But already immediately before FIXADDR_START is the FIX_BTMAP area, which means that early_ioremap can collide with the entry area. It's especially bad on PAE where FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN gets aligned to exactly match CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE, so the first early_ioremap slot clobbers the IDT and causes interrupts during early boot to reset the system. The overlap wasn't a problem before the CPU entry area was introduced, as the fixmap has classically been preceded by the pkmap or vmalloc areas, neither of which is used until early_ioremap is out of the picture. Relocate CPU_ENTRY_AREA to below FIX_BTMAP, not just below the permanent fixmap area. Fixes: commit 92a0f81d ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Move it out of the fixmap") Signed-off-by:
William Grant <william.grant@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
With the following fix: 2a0098d7 ("objtool: Fix seg fault with gold linker") ... a seg fault was avoided, but the original seg fault condition in objtool wasn't fixed. Replace the seg fault with an error message. Suggested-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
Now that the previous patch gave objtool the ability to read retpoline alternatives, it shows a new warning: arch/x86/entry/entry_64.o: warning: objtool: .entry_trampoline: don't know how to handle alternatives at end of section This is due to the JMP_NOSPEC in entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline(). Previously, objtool ignored this situation because it wasn't needed, and it would have required a bit of extra code. Now that this case exists, add proper support for it. Signed-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
Currently objtool requires all retpolines to be: a) patched in with alternatives; and b) annotated with ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE. If you forget to do both of the above, objtool segfaults trying to dereference a NULL 'insn->call_dest' pointer. Avoid that situation and print a more helpful error message: quirks.o: warning: objtool: efi_delete_dummy_variable()+0x99: unsupported intra-function call quirks.o: warning: objtool: If this is a retpoline, please patch it in with alternatives and annotate it with ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE. Future improvements can be made to make objtool smarter with respect to retpolines, but this is a good incremental improvement for now. Reported-and-tested-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
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Ingo Molnar authored
Time has come to switch PTI development over to a v4.15 base - we'll still try to make sure that all PTI fixes backport cleanly to v4.14 and earlier. Signed-off-by:
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- 28 Jan, 2018 4 commits
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Linus Torvalds authored
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull x86 retpoline fixlet from Thomas Gleixner: "Remove the ESP/RSP thunks for retpoline as they cannot ever work. Get rid of them before they show up in a release" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "A set of small fixes for 4.15: - Fix vmapped stack synchronization on systems with 4-level paging and a large amount of memory caused by a missing 5-level folding which made the pgd synchronization logic to fail and causing double faults. - Add a missing sanity check in the vmalloc_fault() logic on 5-level paging systems. - Bring back protection against accessing a freed initrd in the microcode loader which was lost by a wrong merge conflict resolution. - Extend the Broadwell micro code loading sanity check. - Add a missing ENDPROC annotation in ftrace assembly code which makes ORC unhappy. - Prevent loading the AMD power module on !AMD platforms. The load itself is uncritical, but an unload attempt results in a kernel crash. - Update Peter Anvins role in the MAINTAINERS file" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/ftrace: Add one more ENDPROC annotation x86: Mark hpa as a "Designated Reviewer" for the time being x86/mm/64: Tighten up vmalloc_fault() sanity checks on 5-level kernels x86/mm/64: Fix vmapped stack syncing on very-large-memory 4-level systems x86/microcode: Fix again accessing initrd after having been freed x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading further with LLC size check perf/x86/amd/power: Do not load AMD power module on !AMD platforms -
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull timer fix from Thomas Gleixner: "A single fix for a ~10 years old problem which causes high resolution timers to stop after a CPU unplug/plug cycle due to a stale flag in the per CPU hrtimer base struct. Paul McKenney was hunting this for about a year, but the heisenbug nature made it resistant against debug attempts for quite some time" * 'timers-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: hrtimer: Reset hrtimer cpu base proper on CPU hotplug
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