Ring TX doorbell only if xmit_more is not set or the queue is stopped.
Suggested-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Prashant Sreedharan <prashant@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <mchan@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

fib_nh_match does not match nexthops correctly. Example:

ip route add 172.16.10/24 nexthop via 192.168.122.12 dev eth0 \
                          nexthop via 192.168.122.13 dev eth0
ip route del 172.16.10/24 nexthop via 192.168.122.14 dev eth0 \
                          nexthop via 192.168.122.15 dev eth0

Del command is successful and route is removed. After this patch
applied, the route is correctly matched and result is:
RTNETLINK answers: No such process

Please consider this for stable trees as well.

Fixes: 4e902c57 ("[IPv4]: FIB configuration using struct fib_config")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

We worked hard to improve tcp_ack() performance, by not accessing
skb_shinfo() in fast path (cd7d8498 tcp: change tcp_skb_pcount()
location)

We still have one spurious access because of ACK timestamping,
added in commit e1c8a607 ("net-timestamp: ACK timestamp for
bytestreams")

By checking if sk_tsflags has SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK set,
we can avoid two cache line misses for the common case.

While we are at it, add two prefetchw() :

One in tcp_ack() to bring skb at the head of write queue.

One in tcp_clean_rtx_queue() loop to bring following skb,
as we will delete skb from the write queue and dirty skb->next->prev.

Add a couple of [un]likely() clauses.

After this patch, tcp_ack() is no longer the most consuming
function in tcp stack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Van Jacobson <vanj@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Tilman Schmidt says:

====================
Coverity patches for drivers/isdn

Here's a series of patches for the ISDN CAPI subsystem and the
Gigaset ISDN driver.
Patches 1 to 7 are specific fixes for Coverity warnings.
Patches 8 to 11 fix related problems with the handling of invalid
CAPI command codes I noticed while working on this.
Patch 12 fixes an unrelated problem I noticed during the subsequent
regression tests.
It would be great if these could still be merged.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In usb_gigaset function gigaset_write_cmd(), the length field of
the command buffer structure could be cleared by the transmit
tasklet before it was used for the function's return value.
Fix by copying to a local variable before scheduling the tasklet.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

capi_cmd2str() is used in many places to build log messages.
None of them is prepared to handle NULL as a result.
Change the function to return printable string "INVALID_COMMAND"
instead.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Have callers of capi_cmsg2message and capi_message2cmsg handle
non-zero return values indicating failure.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

An invalid CAPI 2.0 command/subcommand combination may retrieve a
NULL pointer from the cpars[] array which will later be dereferenced
by the parser routines.
Fix by adding NULL pointer checks in strategic places.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Encapsulate accesses to the CAPI 2.0 command/subcommand name and
parameter tables in a single place in preparation for redesign.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The result of the function command_2_index() is used to index two
arrays mnames[] and cpars[] with max. index 0x4e but in its current
form that function can produce results up to 3*(0x9+0x9)+0x7f =
0xb5.
Fix by clamping all result values potentially overrunning the arrays
to zero which is already handled as an invalid value.

Re-spotted with Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Function capi20_manufacturer() is declared with unsigned int cmd
argument but called with unsigned long.
Fix by correcting the function prototype since the actual argument
is part of the user visible API.

Spotted with Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

at_state structures may be allocated individually or as part of a
cardstate or bc_state structure. The disconnect() function handled
both cases, creating a risk that it might try to deallocate an
at_state structure that had not been allocated individually.
Fix by splitting disconnect() into two variants handling cases
with and without an associated B channel separately, and adding
an explicit check.

Spotted with Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In do_action, a NULL pointer might be passed to function start_dial
which will dereference it.
Fix by adding a check for NULL before the call.

Spotted with Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In dump_rawmsg, the length field from a received data package was
used unscrutinized, allowing an attacker to control the size of the
allocated buffer and the number of times the output loop iterates.
Fix by limiting to a reasonable value.

Spotted with Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In gigaset_isdn_regdev, the name field may not have a null terminator
if the source string's length is equal to the buffer size.
Fix by zero filling the structure and excluding the last byte of the
name field from the copy.

Spotted with Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If we take the unsupported supplementary service notification mask
path, we end up falling through and overwriting the error code.
Insert a break statement to skip the remainder of the switch case
and proceed to sending the reply message.

Spotted with Coverity.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Luwei Zhou says:

====================
Enable FEC pps feather

Change from v2 to v3:
	-Using the default channel 0 to be PPS channel not PTP_PIN_SET/GETFUNC interface.
	-Using the linux definition of NSEC_PER_SEC.

Change from v1 to v2:
	- Fix the potential 32-bit multiplication overflow issue.
	- Optimize the hareware adjustment code to improve efficiency as Richard suggested
	- Use ptp PTP_PIN_SET/GETFUNC interface to set PPS channel not device tree
	and add PTP_PF_PPS enumeration
	- Modify comments style
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

FEC ptp timer has 4 channel compare/trigger function. It can be used to
enable pps output.
The pulse would be ouput high exactly on N second. The pulse ouput high
on compare event mode is used to produce pulse per second.  The pulse
width would be one cycle based on ptp timer clock source.Since 31-bit
ptp hardware timer is used, the timer will wrap more than 2 seconds. We
need to reload the compare compare event about every 1 second.
Signed-off-by: Luwei Zhou <b45643@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The FEC IP supports hardware adjustment for ptp timer. Refer to the description of
ENET_ATCOR and ENET_ATINC registers in the spec about the hardware adjustment. This
patch uses hardware support to adjust the ptp offset and frequency on the slave side.
Signed-off-by: Luwei Zhou <b45643@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Fugang Duan <b38611@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When ptp switches from software adjustment to hardware ajustment, linux ptp can't converge.
It is caused by the IP limit. Hardware adjustment logcial have issue when ptp counter
runs over 0x80000000(31 bit counter). The internal IP reference manual already remove 32bit
free-running count support. This patch replace the 32-bit PTP timer with 31-bit.
Signed-off-by: Luwei Zhou <b45643@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

no user uses this lock.
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <roy.qing.li@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1.
JIT compiler using multi-pass approach to converge to final image size,
since x86 instructions are variable length. It starts with large
gaps between instructions (so some jumps may use imm32 instead of imm8)
and iterates until total program size is the same as in previous pass.
This algorithm works only if program size is strictly decreasing.
Programs that use LD_ABS insn need additional code in prologue, but it
was not emitted during 1st pass, so there was a chance that 2nd pass would
adjust imm32->imm8 jump offsets to the same number of bytes as increase in
prologue, which may cause algorithm to erroneously decide that size converged.
Fix it by always emitting largest prologue in the first pass which
is detected by oldproglen==0 check.
Also change error check condition 'proglen != oldproglen' to fail gracefully.

2.
while staring at the code realized that 64-byte buffer may not be enough
when 1st insn is large, so increase it to 128 to avoid buffer overflow
(theoretical maximum size of prologue+div is 109) and add runtime check.

Fixes: 62258278 ("net: filter: x86: internal BPF JIT")
Reported-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Tested-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

TCP Small Queues (tcp_tsq_handler()) can hold one reference on
sk->sk_wmem_alloc, preventing skb->ooo_okay being set.

We should relax test done to set skb->ooo_okay to take care
of this extra reference.

Minimal truesize of skb containing one byte of payload is
SKB_TRUESIZE(1)

Without this fix, we have more chance locking flows into the wrong
transmit queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If the skb is not dropped afterwards we should run consume_skb instead
kfree_skb. Inside of function skb_unshare we do always a kfree_skb,
doesn't depend if skb_copy failed or was successful.

This patch switch this behaviour like skb_share_check, if allocation of
sk_buff failed we use kfree_skb otherwise consume_skb.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This change adds support for skb->xmit_more based on the changes that were
made to igb to support the feature.  The main changes are moving up the
check for maybe_stop_tx so that we can check netif_xmit_stopped to determine
if we must write the tail because we can add no further buffers.
Acked-by: Matthew Vick <matthew.vick@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

reproduce:
make  ARCH=arm C=1 2>fec.txt drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.o
cat fec.txt

sparse warnings:
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c:2916:12: warning: context imbalance
in 'fec_set_features' - different lock contexts for basic block

Christopher Li suggest to change as below:
	if (need_lock) {
		lock();
		do_something_real();
		unlock();
	} else {
		do_something_real();
	}
Reported-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Christopher Li <sparse@chrisli.org>
Signed-off-by: Fugang Duan <B38611@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: Vince Bridgers <vbridger@opensource.altera.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
Here are some SCTP fixes.

[ Note, immediate workaround would be to disable ASCONF (it
  is sysctl disabled by default). It is actually only used
  together with chunk authentication. ]
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
  [...]
  ---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>

... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.

We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].

The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.

In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.

One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
form of ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->

... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!

The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.

Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():

While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
!end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd
changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
this commit, we would just flush the output queue.

Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
crashing the kernel.

Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
before transmission.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit 6f4c618d ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:

skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
 end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
 [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
 [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
 [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60

This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>

... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...

  1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
  2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)

... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.

The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.

In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.

When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...

  length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
  asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;

... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.

Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: b896b82b ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Bug: Unable to send and receive Ethernet packets with Micrel PHY.

Affected devices:
KSZ8031RNL (commercial temp)
KSZ8031RNLI (industrial temp)

Description:
PHY device is correctly detected during probe.
PHY power-up default is 25MHz crystal clock input
and output 50MHz RMII clock to MAC.
Reconfiguration of PHY to input 50MHz RMII clock from MAC
causes PHY to become unresponsive if clock source is changed
after Operation Mode Strap Override (OMSO) register setup.

Cause:
Long lead times on parts where clock setup match circuit design
forces the usage of similar parts with wrong default setup.

Solution:
Swapped KSZ8031 register setup and added phy_write return code validation.

Tested with Freescale i.MX28 Fast Ethernet Controler (fec).
Signed-off-by: Bruno Thomsen <bth@kamstrup.dk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Florian Fainelli says:

====================
net: bcmgenet & systemport fixes

This patch series fixes an off-by-one error introduced during a previous
change, and the two other fixes fix a wake depth imbalance situation for
the Wake-on-LAN interrupt line.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Multiple enable_irq_wake() calls will keep increasing the IRQ
wake_depth, which ultimately leads to the following types of
situation:

1) enable Wake-on-LAN interrupt w/o password
2) enable Wake-on-LAN interrupt w/ password
3) enable Wake-on-LAN interrupt w/o password
4) disable Wake-on-LAN interrupt

After step 4), SYSTEMPORT would always wake-up the system no matter what
wake-up device we use, which is not what we want. Fix this by making
sure there are no unbalanced enable_irq_wake() calls.
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Multiple enable_irq_wake() calls will keep increasing the IRQ
wake_depth, which ultimately leads to the following types of
situation:

1) enable Wake-on-LAN interrupt w/o password
2) enable Wake-on-LAN interrupt w/ password
3) enable Wake-on-LAN interrupt w/o password
4) disable Wake-on-LAN interrupt

After step 4), GENET would always wake-up the system no matter what
wake-up device we use, which is not what we want. Fix this by making
sure there are no unbalanced enable_irq_wake() calls.
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Commit b629be5c ("net: bcmgenet: check
harder for out of memory conditions") moved the increment of the local
read pointer *before* reading from the hardware descriptor using
dmadesc_get_length_status(), which creates an off-by-one situation.

Fix this by moving again the read_ptr increment after we have read the
hardware descriptor to get both the control block and the read pointer
back in sync.

Fixes: b629be5c ("net: bcmgenet: check harder for out of memory conditions")
Signed-off-by: Jaedon Shin <jaedon.shin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Petri Gynther <pgynther@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Eric Dumazet says:

====================
net: fix races accessing page->_count

This is illegal to use atomic_set(&page->_count, ...) even if we 'own'
the page. Other entities in the kernel need to use get_page_unless_zero()
to get a reference to the page before testing page properties, so we could
loose a refcount increment.

The only case it is valid is when page->_count is 0, we can use this in
__netdev_alloc_frag()

Note that I never seen crashes caused by these races, the issue was reported
by Andres Lagar-Cavilla and Hugh Dickins.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This is illegal to use atomic_set(&page->_count, ...) even if we 'own'
the page. Other entities in the kernel need to use get_page_unless_zero()
to get a reference to the page before testing page properties, so we could
loose a refcount increment.

The only case it is valid is when page->_count is 0

Fixes: 540eb7bf ("net: Update alloc frag to reduce get/put page usage and recycle pages")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumaze <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This is illegal to use atomic_set(&page->_count, ...) even if we 'own'
the page. Other entities in the kernel need to use get_page_unless_zero()
to get a reference to the page before testing page properties, so we could
loose a refcount increment.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This is illegal to use atomic_set(&page->_count, 2) even if we 'own'
the page. Other entities in the kernel need to use get_page_unless_zero()
to get a reference to the page before testing page properties, so we could
loose a refcount increment.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>