Commit 9aa2fcb8 authored by Ryder Lee's avatar Ryder Lee Committed by Herbert Xu

crypto: mediatek - make hardware operation flow more efficient

This patch refines data structures, which are used to control engine's
data path, to make it more efficient. Hence current change are:

- gathers the broken pieces of structures 'mtk_aes_ct''mtk_aes_tfm'
into struct mtk_aes_info hence avoiding additional DMA-mapping.

- adds 'keymode' in struct mtk_aes_base_ctx. When .setkey() callback is
called, we store keybit setting in keymode. Doing so, there is no need
to check keylen second time in mtk_aes_info_init() / mtk_aes_gcm_info_init().

Besides, this patch also removes unused macro definitions and adds helper
inline function to write security information(key, IV,...) to info->state.
Signed-off-by: default avatarRyder Lee <ryder.lee@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
parent 98b10235
......@@ -19,13 +19,10 @@
#define AES_BUF_ORDER 2
#define AES_BUF_SIZE ((PAGE_SIZE << AES_BUF_ORDER) \
& ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1))
#define AES_MAX_STATE_BUF_SIZE SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_256 + \
AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2)
#define AES_MAX_CT_SIZE 6
/* AES command token size */
#define AES_CT_SIZE_ECB 2
#define AES_CT_SIZE_CBC 3
#define AES_CT_SIZE_CTR 3
#define AES_CT_SIZE_GCM_OUT 5
#define AES_CT_SIZE_GCM_IN 6
#define AES_CT_CTRL_HDR cpu_to_le32(0x00220000)
/* AES-CBC/ECB/CTR command token */
......@@ -50,6 +47,8 @@
#define AES_TFM_128BITS cpu_to_le32(0xb << 16)
#define AES_TFM_192BITS cpu_to_le32(0xd << 16)
#define AES_TFM_256BITS cpu_to_le32(0xf << 16)
#define AES_TFM_GHASH_DIGEST cpu_to_le32(0x2 << 21)
#define AES_TFM_GHASH cpu_to_le32(0x4 << 23)
/* AES transform information word 1 fields */
#define AES_TFM_ECB cpu_to_le32(0x0 << 0)
#define AES_TFM_CBC cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 0)
......@@ -59,10 +58,9 @@
#define AES_TFM_FULL_IV cpu_to_le32(0xf << 5) /* using IV 0-3 */
#define AES_TFM_IV_CTR_MODE cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 10)
#define AES_TFM_ENC_HASH cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 17)
#define AES_TFM_GHASH_DIG cpu_to_le32(0x2 << 21)
#define AES_TFM_GHASH cpu_to_le32(0x4 << 23)
/* AES flags */
#define AES_FLAGS_CIPHER_MSK GENMASK(2, 0)
#define AES_FLAGS_ECB BIT(0)
#define AES_FLAGS_CBC BIT(1)
#define AES_FLAGS_CTR BIT(2)
......@@ -73,18 +71,12 @@
#define AES_AUTH_TAG_ERR cpu_to_le32(BIT(26))
/**
* Command token(CT) is a set of hardware instructions that
* are used to control engine's processing flow of AES.
*
* Transform information(TFM) is used to define AES state and
* contains all keys and initial vectors.
*
* The engine requires CT and TFM to do:
* - Commands decoding and control of the engine's data path.
* - Coordinating hardware data fetch and store operations.
* - Result token construction and output.
* mtk_aes_info - hardware information of AES
* @cmd: command token, hardware instruction
* @tfm: transform state of cipher algorithm.
* @state: contains keys and initial vectors.
*
* Memory map of GCM's TFM:
* Memory layout of GCM buffer:
* /-----------\
* | AES KEY | 128/196/256 bits
* |-----------|
......@@ -92,14 +84,16 @@
* |-----------|
* | IVs | 4 * 4 bytes
* \-----------/
*
* The engine requires all these info to do:
* - Commands decoding and control of the engine's data path.
* - Coordinating hardware data fetch and store operations.
* - Result token construction and output.
*/
struct mtk_aes_ct {
__le32 cmd[AES_CT_SIZE_GCM_IN];
};
struct mtk_aes_tfm {
__le32 ctrl[2];
__le32 state[SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_256 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2)];
struct mtk_aes_info {
__le32 cmd[AES_MAX_CT_SIZE];
__le32 tfm[2];
__le32 state[AES_MAX_STATE_BUF_SIZE];
};
struct mtk_aes_reqctx {
......@@ -109,11 +103,12 @@ struct mtk_aes_reqctx {
struct mtk_aes_base_ctx {
struct mtk_cryp *cryp;
u32 keylen;
__le32 keymode;
mtk_aes_fn start;
struct mtk_aes_ct ct;
struct mtk_aes_info info;
dma_addr_t ct_dma;
struct mtk_aes_tfm tfm;
dma_addr_t tfm_dma;
__le32 ct_hdr;
......@@ -250,6 +245,22 @@ static inline void mtk_aes_restore_sg(const struct mtk_aes_dma *dma)
sg->length += dma->remainder;
}
static inline void mtk_aes_write_state_le(__le32 *dst, const u32 *src, u32 size)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SIZE_IN_WORDS(size); i++)
dst[i] = cpu_to_le32(src[i]);
}
static inline void mtk_aes_write_state_be(__be32 *dst, const u32 *src, u32 size)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < SIZE_IN_WORDS(size); i++)
dst[i] = cpu_to_be32(src[i]);
}
static inline int mtk_aes_complete(struct mtk_cryp *cryp,
struct mtk_aes_rec *aes,
int err)
......@@ -331,9 +342,7 @@ static void mtk_aes_unmap(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
{
struct mtk_aes_base_ctx *ctx = aes->ctx;
dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->ct_dma, sizeof(ctx->ct),
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->tfm_dma, sizeof(ctx->tfm),
dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->ct_dma, sizeof(ctx->info),
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (aes->src.sg == aes->dst.sg) {
......@@ -364,16 +373,14 @@ static void mtk_aes_unmap(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
static int mtk_aes_map(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
{
struct mtk_aes_base_ctx *ctx = aes->ctx;
struct mtk_aes_info *info = &ctx->info;
ctx->ct_dma = dma_map_single(cryp->dev, &ctx->ct, sizeof(ctx->ct),
ctx->ct_dma = dma_map_single(cryp->dev, info, sizeof(*info),
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(cryp->dev, ctx->ct_dma)))
goto exit;
ctx->tfm_dma = dma_map_single(cryp->dev, &ctx->tfm, sizeof(ctx->tfm),
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(cryp->dev, ctx->tfm_dma)))
goto tfm_map_err;
ctx->tfm_dma = ctx->ct_dma + sizeof(info->cmd);
if (aes->src.sg == aes->dst.sg) {
aes->src.sg_len = dma_map_sg(cryp->dev, aes->src.sg,
......@@ -400,11 +407,7 @@ static int mtk_aes_map(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
return mtk_aes_xmit(cryp, aes);
sg_map_err:
dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->tfm_dma, sizeof(ctx->tfm),
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
tfm_map_err:
dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->ct_dma, sizeof(ctx->ct),
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
dma_unmap_single(cryp->dev, ctx->ct_dma, sizeof(*info), DMA_TO_DEVICE);
exit:
return mtk_aes_complete(cryp, aes, -EINVAL);
}
......@@ -415,50 +418,43 @@ static void mtk_aes_info_init(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes,
{
struct ablkcipher_request *req = ablkcipher_request_cast(aes->areq);
struct mtk_aes_base_ctx *ctx = aes->ctx;
struct mtk_aes_info *info = &ctx->info;
u32 cnt = 0;
ctx->ct_hdr = AES_CT_CTRL_HDR | cpu_to_le32(len);
ctx->ct.cmd[0] = AES_CMD0 | cpu_to_le32(len);
ctx->ct.cmd[1] = AES_CMD1;
info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_CMD0 | cpu_to_le32(len);
info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_CMD1;
info->tfm[0] = AES_TFM_SIZE(ctx->keylen) | ctx->keymode;
if (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_ENCRYPT)
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] = AES_TFM_BASIC_OUT;
info->tfm[0] |= AES_TFM_BASIC_OUT;
else
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] = AES_TFM_BASIC_IN;
info->tfm[0] |= AES_TFM_BASIC_IN;
if (ctx->keylen == SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_128))
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_128BITS;
else if (ctx->keylen == SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_256))
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_256BITS;
else
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_192BITS;
if (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_CBC) {
const u32 *iv = (const u32 *)req->info;
u32 *iv_state = ctx->tfm.state + ctx->keylen;
int i;
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_SIZE(ctx->keylen +
SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
ctx->tfm.ctrl[1] = AES_TFM_CBC | AES_TFM_FULL_IV;
for (i = 0; i < SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE); i++)
iv_state[i] = cpu_to_le32(iv[i]);
ctx->ct.cmd[2] = AES_CMD2;
ctx->ct_size = AES_CT_SIZE_CBC;
} else if (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_ECB) {
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_SIZE(ctx->keylen);
ctx->tfm.ctrl[1] = AES_TFM_ECB;
ctx->ct_size = AES_CT_SIZE_ECB;
} else if (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_CTR) {
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_SIZE(ctx->keylen +
SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
ctx->tfm.ctrl[1] = AES_TFM_CTR_LOAD | AES_TFM_FULL_IV;
ctx->ct.cmd[2] = AES_CMD2;
ctx->ct_size = AES_CT_SIZE_CTR;
switch (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_CIPHER_MSK) {
case AES_FLAGS_CBC:
info->tfm[1] = AES_TFM_CBC;
break;
case AES_FLAGS_ECB:
info->tfm[1] = AES_TFM_ECB;
goto ecb;
case AES_FLAGS_CTR:
info->tfm[1] = AES_TFM_CTR_LOAD;
goto ctr;
default:
/* Should not happen... */
return;
}
mtk_aes_write_state_le(info->state + ctx->keylen, req->info,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
ctr:
info->tfm[0] += AES_TFM_SIZE(SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
info->tfm[1] |= AES_TFM_FULL_IV;
info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_CMD2;
ecb:
ctx->ct_size = cnt;
}
static int mtk_aes_dma(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes,
......@@ -572,8 +568,7 @@ static int mtk_aes_ctr_transfer(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
struct mtk_aes_ctr_ctx *cctx = mtk_aes_ctr_ctx_cast(ctx);
struct ablkcipher_request *req = ablkcipher_request_cast(aes->areq);
struct scatterlist *src, *dst;
int i;
u32 start, end, ctr, blocks, *iv_state;
u32 start, end, ctr, blocks;
size_t datalen;
bool fragmented = false;
......@@ -602,9 +597,8 @@ static int mtk_aes_ctr_transfer(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes)
scatterwalk_ffwd(cctx->dst, req->dst, cctx->offset));
/* Write IVs into transform state buffer. */
iv_state = ctx->tfm.state + ctx->keylen;
for (i = 0; i < SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE); i++)
iv_state[i] = cpu_to_le32(cctx->iv[i]);
mtk_aes_write_state_le(ctx->info.state + ctx->keylen, cctx->iv,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
if (unlikely(fragmented)) {
/*
......@@ -639,21 +633,25 @@ static int mtk_aes_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm,
const u8 *key, u32 keylen)
{
struct mtk_aes_base_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(tfm);
const u32 *aes_key = (const u32 *)key;
u32 *key_state = ctx->tfm.state;
int i;
if (keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
switch (keylen) {
case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_128BITS;
break;
case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_192BITS;
break;
case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_256BITS;
break;
default:
crypto_ablkcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
return -EINVAL;
}
ctx->keylen = SIZE_IN_WORDS(keylen);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->keylen; i++)
key_state[i] = cpu_to_le32(aes_key[i]);
mtk_aes_write_state_le(ctx->info.state, (const u32 *)key, keylen);
return 0;
}
......@@ -825,45 +823,35 @@ static void mtk_aes_gcm_info_init(struct mtk_cryp *cryp,
struct aead_request *req = aead_request_cast(aes->areq);
struct mtk_aes_base_ctx *ctx = aes->ctx;
struct mtk_aes_gcm_ctx *gctx = mtk_aes_gcm_ctx_cast(ctx);
const u32 *iv = (const u32 *)req->iv;
u32 *iv_state = ctx->tfm.state + ctx->keylen +
SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
struct mtk_aes_info *info = &ctx->info;
u32 ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req));
int i;
u32 cnt = 0;
ctx->ct_hdr = AES_CT_CTRL_HDR | len;
ctx->ct.cmd[0] = AES_GCM_CMD0 | cpu_to_le32(req->assoclen);
ctx->ct.cmd[1] = AES_GCM_CMD1 | cpu_to_le32(req->assoclen);
ctx->ct.cmd[2] = AES_GCM_CMD2;
ctx->ct.cmd[3] = AES_GCM_CMD3 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->textlen);
info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD0 | cpu_to_le32(req->assoclen);
info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD1 | cpu_to_le32(req->assoclen);
info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD2;
info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD3 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->textlen);
if (aes->flags & AES_FLAGS_ENCRYPT) {
ctx->ct.cmd[4] = AES_GCM_CMD4 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
ctx->ct_size = AES_CT_SIZE_GCM_OUT;
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] = AES_TFM_GCM_OUT;
info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD4 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
info->tfm[0] = AES_TFM_GCM_OUT;
} else {
ctx->ct.cmd[4] = AES_GCM_CMD5 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
ctx->ct.cmd[5] = AES_GCM_CMD6 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
ctx->ct_size = AES_CT_SIZE_GCM_IN;
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] = AES_TFM_GCM_IN;
info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD5 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
info->cmd[cnt++] = AES_GCM_CMD6 | cpu_to_le32(gctx->authsize);
info->tfm[0] = AES_TFM_GCM_IN;
}
ctx->ct_size = cnt;
if (ctx->keylen == SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_128))
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_128BITS;
else if (ctx->keylen == SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_KEYSIZE_256))
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_256BITS;
else
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_192BITS;
ctx->tfm.ctrl[0] |= AES_TFM_GHASH_DIG | AES_TFM_GHASH |
AES_TFM_SIZE(ctx->keylen + SIZE_IN_WORDS(
AES_BLOCK_SIZE + ivsize));
ctx->tfm.ctrl[1] = AES_TFM_CTR_INIT | AES_TFM_IV_CTR_MODE |
AES_TFM_3IV | AES_TFM_ENC_HASH;
info->tfm[0] |= AES_TFM_GHASH_DIGEST | AES_TFM_GHASH | AES_TFM_SIZE(
ctx->keylen + SIZE_IN_WORDS(AES_BLOCK_SIZE + ivsize)) |
ctx->keymode;
info->tfm[1] = AES_TFM_CTR_INIT | AES_TFM_IV_CTR_MODE | AES_TFM_3IV |
AES_TFM_ENC_HASH;
for (i = 0; i < SIZE_IN_WORDS(ivsize); i++)
iv_state[i] = cpu_to_le32(iv[i]);
mtk_aes_write_state_le(info->state + ctx->keylen + SIZE_IN_WORDS(
AES_BLOCK_SIZE), (const u32 *)req->iv, ivsize);
}
static int mtk_aes_gcm_dma(struct mtk_cryp *cryp, struct mtk_aes_rec *aes,
......@@ -979,24 +967,26 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
struct scatterlist sg[1];
struct skcipher_request req;
} *data;
const u32 *aes_key;
u32 *key_state, *hash_state;
int err, i;
int err;
if (keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256 &&
keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128) {
switch (keylen) {
case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_128BITS;
break;
case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_192BITS;
break;
case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
ctx->keymode = AES_TFM_256BITS;
break;
default:
crypto_aead_set_flags(aead, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
return -EINVAL;
}
key_state = ctx->tfm.state;
aes_key = (u32 *)key;
ctx->keylen = SIZE_IN_WORDS(keylen);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->keylen; i++)
ctx->tfm.state[i] = cpu_to_le32(aes_key[i]);
/* Same as crypto_gcm_setkey() from crypto/gcm.c */
crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(ctr, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(ctr, crypto_aead_get_flags(aead) &
......@@ -1031,10 +1021,11 @@ static int mtk_aes_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key,
if (err)
goto out;
hash_state = key_state + ctx->keylen;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
hash_state[i] = cpu_to_be32(data->hash[i]);
/* Write key into state buffer */
mtk_aes_write_state_le(ctx->info.state, (const u32 *)key, keylen);
/* Write key(H) into state buffer */
mtk_aes_write_state_be(ctx->info.state + ctx->keylen, data->hash,
AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
out:
kzfree(data);
return err;
......
......@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#define SHA_OP_FINAL 2
#define SHA_DATA_LEN_MSK cpu_to_le32(GENMASK(16, 0))
#define SHA_MAX_DIGEST_BUF_SIZE 32
/* SHA command token */
#define SHA_CT_SIZE 5
......@@ -33,7 +34,6 @@
/* SHA transform information */
#define SHA_TFM_HASH cpu_to_le32(0x2 << 0)
#define SHA_TFM_INNER_DIG cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 21)
#define SHA_TFM_SIZE(x) cpu_to_le32((x) << 8)
#define SHA_TFM_START cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 4)
#define SHA_TFM_CONTINUE cpu_to_le32(0x1 << 5)
......@@ -60,31 +60,17 @@
#define SHA_FLAGS_PAD BIT(10)
/**
* mtk_sha_ct is a set of hardware instructions(command token)
* that are used to control engine's processing flow of SHA,
* and it contains the first two words of transform state.
* mtk_sha_info - hardware information of AES
* @cmd: command token, hardware instruction
* @tfm: transform state of cipher algorithm.
* @state: contains keys and initial vectors.
*
*/
struct mtk_sha_ct {
struct mtk_sha_info {
__le32 ctrl[2];
__le32 cmd[3];
};
/**
* mtk_sha_tfm is used to define SHA transform state
* and store result digest that produced by engine.
*/
struct mtk_sha_tfm {
__le32 ctrl[2];
__le32 digest[SIZE_IN_WORDS(SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE)];
};
/**
* mtk_sha_info consists of command token and transform state
* of SHA, its role is similar to mtk_aes_info.
*/
struct mtk_sha_info {
struct mtk_sha_ct ct;
struct mtk_sha_tfm tfm;
__le32 tfm[2];
__le32 digest[SHA_MAX_DIGEST_BUF_SIZE];
};
struct mtk_sha_reqctx {
......@@ -93,7 +79,6 @@ struct mtk_sha_reqctx {
unsigned long op;
u64 digcnt;
bool start;
size_t bufcnt;
dma_addr_t dma_addr;
......@@ -265,7 +250,9 @@ static void mtk_sha_fill_padding(struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx, u32 len)
bits[1] = cpu_to_be64(size << 3);
bits[0] = cpu_to_be64(size >> 61);
if (ctx->flags & (SHA_FLAGS_SHA384 | SHA_FLAGS_SHA512)) {
switch (ctx->flags & SHA_FLAGS_ALGO_MSK) {
case SHA_FLAGS_SHA384:
case SHA_FLAGS_SHA512:
index = ctx->bufcnt & 0x7f;
padlen = (index < 112) ? (112 - index) : ((128 + 112) - index);
*(ctx->buffer + ctx->bufcnt) = 0x80;
......@@ -273,7 +260,9 @@ static void mtk_sha_fill_padding(struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx, u32 len)
memcpy(ctx->buffer + ctx->bufcnt + padlen, bits, 16);
ctx->bufcnt += padlen + 16;
ctx->flags |= SHA_FLAGS_PAD;
} else {
break;
default:
index = ctx->bufcnt & 0x3f;
padlen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : ((64 + 56) - index);
*(ctx->buffer + ctx->bufcnt) = 0x80;
......@@ -281,36 +270,35 @@ static void mtk_sha_fill_padding(struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx, u32 len)
memcpy(ctx->buffer + ctx->bufcnt + padlen, &bits[1], 8);
ctx->bufcnt += padlen + 8;
ctx->flags |= SHA_FLAGS_PAD;
break;
}
}
/* Initialize basic transform information of SHA */
static void mtk_sha_info_init(struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx)
{
struct mtk_sha_ct *ct = &ctx->info.ct;
struct mtk_sha_tfm *tfm = &ctx->info.tfm;
struct mtk_sha_info *info = &ctx->info;
ctx->ct_hdr = SHA_CT_CTRL_HDR;
ctx->ct_size = SHA_CT_SIZE;
tfm->ctrl[0] = SHA_TFM_HASH | SHA_TFM_INNER_DIG |
SHA_TFM_SIZE(SIZE_IN_WORDS(ctx->ds));
info->tfm[0] = SHA_TFM_HASH | SHA_TFM_SIZE(SIZE_IN_WORDS(ctx->ds));
switch (ctx->flags & SHA_FLAGS_ALGO_MSK) {
case SHA_FLAGS_SHA1:
tfm->ctrl[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA1;
info->tfm[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA1;
break;
case SHA_FLAGS_SHA224:
tfm->ctrl[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA224;
info->tfm[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA224;
break;
case SHA_FLAGS_SHA256:
tfm->ctrl[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA256;
info->tfm[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA256;
break;
case SHA_FLAGS_SHA384:
tfm->ctrl[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA384;
info->tfm[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA384;
break;
case SHA_FLAGS_SHA512:
tfm->ctrl[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA512;
info->tfm[0] |= SHA_TFM_SHA512;
break;
default:
......@@ -318,13 +306,13 @@ static void mtk_sha_info_init(struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx)
return;
}
tfm->ctrl[1] = SHA_TFM_HASH_STORE;
ct->ctrl[0] = tfm->ctrl[0] | SHA_TFM_CONTINUE | SHA_TFM_START;
ct->ctrl[1] = tfm->ctrl[1];
info->tfm[1] = SHA_TFM_HASH_STORE;
info->ctrl[0] = info->tfm[0] | SHA_TFM_CONTINUE | SHA_TFM_START;
info->ctrl[1] = info->tfm[1];
ct->cmd[0] = SHA_CMD0;
ct->cmd[1] = SHA_CMD1;
ct->cmd[2] = SHA_CMD2 | SHA_TFM_DIGEST(SIZE_IN_WORDS(ctx->ds));
info->cmd[0] = SHA_CMD0;
info->cmd[1] = SHA_CMD1;
info->cmd[2] = SHA_CMD2 | SHA_TFM_DIGEST(SIZE_IN_WORDS(ctx->ds));
}
/*
......@@ -337,17 +325,15 @@ static int mtk_sha_info_update(struct mtk_cryp *cryp,
{
struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(sha->req);
struct mtk_sha_info *info = &ctx->info;
struct mtk_sha_ct *ct = &info->ct;
if (ctx->start)
ctx->start = false;
else
ct->ctrl[0] &= ~SHA_TFM_START;
ctx->ct_hdr &= ~SHA_DATA_LEN_MSK;
ctx->ct_hdr |= cpu_to_le32(len1 + len2);
ct->cmd[0] &= ~SHA_DATA_LEN_MSK;
ct->cmd[0] |= cpu_to_le32(len1 + len2);
info->cmd[0] &= ~SHA_DATA_LEN_MSK;
info->cmd[0] |= cpu_to_le32(len1 + len2);
/* Setting SHA_TFM_START only for the first iteration */
if (ctx->digcnt)
info->ctrl[0] &= ~SHA_TFM_START;
ctx->digcnt += len1;
......@@ -357,7 +343,8 @@ static int mtk_sha_info_update(struct mtk_cryp *cryp,
dev_err(cryp->dev, "dma %zu bytes error\n", sizeof(*info));
return -EINVAL;
}
ctx->tfm_dma = ctx->ct_dma + sizeof(*ct);
ctx->tfm_dma = ctx->ct_dma + sizeof(info->ctrl) + sizeof(info->cmd);
return 0;
}
......@@ -422,7 +409,6 @@ static int mtk_sha_init(struct ahash_request *req)
ctx->bufcnt = 0;
ctx->digcnt = 0;
ctx->buffer = tctx->buf;
ctx->start = true;
if (tctx->flags & SHA_FLAGS_HMAC) {
struct mtk_sha_hmac_ctx *bctx = tctx->base;
......@@ -635,7 +621,7 @@ static int mtk_sha_final_req(struct mtk_cryp *cryp,
static int mtk_sha_finish(struct ahash_request *req)
{
struct mtk_sha_reqctx *ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
u32 *digest = ctx->info.tfm.digest;
__le32 *digest = ctx->info.digest;
u32 *result = (u32 *)req->result;
int i;
......
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