Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
  Take ima_file_free() to proper place.
  ima: rename PATH_CHECK to FILE_CHECK
  ima: rename ima_path_check to ima_file_check
  ima: initialize ima before inodes can be allocated
  fix ima breakage
  Take ima_path_check() in nfsd past dentry_open() in nfsd_open()
  freeze_bdev: don't deactivate successfully frozen MS_RDONLY sb
  befs: fix leak

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Description:
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
 				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 
-		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION]
+		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][FILE_CHECK]
 			mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
 			uid:= decimal value
@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ Description:
 
 			measure func=BPRM_CHECK
 			measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
-			measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+			measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
 
 		The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
 		all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
-		open for read by root in inode_permission.
+		open for read by root in do_filp_open.
 
 		Examples of LSM specific definitions:
 
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ Description:
 
 			dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
 			dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
-			measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
-			measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+			measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+			measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
 
 		Smack:
-			measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+			measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ

fs/befs/linuxvfs.c

@@ -873,6 +873,7 @@ befs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	brelse(bh);
 
       unacquire_priv_sbp:
+	kfree(befs_sb->mount_opts.iocharset);
 	kfree(sb->s_fs_info);
 
       unacquire_none:

fs/block_dev.c

@@ -246,7 +246,8 @@ struct super_block *freeze_bdev(struct block_device *bdev)
 	if (!sb)
 		goto out;
 	if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) {
-		deactivate_locked_super(sb);
+		sb->s_frozen = SB_FREEZE_TRANS;
+		up_write(&sb->s_umount);
 		mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
 		return sb;
 	}
@@ -307,7 +308,7 @@ int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb)
 	BUG_ON(sb->s_bdev != bdev);
 	down_write(&sb->s_umount);
 	if (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY)
-		goto out_deactivate;
+		goto out_unfrozen;
 
 	if (sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs) {
 		error = sb->s_op->unfreeze_fs(sb);
@@ -321,11 +322,11 @@ int thaw_bdev(struct block_device *bdev, struct super_block *sb)
 		}
 	}
 
+out_unfrozen:
 	sb->s_frozen = SB_UNFROZEN;
 	smp_wmb();
 	wake_up(&sb->s_wait_unfrozen);
 
-out_deactivate:
 	if (sb)
 		deactivate_locked_super(sb);
 out_unlock:

fs/file_table.c

@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ void __fput(struct file *file)
 	if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
 		file->f_op->release(inode, file);
 	security_file_free(file);
+	ima_file_free(file);
 	if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL))
 		cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
 	fops_put(file->f_op);

fs/namei.c

@@ -1736,8 +1736,7 @@ struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, const char *pathname,
 		if (nd.root.mnt)
 			path_put(&nd.root);
 		if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
-			error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode &
-				       (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
+			error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode);
 			if (error) {
 				fput(filp);
 				filp = ERR_PTR(error);
@@ -1797,8 +1796,7 @@ struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, const char *pathname,
 	}
 	filp = nameidata_to_filp(&nd);
 	if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
-		error = ima_path_check(&filp->f_path, filp->f_mode &
-			       (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
+		error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode);
 		if (error) {
 			fput(filp);
 			filp = ERR_PTR(error);

fs/nfsd/vfs.c

@@ -752,6 +752,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
 			    flags, current_cred());
 	if (IS_ERR(*filp))
 		host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp);
+	host_err = ima_file_check(*filp, access);
 out_nfserr:
 	err = nfserrno(host_err);
 out:
@@ -2127,7 +2128,6 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
 	 */
 	path.mnt = exp->ex_path.mnt;
 	path.dentry = dentry;
-	err = ima_path_check(&path, acc & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
 nfsd_out:
 	return err? nfserrno(err) : 0;
 }

include/linux/ima.h

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct linux_binprm;
 extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 extern int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
 extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
-extern int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask);
+extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask);
 extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
 extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
 extern void ima_counts_get(struct file *file);
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static inline void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 	return;
 }
 
-static inline int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
+static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
 	return 0;
 }

init/main.c

@@ -657,9 +657,9 @@ asmlinkage void __init start_kernel(void)
 	proc_caches_init();
 	buffer_init();
 	key_init();
+	radix_tree_init();
 	security_init();
 	vfs_caches_init(totalram_pages);
-	radix_tree_init();
 	signals_init();
 	/* rootfs populating might need page-writeback */
 	page_writeback_init();

security/integrity/ima/ima.h

@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 			 const char *cause, int result, int info);
 
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
-void ima_iintcache_init(void);
 int ima_init(void);
 void ima_cleanup(void);
 int ima_fs_init(void);
@@ -131,7 +130,7 @@ void iint_free(struct kref *kref);
 void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
 
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
 void ima_init_policy(void);

security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c

@@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
  * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
+ * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  * 		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- * 	func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
+ * 	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
  * 	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *

security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c

@@ -52,9 +52,6 @@ int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (!ima_initialized)
-		return 0;
-
 	iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!iint)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -118,8 +115,6 @@ void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
-	if (!ima_initialized)
-		return;
 	spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock);
 	iint = radix_tree_delete(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode);
 	spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock);
@@ -141,9 +136,11 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 	kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1);
 }
 
-void __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
+static int __init ima_iintcache_init(void)
 {
 	iint_cache =
 	    kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0,
 			      SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
+	return 0;
 }
+security_initcall(ima_iintcache_init);

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  *
  * File: ima_main.c
  *	implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
- *	and ima_path_check.
+ *	and ima_file_check.
  */
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
@@ -84,6 +84,36 @@ static bool ima_limit_imbalance(struct file *file)
 	return found;
 }
 
+/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR.
+ *
+ * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write,
+ * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results
+ * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *
+ * In either case invalidate the PCR.
+ */
+enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
+static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
+				 struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+				 struct inode *inode,
+				 const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+	switch (error) {
+	case TOMTOU:
+		if (iint->readcount > 0)
+			ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+					  "ToMToU");
+		break;
+	case OPEN_WRITERS:
+		if (iint->writecount > 0)
+			ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+					  "open_writers");
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * Update the counts given an fmode_t
  */
@@ -98,6 +128,47 @@ static void ima_inc_counts(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, fmode_t mode)
 		iint->writecount++;
 }
 
+/*
+ * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
+ *
+ * Maintain read/write counters for all files, but only
+ * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ * 	- Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ *	  results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *	- Opening a file for read when already open for write,
+ * 	  could result in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ */
+void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
+	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return;
+	iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+	if (!iint)
+		return;
+	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+	rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+		ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode, dentry->d_name.name);
+out:
+	ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
+	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+
+	kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+}
+
 /*
  * Decrement ima counts
  */
@@ -153,123 +224,6 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 	kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
 }
 
-/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR.
- *
- * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write,
- * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error.
- *
- * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results
- * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
- *
- * In either case invalidate the PCR.
- */
-enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
-static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
-				 struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
-				 struct inode *inode,
-				 const unsigned char *filename)
-{
-	switch (error) {
-	case TOMTOU:
-		if (iint->readcount > 0)
-			ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
-					  "ToMToU");
-		break;
-	case OPEN_WRITERS:
-		if (iint->writecount > 0)
-			ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
-					  "open_writers");
-		break;
-	}
-}
-
-static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
-				const unsigned char *filename)
-{
-	int rc = 0;
-
-	ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
-
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
-	if (!rc)
-		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
-	return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
- * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured
- * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
- *
- * Measure the file being open for readonly, based on the
- * ima_must_measure() policy decision.
- *
- * Keep read/write counters for all files, but only
- * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
- * 	- Opening a file for write when already open for read,
- *	  results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
- *	- Opening a file for read when already open for write,
- * 	  could result in a file measurement error.
- *
- * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
- * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
- */
-int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
-{
-	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
-	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
-	struct file *file = NULL;
-	int rc;
-
-	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
-		return 0;
-	iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
-	if (!iint)
-		return 0;
-
-	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-
-	rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
-	if (rc < 0)
-		goto out;
-
-	if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
-		ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode,
-				     path->dentry->d_name.name);
-
-	if ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) != MAY_READ)
-		goto out;
-
-	ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode,
-			     path->dentry->d_name.name);
-	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
-		struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry);
-		struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
-
-		file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY | O_LARGEFILE,
-				   current_cred());
-		if (IS_ERR(file)) {
-			int audit_info = 0;
-
-			integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
-					    dentry->d_name.name,
-					    "add_measurement",
-					    "dentry_open failed",
-					    1, audit_info);
-			file = NULL;
-			goto out;
-		}
-		rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name);
-	}
-out:
-	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
-	if (file)
-		fput(file);
-	kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
-	return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_path_check);
-
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 			       int mask, int function)
 {
@@ -297,33 +251,6 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-/*
- * ima_counts_get - increment file counts
- *
- * - for IPC shm and shmat file.
- * - for nfsd exported files.
- *
- * Increment the counts for these files to prevent unnecessary
- * imbalance messages.
- */
-void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
-{
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
-	struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
-
-	if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
-		return;
-	iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
-	if (!iint)
-		return;
-	mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-	ima_inc_counts(iint, file->f_mode);
-	mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
-
-	kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_counts_get);
-
 /**
  * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
  * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
@@ -369,11 +296,31 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
+ * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
+ *
+ * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
+ *
+ * Always return 0 and audit dentry_open failures.
+ * (Return code will be based upon measurement appraisal.)
+ */
+int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+				 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
+				 FILE_CHECK);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
+
 static int __init init_ima(void)
 {
 	int error;
 
-	ima_iintcache_init();
 	error = ima_init();
 	ima_initialized = 1;
 	return error;

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
-	{.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
+	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
 };
 
@@ -282,8 +282,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 			break;
 		case Opt_func:
 			audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
-			if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
-				entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
+			if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+			/* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
+			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
+				entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
 				entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
 			else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)

security/security.c

@@ -666,8 +666,6 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	security_ops->file_free_security(file);
-	if (file->f_dentry)
-		ima_file_free(file);
 }
 
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)