Commit de190555 authored by Jeremy Linton's avatar Jeremy Linton Committed by Jonathan Corbet

Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control

For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling
or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the
documentation reflects that.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
parent 0c5e1949
...@@ -1983,6 +1983,12 @@ ...@@ -1983,6 +1983,12 @@
Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y, Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y,
the default is off. the default is off.
kpti= [ARM64] Control page table isolation of user
and kernel address spaces.
Default: enabled on cores which need mitigation.
0: force disabled
1: force enabled
kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs. kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled MSRs.
Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP) Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)
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