1. 17 Mar, 2017 2 commits
    • Zygo Blaxell's avatar
      btrfs: add missing memset while reading compressed inline extents · e1699d2d
      Zygo Blaxell authored
      This is a story about 4 distinct (and very old) btrfs bugs.
      
      Commit c8b97818 ("Btrfs: Add zlib compression support") added
      three data corruption bugs for inline extents (bugs #1-3).
      
      Commit 93c82d57 ("Btrfs: zero page past end of inline file items")
      fixed bug #1:  uncompressed inline extents followed by a hole and more
      extents could get non-zero data in the hole as they were read.  The fix
      was to add a memset in btrfs_get_extent to zero out the hole.
      
      Commit 166ae5a4 ("btrfs: fix inline compressed read err corruption")
      fixed bug #2:  compressed inline extents which contained non-zero bytes
      might be replaced with zero bytes in some cases.  This patch removed an
      unhelpful memset from uncompress_inline, but the case where memset is
      required was missed.
      
      There is also a memset in the decompression code, but this only covers
      decompressed data that is shorter than the ram_bytes from the extent
      ref record.  This memset doesn't cover the region between the end of the
      decompressed data and the end of the page.  It has also moved around a
      few times over the years, so there's no single patch to refer to.
      
      This patch fixes bug #3:  compressed inline extents followed by a hole
      and more extents could get non-zero data in the hole as they were read
      (i.e. bug #3 is the same as bug #1, but s/uncompressed/compressed/).
      The fix is the same:  zero out the hole in the compressed case too,
      by putting a memset back in uncompress_inline, but this time with
      correct parameters.
      
      The last and oldest bug, bug #0, is the cause of the offending inline
      extent/hole/extent pattern.  Bug #0 is a subtle and mostly-harmless quirk
      of behavior somewhere in the btrfs write code.  In a few special cases,
      an inline extent and hole are allowed to persist where they normally
      would be combined with later extents in the file.
      
      A fast reproducer for bug #0 is presented below.  A few offending extents
      are also created in the wild during large rsync transfers with the -S
      flag.  A Linux kernel build (git checkout; make allyesconfig; make -j8)
      will produce a handful of offending files as well.  Once an offending
      file is created, it can present different content to userspace each
      time it is read.
      
      Bug #0 is at least 4 and possibly 8 years old.  I verified every vX.Y
      kernel back to v3.5 has this behavior.  There are fossil records of this
      bug's effects in commits all the way back to v2.6.32.  I have no reason
      to believe bug #0 wasn't present at the beginning of btrfs compression
      support in v2.6.29, but I can't easily test kernels that old to be sure.
      
      It is not clear whether bug #0 is worth fixing.  A fix would likely
      require injecting extra reads into currently write-only paths, and most
      of the exceptional cases caused by bug #0 are already handled now.
      
      Whether we like them or not, bug #0's inline extents followed by holes
      are part of the btrfs de-facto disk format now, and we need to be able
      to read them without data corruption or an infoleak.  So enough about
      bug #0, let's get back to bug #3 (this patch).
      
      An example of on-disk structure leading to data corruption found in
      the wild:
      
              item 61 key (606890 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 9662 itemsize 160
                      inode generation 50 transid 50 size 47424 nbytes 49141
                      block group 0 mode 100644 links 1 uid 0 gid 0
                      rdev 0 flags 0x0(none)
              item 62 key (606890 INODE_REF 603050) itemoff 9642 itemsize 20
                      inode ref index 3 namelen 10 name: DB_File.so
              item 63 key (606890 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 8280 itemsize 1362
                      inline extent data size 1341 ram 4085 compress(zlib)
              item 64 key (606890 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 8227 itemsize 53
                      extent data disk byte 5367308288 nr 20480
                      extent data offset 0 nr 45056 ram 45056
                      extent compression(zlib)
      
      Different data appears in userspace during each read of the 11 bytes
      between 4085 and 4096.  The extent in item 63 is not long enough to
      fill the first page of the file, so a memset is required to fill the
      space between item 63 (ending at 4085) and item 64 (beginning at 4096)
      with zero.
      
      Here is a reproducer from Liu Bo, which demonstrates another method
      of creating the same inline extent and hole pattern:
      
      Using 'page_poison=on' kernel command line (or enable
      CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING) run the following:
      
      	# touch foo
      	# chattr +c foo
      	# xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -W 0 1000" foo
      	# xfs_io -f -c "falloc 4 8188" foo
      	# od -x foo
      	# echo 3 >/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
      	# od -x foo
      
      This produce the following on my box:
      
      Correct output:  file contains 1000 data bytes followed
      by zeros:
      
      	0000000 cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd
      	*
      	0001740 cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd 0000 0000 0000 0000
      	0001760 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
      	*
      	0020000
      
      Actual output:  the data after the first 1000 bytes
      will be different each run:
      
      	0000000 cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd
      	*
      	0001740 cdcd cdcd cdcd cdcd 6c63 7400 635f 006d
      	0001760 5f74 6f43 7400 435f 0053 5f74 7363 7400
      	0002000 435f 0056 5f74 6164 7400 645f 0062 5f74
      	(...)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarZygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarChris Mason <clm@fb.com>
      e1699d2d
    • Liu Bo's avatar
      Btrfs: fix regression in lock_delalloc_pages · 49d4a334
      Liu Bo authored
      The bug is a regression after commit
      (da2c7009 "btrfs: teach __process_pages_contig about PAGE_LOCK operation")
      and commit
      (76c0021d "Btrfs: use helper to simplify lock/unlock pages").
      
      So if the dirty pages which are under writeback got truncated partially
      before we lock the dirty pages, we couldn't find all pages mapping to the
      delalloc range, and the bug didn't return an error so it kept going on and
      found that the delalloc range got truncated and got to unlock the dirty
      pages, and then the ASSERT could caught the error, and showed
      
      -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      assertion failed: page_ops & PAGE_LOCK, file: fs/btrfs/extent_io.c, line: 1716
      -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
      
      This fixes the bug by returning the proper -EAGAIN.
      
      Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      Reported-by: default avatarDave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLiu Bo <bo.li.liu@oracle.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
      49d4a334
  2. 07 Mar, 2017 1 commit
  3. 28 Feb, 2017 37 commits