Merge branch 'for-next/scs' into for-next/core

Support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack in the kernel
(Sami Tolvanen and Will Deacon)
* for-next/scs:
  arm64: entry-ftrace.S: Update comment to indicate that x18 is live
  scs: Move DEFINE_SCS macro into core code
  scs: Remove references to asm/scs.h from core code
  scs: Move scs_overflow_check() out of architecture code
  arm64: scs: Use 'scs_sp' register alias for x18
  scs: Move accounting into alloc/free functions
  arm64: scs: Store absolute SCS stack pointer value in thread_info
  efi/libstub: Disable Shadow Call Stack
  arm64: scs: Add shadow stacks for SDEI
  arm64: Implement Shadow Call Stack
  arm64: Disable SCS for hypervisor code
  arm64: vdso: Disable Shadow Call Stack
  arm64: efi: Restore register x18 if it was corrupted
  arm64: Preserve register x18 when CPU is suspended
  arm64: Reserve register x18 from general allocation with SCS
  scs: Disable when function graph tracing is enabled
  scs: Add support for stack usage debugging
  scs: Add page accounting for shadow call stack allocations
  scs: Add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack (SCS)

Makefile

@@ -866,6 +866,12 @@ ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option, -flive-patching=inline-clone)
 endif
 
+ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+CC_FLAGS_SCS	:= -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack
+KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(CC_FLAGS_SCS)
+export CC_FLAGS_SCS
+endif
+
 # arch Makefile may override CC so keep this after arch Makefile is included
 NOSTDINC_FLAGS += -nostdinc -isystem $(shell $(CC) -print-file-name=include)
 

arch/Kconfig

@@ -533,6 +533,31 @@ config STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
 	  about 20% of all kernel functions, which increases the kernel code
 	  size by about 2%.
 
+config ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	bool
+	help
+	  An architecture should select this if it supports Clang's Shadow
+	  Call Stack and implements runtime support for shadow stack
+	  switching.
+
+config SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	bool "Clang Shadow Call Stack"
+	depends on CC_IS_CLANG && ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	depends on DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS || !FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
+	help
+	  This option enables Clang's Shadow Call Stack, which uses a
+	  shadow stack to protect function return addresses from being
+	  overwritten by an attacker. More information can be found in
+	  Clang's documentation:
+
+	    https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ShadowCallStack.html
+
+	  Note that security guarantees in the kernel differ from the
+	  ones documented for user space. The kernel must store addresses
+	  of shadow stacks in memory, which means an attacker capable of
+	  reading and writing arbitrary memory may be able to locate them
+	  and hijack control flow by modifying the stacks.
+
 config HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
 	bool
 	help

arch/arm64/Kconfig

@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ config ARM64
 	select ARCH_USE_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS
 	select ARCH_USE_SYM_ANNOTATIONS
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_MEMORY_FAILURE
+	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_SHADOW_CALL_STACK if CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if CC_HAS_INT128 && (GCC_VERSION >= 50000 || CC_IS_CLANG)
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING
@@ -1026,6 +1027,10 @@ config ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE
 config ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK
 	def_bool y if PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2
 
+# Supported by clang >= 7.0
+config CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack -ffixed-x18)
+
 config SECCOMP
 	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
 	---help---

arch/arm64/Makefile

@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ endif
 
 KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(branch-prot-flags-y)
 
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK), y)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= -ffixed-x18
+endif
+
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN), y)
 KBUILD_CPPFLAGS	+= -mbig-endian
 CHECKFLAGS	+= -D__AARCH64EB__

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/sysreg.h>
 
-#define __hyp_text __section(.hyp.text) notrace
+#define __hyp_text __section(.hyp.text) notrace __noscs
 
 #define read_sysreg_elx(r,nvh,vh)					\
 	({								\

arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h

+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_SCS_H
+#define _ASM_SCS_H
+
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	scs_sp	.req	x18
+
+	.macro scs_load tsk, tmp
+	ldr	scs_sp, [\tsk, #TSK_TI_SCS_SP]
+	.endm
+
+	.macro scs_save tsk, tmp
+	str	scs_sp, [\tsk, #TSK_TI_SCS_SP]
+	.endm
+#else
+	.macro scs_load tsk, tmp
+	.endm
+
+	.macro scs_save tsk, tmp
+	.endm
+#endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
+
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY __ */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_SCS_H */

arch/arm64/include/asm/suspend.h

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_SUSPEND_H
 #define __ASM_SUSPEND_H
 
-#define NR_CTX_REGS 12
+#define NR_CTX_REGS 13
 #define NR_CALLEE_SAVED_REGS 12
 
 /*

arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h

@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@ struct thread_info {
 #endif
 		} preempt;
 	};
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	void			*scs_base;
+	void			*scs_sp;
+#endif
 };
 
 #define thread_saved_pc(tsk)	\
@@ -100,11 +104,20 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk);
 				 _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT | _TIF_SECCOMP | \
 				 _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+#define INIT_SCS							\
+	.scs_base	= init_shadow_call_stack,			\
+	.scs_sp		= init_shadow_call_stack,
+#else
+#define INIT_SCS
+#endif
+
 #define INIT_THREAD_INFO(tsk)						\
 {									\
 	.flags		= _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE,				\
 	.preempt_count	= INIT_PREEMPT_COUNT,				\
 	.addr_limit	= KERNEL_DS,					\
+	INIT_SCS							\
 }
 
 #endif /* __ASM_THREAD_INFO_H */

arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE)		+= crash_core.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE)		+= sdei.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD)		+= ssbd.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH)		+= pointer_auth.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK)		+= scs.o
 
 obj-y					+= vdso/ probes/
 obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO)		+= vdso32/

arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c

@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ int main(void)
   DEFINE(TSK_TI_ADDR_LIMIT,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread_info.addr_limit));
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
   DEFINE(TSK_TI_TTBR0,		offsetof(struct task_struct, thread_info.ttbr0));
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+  DEFINE(TSK_TI_SCS_BASE,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread_info.scs_base));
+  DEFINE(TSK_TI_SCS_SP,		offsetof(struct task_struct, thread_info.scs_sp));
 #endif
   DEFINE(TSK_STACK,		offsetof(struct task_struct, stack));
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR

arch/arm64/kernel/efi-rt-wrapper.S

@@ -34,5 +34,14 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__efi_rt_asm_wrapper)
 	ldp	x29, x30, [sp], #32
 	b.ne	0f
 	ret
-0:	b	efi_handle_corrupted_x18	// tail call
+0:
+	/*
+	 * With CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, the kernel uses x18 to store a
+	 * shadow stack pointer, which we need to restore before returning to
+	 * potentially instrumented code. This is safe because the wrapper is
+	 * called with preemption disabled and a separate shadow stack is used
+	 * for interrupts.
+	 */
+	mov	x18, x2
+	b	efi_handle_corrupted_x18	// tail call
 SYM_FUNC_END(__efi_rt_asm_wrapper)

arch/arm64/kernel/entry-ftrace.S

@@ -23,8 +23,9 @@
  *
  * ... where <entry> is either ftrace_caller or ftrace_regs_caller.
  *
- * Each instrumented function follows the AAPCS, so here x0-x8 and x19-x30 are
- * live, and x9-x18 are safe to clobber.
+ * Each instrumented function follows the AAPCS, so here x0-x8 and x18-x30 are
+ * live (x18 holds the Shadow Call Stack pointer), and x9-x17 are safe to
+ * clobber.
  *
  * We save the callsite's context into a pt_regs before invoking any ftrace
  * callbacks. So that we can get a sensible backtrace, we create a stack record

arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <asm/mmu.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/scs.h>
 #include <asm/thread_info.h>
 #include <asm/asm-uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -179,6 +180,8 @@ alternative_cb_end
 	apply_ssbd 1, x22, x23
 
 	ptrauth_keys_install_kernel tsk, x20, x22, x23
+
+	scs_load tsk, x20
 	.else
 	add	x21, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE
 	get_current_task tsk
@@ -343,6 +346,8 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	msr	cntkctl_el1, x1
 4:
 #endif
+	scs_save tsk, x0
+
 	/* No kernel C function calls after this as user keys are set. */
 	ptrauth_keys_install_user tsk, x0, x1, x2
 
@@ -388,6 +393,9 @@ alternative_insn eret, nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 
 	.macro	irq_stack_entry
 	mov	x19, sp			// preserve the original sp
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	mov	x24, scs_sp		// preserve the original shadow stack
+#endif
 
 	/*
 	 * Compare sp with the base of the task stack.
@@ -405,15 +413,25 @@ alternative_insn eret, nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 
 	/* switch to the irq stack */
 	mov	sp, x26
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	/* also switch to the irq shadow stack */
+	adr_this_cpu scs_sp, irq_shadow_call_stack, x26
+#endif
+
 9998:
 	.endm
 
 	/*
-	 * x19 should be preserved between irq_stack_entry and
-	 * irq_stack_exit.
+	 * The callee-saved regs (x19-x29) should be preserved between
+	 * irq_stack_entry and irq_stack_exit, but note that kernel_entry
+	 * uses x20-x23 to store data for later use.
 	 */
 	.macro	irq_stack_exit
 	mov	sp, x19
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	mov	scs_sp, x24
+#endif
 	.endm
 
 /* GPRs used by entry code */
@@ -902,6 +920,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_switch_to)
 	mov	sp, x9
 	msr	sp_el0, x1
 	ptrauth_keys_install_kernel x1, x8, x9, x10
+	scs_save x0, x8
+	scs_load x1, x8
 	ret
 SYM_FUNC_END(cpu_switch_to)
 NOKPROBE(cpu_switch_to)
@@ -1030,13 +1050,16 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__sdei_asm_handler)
 
 	mov	x19, x1
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK) || defined(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK)
+	ldrb	w4, [x19, #SDEI_EVENT_PRIORITY]
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
 	/*
 	 * entry.S may have been using sp as a scratch register, find whether
 	 * this is a normal or critical event and switch to the appropriate
 	 * stack for this CPU.
 	 */
-	ldrb	w4, [x19, #SDEI_EVENT_PRIORITY]
 	cbnz	w4, 1f
 	ldr_this_cpu dst=x5, sym=sdei_stack_normal_ptr, tmp=x6
 	b	2f
@@ -1046,6 +1069,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__sdei_asm_handler)
 	mov	sp, x5
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	/* Use a separate shadow call stack for normal and critical events */
+	cbnz	w4, 3f
+	adr_this_cpu dst=scs_sp, sym=sdei_shadow_call_stack_normal, tmp=x6
+	b	4f
+3:	adr_this_cpu dst=scs_sp, sym=sdei_shadow_call_stack_critical, tmp=x6
+4:
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * We may have interrupted userspace, or a guest, or exit-from or
 	 * return-to either of these. We can't trust sp_el0, restore it.

arch/arm64/kernel/head.S

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/scs.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 #include <asm/sysreg.h>
 #include <asm/thread_info.h>
@@ -433,6 +434,10 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__primary_switched)
 	stp	xzr, x30, [sp, #-16]!
 	mov	x29, sp
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	adr_l	scs_sp, init_shadow_call_stack	// Set shadow call stack
+#endif
+
 	str_l	x21, __fdt_pointer, x5		// Save FDT pointer
 
 	ldr_l	x4, kimage_vaddr		// Save the offset between
@@ -745,6 +750,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(__secondary_switched)
 	ldr	x2, [x0, #CPU_BOOT_TASK]
 	cbz	x2, __secondary_too_slow
 	msr	sp_el0, x2
+	scs_load x2, x3
 	mov	x29, #0
 	mov	x30, #0
 

arch/arm64/kernel/scs.c

+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Shadow Call Stack support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/scs.h>
+
+DEFINE_SCS(irq_shadow_call_stack);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE
+DEFINE_SCS(sdei_shadow_call_stack_normal);
+DEFINE_SCS(sdei_shadow_call_stack_critical);
+#endif

arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ldflags-y := -shared -nostdlib -soname=linux-vdso.so.1 --hash-style=sysv \
 ccflags-y := -fno-common -fno-builtin -fno-stack-protector -ffixed-x18
 ccflags-y += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
 
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -Os
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -Os $(CC_FLAGS_SCS)
 KBUILD_CFLAGS			+= $(DISABLE_LTO)
 KASAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 UBSAN_SANITIZE			:= n

arch/arm64/mm/proc.S

@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
  * cpu_do_suspend - save CPU registers context
  *
  * x0: virtual address of context pointer
+ *
+ * This must be kept in sync with struct cpu_suspend_ctx in <asm/suspend.h>.
  */
 SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_do_suspend)
 	mrs	x2, tpidr_el0
@@ -82,6 +84,11 @@ alternative_endif
 	stp	x8, x9, [x0, #48]
 	stp	x10, x11, [x0, #64]
 	stp	x12, x13, [x0, #80]
+	/*
+	 * Save x18 as it may be used as a platform register, e.g. by shadow
+	 * call stack.
+	 */
+	str	x18, [x0, #96]
 	ret
 SYM_FUNC_END(cpu_do_suspend)
 
@@ -98,6 +105,13 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(cpu_do_resume)
 	ldp	x9, x10, [x0, #48]
 	ldp	x11, x12, [x0, #64]
 	ldp	x13, x14, [x0, #80]
+	/*
+	 * Restore x18, as it may be used as a platform register, and clear
+	 * the buffer to minimize the risk of exposure when used for shadow
+	 * call stack.
+	 */
+	ldr	x18, [x0, #96]
+	str	xzr, [x0, #96]
 	msr	tpidr_el0, x2
 	msr	tpidrro_el0, x3
 	msr	contextidr_el1, x4

drivers/base/node.c

@@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ static ssize_t node_read_meminfo(struct device *dev,
 		       "Node %d AnonPages:      %8lu kB\n"
 		       "Node %d Shmem:          %8lu kB\n"
 		       "Node %d KernelStack:    %8lu kB\n"
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+		       "Node %d ShadowCallStack:%8lu kB\n"
+#endif
 		       "Node %d PageTables:     %8lu kB\n"
 		       "Node %d NFS_Unstable:   %8lu kB\n"
 		       "Node %d Bounce:         %8lu kB\n"
@@ -438,6 +441,9 @@ static ssize_t node_read_meminfo(struct device *dev,
 		       nid, K(node_page_state(pgdat, NR_ANON_MAPPED)),
 		       nid, K(i.sharedram),
 		       nid, sum_zone_node_page_state(nid, NR_KERNEL_STACK_KB),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+		       nid, sum_zone_node_page_state(nid, NR_KERNEL_SCS_KB),
+#endif
 		       nid, K(sum_zone_node_page_state(nid, NR_PAGETABLE)),
 		       nid, K(node_page_state(pgdat, NR_UNSTABLE_NFS)),
 		       nid, K(sum_zone_node_page_state(nid, NR_BOUNCE)),

drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile

@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS			:= $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
 				   $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) \
 				   -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS
 
+# remove SCS flags from all objects in this directory
+KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_SCS), $(KBUILD_CFLAGS))
+
 GCOV_PROFILE			:= n
 KASAN_SANITIZE			:= n
 UBSAN_SANITIZE			:= n

fs/proc/meminfo.c

@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ static int meminfo_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	show_val_kb(m, "SUnreclaim:     ", sunreclaim);
 	seq_printf(m, "KernelStack:    %8lu kB\n",
 		   global_zone_page_state(NR_KERNEL_STACK_KB));
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+	seq_printf(m, "ShadowCallStack:%8lu kB\n",
+		   global_zone_page_state(NR_KERNEL_SCS_KB));
+#endif
 	show_val_kb(m, "PageTables:     ",
 		    global_zone_page_state(NR_PAGETABLE));
 

include/linux/compiler-clang.h

@@ -42,3 +42,7 @@
  * compilers, like ICC.
  */
 #define barrier() __asm__ __volatile__("" : : : "memory")
+
+#if __has_feature(shadow_call_stack)
+# define __noscs	__attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack")))
+#endif

include/linux/compiler_types.h

@@ -193,6 +193,10 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data {
 # define randomized_struct_fields_end
 #endif
 
+#ifndef __noscs
+# define __noscs
+#endif
+
 #ifndef asm_volatile_goto
 #define asm_volatile_goto(x...) asm goto(x)
 #endif

include/linux/mmzone.h

@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ enum zone_stat_item {
 	NR_MLOCK,		/* mlock()ed pages found and moved off LRU */
 	NR_PAGETABLE,		/* used for pagetables */
 	NR_KERNEL_STACK_KB,	/* measured in KiB */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK)
+	NR_KERNEL_SCS_KB,	/* measured in KiB */
+#endif
 	/* Second 128 byte cacheline */
 	NR_BOUNCE,
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZSMALLOC)

include/linux/scs.h

+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Shadow Call Stack support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_SCS_H
+#define _LINUX_SCS_H
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/poison.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+
+/*
+ * In testing, 1 KiB shadow stack size (i.e. 128 stack frames on a 64-bit
+ * architecture) provided ~40% safety margin on stack usage while keeping
+ * memory allocation overhead reasonable.
+ */
+#define SCS_SIZE		SZ_1K
+#define GFP_SCS			(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO)
+
+/* An illegal pointer value to mark the end of the shadow stack. */
+#define SCS_END_MAGIC		(0x5f6UL + POISON_POINTER_DELTA)
+
+/* Allocate a static per-CPU shadow stack */
+#define DEFINE_SCS(name)						\
+	DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long [SCS_SIZE/sizeof(long)], name)	\
+
+#define task_scs(tsk)		(task_thread_info(tsk)->scs_base)
+#define task_scs_sp(tsk)	(task_thread_info(tsk)->scs_sp)
+
+void scs_init(void);
+int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node);
+void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk);
+
+static inline void scs_task_reset(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Reset the shadow stack to the base address in case the task
+	 * is reused.
+	 */
+	task_scs_sp(tsk) = task_scs(tsk);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long *__scs_magic(void *s)
+{
+	return (unsigned long *)(s + SCS_SIZE) - 1;
+}
+
+static inline bool task_scs_end_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	unsigned long *magic = __scs_magic(task_scs(tsk));
+	unsigned long sz = task_scs_sp(tsk) - task_scs(tsk);
+
+	return sz >= SCS_SIZE - 1 || READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*magic) != SCS_END_MAGIC;
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
+
+static inline void scs_init(void) {}
+static inline void scs_task_reset(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
+static inline int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node) { return 0; }
+static inline void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk) {}
+static inline bool task_scs_end_corrupted(struct task_struct *tsk) { return false; }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK */
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_SCS_H */

init/init_task.c

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/numa.h>
+#include <linux/scs.h>
 
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -50,6 +51,13 @@ static struct sighand_struct init_sighand = {
 	.signalfd_wqh	= __WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD_INITIALIZER(init_sighand.signalfd_wqh),
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+unsigned long init_shadow_call_stack[SCS_SIZE / sizeof(long)]
+		__init_task_data = {
+	[(SCS_SIZE / sizeof(long)) - 1] = SCS_END_MAGIC
+};
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Set up the first task table, touch at your own risk!. Base=0,
  * limit=0x1fffff (=2MB)

kernel/Makefile

@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS) += trace/
 obj-$(CONFIG_IRQ_WORK) += irq_work.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_PM) += cpu_pm.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_BPF) += bpf/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK) += scs.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += events/
 

kernel/fork.c

@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <linux/stackleak.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/scs.h>
 
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -456,6 +457,8 @@ void put_task_stack(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
+	scs_release(tsk);
+
 #ifndef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
 	/*
 	 * The task is finally done with both the stack and thread_info,
@@ -840,6 +843,8 @@ void __init fork_init(void)
 			  NULL, free_vm_stack_cache);
 #endif
 
+	scs_init();
+
 	lockdep_init_task(&init_task);
 	uprobes_init();
 }
@@ -899,6 +904,10 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
 	if (err)
 		goto free_stack;
 
+	err = scs_prepare(tsk, node);
+	if (err)
+		goto free_stack;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
 	/*
 	 * We must handle setting up seccomp filters once we're under

kernel/sched/core.c

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <linux/kcov.h>
+#include <linux/scs.h>
 
 #include <asm/switch_to.h>
 #include <asm/tlb.h>
@@ -3877,6 +3878,9 @@ static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev, bool preempt)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
 	if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))
 		panic("corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\n");
+
+	if (task_scs_end_corrupted(prev))
+		panic("corrupted shadow stack detected inside scheduler\n");
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP
@@ -6040,6 +6044,7 @@ void init_idle(struct task_struct *idle, int cpu)
 	idle->se.exec_start = sched_clock();
 	idle->flags |= PF_IDLE;
 
+	scs_task_reset(idle);
 	kasan_unpoison_task_stack(idle);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP

kernel/scs.c

+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Shadow Call Stack support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Google LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/scs.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vmstat.h>
+
+static struct kmem_cache *scs_cache;
+
+static void __scs_account(void *s, int account)
+{
+	struct page *scs_page = virt_to_page(s);
+
+	mod_zone_page_state(page_zone(scs_page), NR_KERNEL_SCS_KB,
+			    account * (SCS_SIZE / SZ_1K));
+}
+
+static void *scs_alloc(int node)
+{
+	void *s = kmem_cache_alloc_node(scs_cache, GFP_SCS, node);
+
+	if (!s)
+		return NULL;
+
+	*__scs_magic(s) = SCS_END_MAGIC;
+
+	/*
+	 * Poison the allocation to catch unintentional accesses to
+	 * the shadow stack when KASAN is enabled.
+	 */
+	kasan_poison_object_data(scs_cache, s);
+	__scs_account(s, 1);
+	return s;
+}
+
+static void scs_free(void *s)
+{
+	__scs_account(s, -1);
+	kasan_unpoison_object_data(scs_cache, s);
+	kmem_cache_free(scs_cache, s);
+}
+
+void __init scs_init(void)
+{
+	scs_cache = kmem_cache_create("scs_cache", SCS_SIZE, 0, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+int scs_prepare(struct task_struct *tsk, int node)
+{
+	void *s = scs_alloc(node);
+
+	if (!s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	task_scs(tsk) = task_scs_sp(tsk) = s;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void scs_check_usage(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	static unsigned long highest;
+
+	unsigned long *p, prev, curr = highest, used = 0;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE))
+		return;
+
+	for (p = task_scs(tsk); p < __scs_magic(tsk); ++p) {
+		if (!READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*p))
+			break;
+		used++;
+	}
+
+	while (used > curr) {
+		prev = cmpxchg_relaxed(&highest, curr, used);
+
+		if (prev == curr) {
+			pr_info("%s (%d): highest shadow stack usage: %lu bytes\n",
+				tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), used);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		curr = prev;
+	}
+}
+
+void scs_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	void *s = task_scs(tsk);
+
+	if (!s)
+		return;
+
+	WARN(task_scs_end_corrupted(tsk),
+	     "corrupted shadow stack detected when freeing task\n");
+	scs_check_usage(tsk);
+	scs_free(s);
+}

mm/page_alloc.c

@@ -5411,6 +5411,9 @@ void show_free_areas(unsigned int filter, nodemask_t *nodemask)
 			" managed:%lukB"
 			" mlocked:%lukB"
 			" kernel_stack:%lukB"
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+			" shadow_call_stack:%lukB"
+#endif
 			" pagetables:%lukB"
 			" bounce:%lukB"
 			" free_pcp:%lukB"
@@ -5433,6 +5436,9 @@ void show_free_areas(unsigned int filter, nodemask_t *nodemask)
 			K(zone_managed_pages(zone)),
 			K(zone_page_state(zone, NR_MLOCK)),
 			zone_page_state(zone, NR_KERNEL_STACK_KB),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK
+			zone_page_state(zone, NR_KERNEL_SCS_KB),
+#endif
 			K(zone_page_state(zone, NR_PAGETABLE)),
 			K(zone_page_state(zone, NR_BOUNCE)),
 			K(free_pcp),

mm/vmstat.c

@@ -1119,6 +1119,9 @@ const char * const vmstat_text[] = {
 	"nr_mlock",
 	"nr_page_table_pages",
 	"nr_kernel_stack",
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK)
+	"nr_shadow_call_stack",
+#endif
 	"nr_bounce",
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ZSMALLOC)
 	"nr_zspages",