Per further discussion with NIST, the requirements for FIPS state that
we only need to panic the system on failed kernel module signature checks
for crypto subsystem modules. This moves the fips-mode-only module
signature check out of the generic module loading code, into the crypto
subsystem, at points where we can catch both algorithm module loads and
mode module loads. At the same time, make CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS dependent on
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG, as this is entirely necessary for FIPS mode.

v2: remove extraneous blank line, perform checks in static inline
function, drop no longer necessary fips.h include.

CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
CC: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>