The helper x86_set_memory_region() is only used in vmx_set_tss_addr()
and kvm_arch_destroy_vm().  Push the lock upper in both cases.  With
that, drop x86_set_memory_region().

This prepares to allow __x86_set_memory_region() to return a HVA
mapped, because the HVA will need to be protected by the lock too even
after __x86_set_memory_region() returns.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

We've already got the slots_lock, so we should be safe.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

It's already going to reach 2400 Bytes (which is over half of page
size on 4K page archs), so maybe it's good to have this build-time
check in case it overflows when adding new fields.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Remove kvm_read_guest_atomic() because it's not used anywhere.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

In nested_enable_evmcs() evmcs_already_enabled check doesn't really do
anything: controls are already sanitized and we return '0' regardless.
Just drop the check.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Remove the CONFIG_X86_64 condition from the low level non-canonical
helpers to effectively enable non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM.
Non-canonical checks are performed by hardware if the CPU *supports*
64-bit mode, whether or not the CPU is actually in 64-bit mode is
irrelevant.

For the most part, skipping non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM is ok-ish
because 32-bit KVM always (hopefully) drops bits 63:32 of whatever value
it's checking before propagating it to hardware, and architecturally,
the expected behavior for the guest is a bit of a grey area since the
vCPU itself doesn't support 64-bit mode.  I.e. a 32-bit KVM guest can
observe the missed checks in several paths, e.g. INVVPID and VM-Enter,
but it's debatable whether or not the missed checks constitute a bug
because technically the vCPU doesn't support 64-bit mode.

The primary motivation for enabling the non-canonical checks is defense
in depth.  As mentioned above, a guest can trigger a missed check via
INVVPID or VM-Enter.  INVVPID is straightforward as it takes a 64-bit
virtual address as part of its 128-bit INVVPID descriptor and fails if
the address is non-canonical, even if INVVPID is executed in 32-bit PM.
Nested VM-Enter is a bit more convoluted as it requires the guest to
write natural width VMCS fields via memory accesses and then VMPTRLD the
VMCS, but it's still possible.  In both cases, KVM is saved from a true
bug only because its flows that propagate values to hardware (correctly)
take "unsigned long" parameters and so drop bits 63:32 of the bad value.

Explicitly performing the non-canonical checks makes it less likely that
a bad value will be propagated to hardware, e.g. in the INVVPID case,
if __invvpid() didn't implicitly drop bits 63:32 then KVM would BUG() on
the resulting unexpected INVVPID failure due to hardware rejecting the
non-canonical address.

The only downside to enabling the non-canonical checks is that it adds a
relatively small amount of overhead, but the affected flows are not hot
paths, i.e. the overhead is negligible.

Note, KVM technically could gate the non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM
with static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LM), but on bare metal that's an even
bigger waste of code for everyone except the 0.00000000000001% of the
population running on Yonah, and nested 32-bit on 64-bit already fudges
things with respect to 64-bit CPU behavior.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
[Also do so in nested_vmx_check_host_state as reported by Krish. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Writes to MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CONTROL should never fail if the VM-exit
and VM-entry controls are exposed to L1. Promote the checks to perform a
full WARN if kvm_set_msr() fails and remove the now unused macro
SET_MSR_OR_WARN().
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Remove an unused struct x86_emulate_ctxt * param from low level helpers
used to access guest FPU state.  The unused param was left behind by
commit 6ab0b9fe ("x86,kvm: remove KVM emulator get_fpu / put_fpu").

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Reload the current thread's FPU state, which contains the guest's FPU
state, to the CPU registers if necessary during vcpu_enter_guest().
TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD can be set any time control is transferred out of KVM,
e.g. if I/O is triggered during a KVM call to get_user_pages() or if a
softirq occurs while KVM is scheduled in.

Moving the handling of TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD from vcpu_enter_guest() to
kvm_arch_vcpu_load(), effectively kvm_sched_in(), papered over a bug
where kvm_put_guest_fpu() failed to account for TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD.  The
easiest way to the kvm_put_guest_fpu() bug was to run with involuntary
preemption enable, thus handling TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD during kvm_sched_in()
made the bug go away.  But, removing the handling in vcpu_enter_guest()
exposed KVM to the rare case of a softirq triggering kernel_fpu_begin()
between vcpu_load() and vcpu_enter_guest().

Now that kvm_{load,put}_guest_fpu() correctly handle TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD,
revert the commit to both restore the vcpu_enter_guest() behavior and
eliminate the superfluous switch_fpu_return() in kvm_arch_vcpu_load().

Note, leaving the handling in kvm_arch_vcpu_load() isn't wrong per se,
but it is unnecessary, and most critically, makes it extremely difficult
to find bugs such as the kvm_put_guest_fpu() issue due to shrinking the
window where a softirq can corrupt state.

A sample trace triggered by warning if TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD is set while
vcpu state is loaded:

 <IRQ>
  gcmaes_crypt_by_sg.constprop.12+0x26e/0x660
  ? 0xffffffffc024547d
  ? __qdisc_run+0x83/0x510
  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x45e/0x990
  ? ip_finish_output2+0x1a8/0x570
  ? fib4_rule_action+0x61/0x70
  ? fib4_rule_action+0x70/0x70
  ? fib_rules_lookup+0x13f/0x1c0
  ? helper_rfc4106_decrypt+0x82/0xa0
  ? crypto_aead_decrypt+0x40/0x70
  ? crypto_aead_decrypt+0x40/0x70
  ? crypto_aead_decrypt+0x40/0x70
  ? esp_output_tail+0x8f4/0xa5a [esp4]
  ? skb_ext_add+0xd3/0x170
  ? xfrm_input+0x7a6/0x12c0
  ? xfrm4_rcv_encap+0xae/0xd0
  ? xfrm4_transport_finish+0x200/0x200
  ? udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x1ba/0x460
  ? udp_unicast_rcv_skb.isra.63+0x72/0x90
  ? __udp4_lib_rcv+0x51b/0xb00
  ? ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd2/0x1c0
  ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x44/0x50
  ? ip_local_deliver+0xe0/0xf0
  ? ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1c0/0x1c0
  ? ip_rcv+0xbc/0xd0
  ? ip_rcv_finish_core.isra.19+0x380/0x380
  ? __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x7e/0x90
  ? netif_receive_skb_internal+0x3d/0xb0
  ? napi_gro_receive+0xed/0x150
  ? 0xffffffffc0243c77
  ? net_rx_action+0x149/0x3b0
  ? __do_softirq+0xe4/0x2f8
  ? handle_irq_event_percpu+0x6a/0x80
  ? irq_exit+0xe6/0xf0
  ? do_IRQ+0x7f/0xd0
  ? common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
  </IRQ>
  ? irq_entries_start+0x20/0x660
  ? vmx_get_interrupt_shadow+0x2f0/0x710 [kvm_intel]
  ? kvm_set_msr_common+0xfc7/0x2380 [kvm]
  ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10
  ? ktime_get+0x3a/0xa0
  ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x107/0x560 [kvm]
  ? kvm_init+0x6bf/0xd00 [kvm]
  ? __seccomp_filter+0x7a/0x680
  ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x630
  ? security_file_ioctl+0x32/0x50
  ? ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90
  ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
  ? do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x1a0
  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
---[ end trace 9564a1ccad733a90 ]---

This reverts commit e7517324.

Fixes: e7517324 ("KVM: X86: Fix fpu state crash in kvm guest")
Reported-by: Derek Yerger <derek@djy.llc>
Reported-by: kernel@najdan.com
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: Thomas Lambertz <mail@thomaslambertz.de>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Lock the FPU regs and reload the current thread's FPU state, which holds
the guest's FPU state, to the CPU registers if necessary prior to
accessing guest FPU state as part of emulation.  kernel_fpu_begin() can
be called from softirq context, therefore KVM must ensure softirqs are
disabled (locking the FPU regs disables softirqs) when touching CPU FPU
state.

Note, for all intents and purposes this reverts commit 6ab0b9fe
("x86,kvm: remove KVM emulator get_fpu / put_fpu"), but at the time it
was applied, removing get/put_fpu() was correct.  The re-introduction
of {get,put}_fpu() is necessitated by the deferring of FPU state load.

Fixes: 5f409e20 ("x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Handle TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD similar to how fpu__copy() handles the flag
when duplicating FPU state to a new task struct.  TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD can
be set any time control is transferred out of KVM, be it voluntarily,
e.g. if I/O is triggered during a KVM call to get_user_pages, or
involuntarily, e.g. if softirq runs after an IRQ occurs.  Therefore,
KVM must account for TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD whenever it is (potentially)
accessing CPU FPU state.

Fixes: 5f409e20 ("x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This reverts commit 95145c25.
The next few patches will fix the issue so the warning is not
needed anymore; revert it separately to simplify application to
stable kernels.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Short-circuit kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr() when pic intr is accepted, there
is no need to proceed further. Also remove unnecessary var r.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The exception pending event is cleared by kvm_clear_exception_queue(). We
shouldn't clear it again.
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in intel_find_fixed_event()
and intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc().
kvm_rdpmc() (ancestor of intel_find_fixed_event()) and
reprogram_fixed_counter() (ancestor of intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc()) are
exported symbols so KVM should treat them conservatively from a security
perspective.

Fixes: 25462f7f ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in __kvm_set_dr() and
kvm_get_dr().
Both kvm_get_dr() and kvm_set_dr() (a wrapper of __kvm_set_dr()) are
exported symbols so KVM should tream them conservatively from a security
perspective.

Fixes: 020df079 ("KVM: move DR register access handling into generic code")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in vmx_handle_exit().
While exit_reason is set by the hardware and therefore should not be
attacker-influenced, an unknown exit_reason could potentially be used to
perform such an attack.

Fixes: 55d2375e ("KVM: nVMX: Move nested code to dedicated files")
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in
vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(), vmx_read_guest_seg_base(),
vmx_read_guest_seg_limit() and vmx_read_guest_seg_ar().  When
invoked from emulation, these functions contain index computations
based on the (attacker-influenced) segment value.  Using constants
prevents the attack.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in set_msr_mce() and
get_msr_mce().
Both functions contain index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: 890ca9ae ("KVM: Add MCE support")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in the get_gp_pmc() and
get_fixed_pmc() functions.
They both contain index computations based on the (attacker-controlled)
MSR number.

Fixes: 25462f7f ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: de9aef5e ("KVM: MTRR: introduce fixed_mtrr_segment table")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in kvm_lapic_reg_write().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: 0105d1a5 ("KVM: x2apic interface to lapic")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_write_indirect().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.

This patch depends on patch
"KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks".

Fixes: 70f93dae ("KVM: Use temporary variable to shorten lines.")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_read_indirect().
This function contains index computations based on the
(attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register.

Fixes: a2c118bf ("KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in picdev_write().
It replaces index computations based on the (attacked-controlled) port
number with constants through a minor refactoring.

Fixes: 85f455f7 ("KVM: Add support for in-kernel PIC emulation")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data()
and kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data().
These functions contain index computations that use the
(attacker-controlled) MSR number.

Fixes: e7d9513b ("kvm/x86: added hyper-v crash msrs into kvm hyperv context")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in x86_decode_insn().
kvm_emulate_instruction() (an ancestor of x86_decode_insn()) is an exported
symbol, so KVM should treat it conservatively from a security perspective.

Fixes: 045a282c ("KVM: emulator: implement fninit, fnstsw, fnstcw")
Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Current SVM implementation does not have support for handling PKU. Guests
running on a host with future AMD cpus that support the feature will read
garbage from the PKRU register and will hit segmentation faults on boot as
memory is getting marked as protected that should not be. Ensure that cpuid
from SVM does not advertise the feature.
Signed-off-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0556cbdc ("x86/pkeys: Don't check if PKRU is zero before writing it")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Open code the allocation and freeing of the vcpu->run page in
kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() and kvm_vcpu_destroy() respectively.  Doing
so allows kvm_vcpu_init() to be a pure init function and eliminates
kvm_vcpu_uninit() entirely.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Move the putting of vcpu->pid to kvm_vcpu_destroy().  vcpu->pid is
guaranteed to be NULL when kvm_vcpu_uninit() is called in the error path
of kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(), e.g. it is explicitly nullified by
kvm_vcpu_init() and is only changed by KVM_RUN.

No functional change intended.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Remove kvm_arch_vcpu_init() and kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() now that all
arch specific implementations are nops.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add an arm specific hook to free the arm64-only sve_state.  Doing so
eliminates the last functional code from kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() across
all architectures and paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_init()
and kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() entirely.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last
action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create()
immediately thereafter).  Rinse and repeat for kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit()
and kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy().  This paves the way for removing
kvm_arch_vcpu_{un}init() entirely.

Note, calling kvmppc_mmu_destroy() if kvmppc_core_vcpu_create() fails
may or may not be necessary.  Move it along with the more obvious call
to kvmppc_subarch_vcpu_uninit() so as not to inadvertantly introduce a
functional change and/or bug.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last
action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create()
immediately thereafter).  This paves the way for removing
kvm_arch_vcpu_{un}init() entirely.

Note, there is no associated unwinding in kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() that
needs to be relocated (to kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy()).

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last
action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create()
immediately thereafter).  Rinse and repeat for kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit()
and kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy().  This paves the way for removing
kvm_arch_vcpu_{un}init() entirely.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last
action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create()
immediately thereafter).  This paves the way for removing
kvm_arch_vcpu_init() entirely.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Remove kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() now that all arch specific implementations
are nops.
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Fold setup() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code.  This paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_setup().
Note, BookE directly implements kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() and PPC's common
kvm_arch_vcpu_create() is responsible for its own cleanup, thus the only
cleanup required when directly invoking kvmppc_core_vcpu_setup() is to
call .vcpu_free(), which is the BookE specific portion of PPC's
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() by way of kvmppc_core_vcpu_free().

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Rename kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() to kvm_s390_vcpu_setup() and manually call
the new function during kvm_arch_vcpu_create().  Define an empty
kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() as it's still required for compilation.  This
is effectively a nop as kvm_arch_vcpu_create() and kvm_arch_vcpu_setup()
are called back-to-back by common KVM code.  Obsoleting
kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() paves the way for its removal.

Note, gmap_remove() is now called if setup fails, as s390 was previously
freeing it via kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(), which is called by common KVM
code if kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() fails.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Fold setup() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by
common KVM code.  This paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_setup().
Note, there is no unwind function associated with kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(),
i.e. no teardown path that also needs to be moved.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>