Commit 3e326731 authored by Al Viro's avatar Al Viro Committed by Sasha Levin

sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS

[ Upstream commit 128394ef ]

Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those.  Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
parent 363f1a90
...@@ -655,6 +655,9 @@ bsg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) ...@@ -655,6 +655,9 @@ bsg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count); dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
return -EINVAL;
bsg_set_block(bd, file); bsg_set_block(bd, file);
bytes_written = 0; bytes_written = 0;
......
...@@ -592,6 +592,9 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos) ...@@ -592,6 +592,9 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
sg_io_hdr_t *hp; sg_io_hdr_t *hp;
unsigned char cmnd[SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE]; unsigned char cmnd[SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE];
if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
return -EINVAL;
if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp))) if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
return -ENXIO; return -ENXIO;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp, SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
......
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