crypto: move certificate verification into x509.

People have a need to verify certificates in situations other than TLS
client handshaking. Thus this CL moves certificate verification into
x509 and expands its abilities.

R=bradfitzgo
CC=golang-dev
https://golang.org/cl/4407046

src/pkg/crypto/tls/Makefile

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ include ../../../Make.inc
 TARG=crypto/tls
 GOFILES=\
 	alert.go\
-	ca_set.go\
 	cipher_suites.go\
 	common.go\
 	conn.go\

src/pkg/crypto/tls/common.go

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ type Config struct {
 	// RootCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities
 	// that clients use when verifying server certificates.
 	// If RootCAs is nil, TLS uses the host's root CA set.
-	RootCAs *CASet
+	RootCAs *x509.CertPool
 
 	// NextProtos is a list of supported, application level protocols.
 	NextProtos []string
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ func (c *Config) time() int64 {
 	return t()
 }
 
-func (c *Config) rootCAs() *CASet {
+func (c *Config) rootCAs() *x509.CertPool {
 	s := c.RootCAs
 	if s == nil {
 		s = defaultRoots()
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ var certFiles = []string{
 
 var once sync.Once
 
-func defaultRoots() *CASet {
+func defaultRoots() *x509.CertPool {
 	once.Do(initDefaults)
 	return varDefaultRoots
 }
@@ -239,14 +239,14 @@ func initDefaults() {
 	initDefaultCipherSuites()
 }
 
-var varDefaultRoots *CASet
+var varDefaultRoots *x509.CertPool
 
 func initDefaultRoots() {
-	roots := NewCASet()
+	roots := x509.NewCertPool()
 	for _, file := range certFiles {
 		data, err := ioutil.ReadFile(file)
 		if err == nil {
-			roots.SetFromPEM(data)
+			roots.AppendCertsFromPEM(data)
 			break
 		}
 	}

src/pkg/crypto/tls/conn.go

@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ type Conn struct {
 	cipherSuite       uint16
 	ocspResponse      []byte // stapled OCSP response
 	peerCertificates  []*x509.Certificate
+	// verifedChains contains the certificate chains that we built, as
+	// opposed to the ones presented by the server.
+	verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate
 
 	clientProtocol         string
 	clientProtocolFallback bool

src/pkg/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go

@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() os.Error {
 	finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
 
 	certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
-	chain := NewCASet()
 	for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
 		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
 		if err != nil {
@@ -96,47 +95,29 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() os.Error {
 			return os.ErrorString("failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.String())
 		}
 		certs[i] = cert
-		chain.AddCert(cert)
 	}
 
 	// If we don't have a root CA set configured then anything is accepted.
 	// TODO(rsc): Find certificates for OS X 10.6.
-	for cur := certs[0]; c.config.RootCAs != nil; {
-		parent := c.config.RootCAs.FindVerifiedParent(cur)
-		if parent != nil {
-			break
+	if c.config.RootCAs != nil {
+		opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
+			Roots:         c.config.RootCAs,
+			CurrentTime:   c.config.Time(),
+			DNSName:       c.config.ServerName,
+			Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
 		}
 
-		parent = chain.FindVerifiedParent(cur)
-		if parent == nil {
-			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
-			return os.ErrorString("could not find root certificate for chain")
+		for i, cert := range certs {
+			if i == 0 {
+				continue
+			}
+			opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
 		}
-
-		if !parent.BasicConstraintsValid || !parent.IsCA {
+		c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts)
+		if err != nil {
 			c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
-			return os.ErrorString("intermediate certificate does not have CA bit set")
+			return err
 		}
-		// KeyUsage status flags are ignored. From Engineering
-		// Security, Peter Gutmann: A European government CA marked its
-		// signing certificates as being valid for encryption only, but
-		// no-one noticed. Another European CA marked its signature
-		// keys as not being valid for signatures. A different CA
-		// marked its own trusted root certificate as being invalid for
-		// certificate signing.  Another national CA distributed a
-		// certificate to be used to encrypt data for the country’s tax
-		// authority that was marked as only being usable for digital
-		// signatures but not for encryption. Yet another CA reversed
-		// the order of the bit flags in the keyUsage due to confusion
-		// over encoding endianness, essentially setting a random
-		// keyUsage in certificates that it issued. Another CA created
-		// a self-invalidating certificate by adding a certificate
-		// policy statement stipulating that the certificate had to be
-		// used strictly as specified in the keyUsage, and a keyUsage
-		// containing a flag indicating that the RSA encryption key
-		// could only be used for Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
-
-		cur = parent
 	}
 
 	if _, ok := certs[0].PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey); !ok {

src/pkg/crypto/x509/Makefile

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ include ../../../Make.inc
 
 TARG=crypto/x509
 GOFILES=\
+	cert_pool.go\
+	verify.go\
 	x509.go\
 
 include ../../../Make.pkg

src/pkg/crypto/tls/ca_set.go → src/pkg/crypto/x509/cert_pool.go

-// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
-package tls
+package x509
 
 import (
-	"crypto/x509"
 	"encoding/pem"
 	"strings"
 )
 
-// A CASet is a set of certificates.
-type CASet struct {
-	bySubjectKeyId map[string][]*x509.Certificate
-	byName         map[string][]*x509.Certificate
+// Roots is a set of certificates.
+type CertPool struct {
+	bySubjectKeyId map[string][]*Certificate
+	byName         map[string][]*Certificate
 }
 
-// NewCASet returns a new, empty CASet.
-func NewCASet() *CASet {
-	return &CASet{
-		make(map[string][]*x509.Certificate),
-		make(map[string][]*x509.Certificate),
+// NewCertPool returns a new, empty CertPool.
+func NewCertPool() *CertPool {
+	return &CertPool{
+		make(map[string][]*Certificate),
+		make(map[string][]*Certificate),
 	}
 }
 
-func nameToKey(name *x509.Name) string {
+func nameToKey(name *Name) string {
 	return strings.Join(name.Country, ",") + "/" + strings.Join(name.Organization, ",") + "/" + strings.Join(name.OrganizationalUnit, ",") + "/" + name.CommonName
 }
 
-// FindVerifiedParent attempts to find the certificate in s which has signed
-// the given certificate. If no such certificate can be found or the signature
+// FindVerifiedParents attempts to find certificates in s which have signed the
+// given certificate. If no such certificate can be found or the signature
 // doesn't match, it returns nil.
-func (s *CASet) FindVerifiedParent(cert *x509.Certificate) (parent *x509.Certificate) {
-	var candidates []*x509.Certificate
+func (s *CertPool) FindVerifiedParents(cert *Certificate) (parents []*Certificate) {
+	var candidates []*Certificate
 
 	if len(cert.AuthorityKeyId) > 0 {
 		candidates = s.bySubjectKeyId[string(cert.AuthorityKeyId)]
@@ -43,15 +42,15 @@ func (s *CASet) FindVerifiedParent(cert *x509.Certificate) (parent *x509.Certifi
 
 	for _, c := range candidates {
 		if cert.CheckSignatureFrom(c) == nil {
-			return c
+			parents = append(parents, c)
 		}
 	}
 
-	return nil
+	return
 }
 
-// AddCert adds a certificate to the set
-func (s *CASet) AddCert(cert *x509.Certificate) {
+// AddCert adds a certificate to a pool.
+func (s *CertPool) AddCert(cert *Certificate) {
 	if len(cert.SubjectKeyId) > 0 {
 		keyId := string(cert.SubjectKeyId)
 		s.bySubjectKeyId[keyId] = append(s.bySubjectKeyId[keyId], cert)
@@ -60,12 +59,13 @@ func (s *CASet) AddCert(cert *x509.Certificate) {
 	s.byName[name] = append(s.byName[name], cert)
 }
 
-// SetFromPEM attempts to parse a series of PEM encoded root certificates. It
-// appends any certificates found to s and returns true if any certificates
-// were successfully parsed. On many Linux systems, /etc/ssl/cert.pem will
-// contains the system wide set of root CAs in a format suitable for this
-// function.
-func (s *CASet) SetFromPEM(pemCerts []byte) (ok bool) {
+// AppendCertsFromPEM attempts to parse a series of PEM encoded root
+// certificates. It appends any certificates found to s and returns true if any
+// certificates were successfully parsed.
+//
+// On many Linux systems, /etc/ssl/cert.pem will contains the system wide set
+// of root CAs in a format suitable for this function.
+func (s *CertPool) AppendCertsFromPEM(pemCerts []byte) (ok bool) {
 	for len(pemCerts) > 0 {
 		var block *pem.Block
 		block, pemCerts = pem.Decode(pemCerts)
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func (s *CASet) SetFromPEM(pemCerts []byte) (ok bool) {
 			continue
 		}
 
-		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
+		cert, err := ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
 		if err != nil {
 			continue
 		}

src/pkg/crypto/x509/verify.go

+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package x509
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+)
+
+type InvalidReason int
+
+const (
+	// NotAuthorizedToSign results when a certificate is signed by another
+	// which isn't marked as a CA certificate.
+	NotAuthorizedToSign InvalidReason = iota
+	// Expired results when a certificate has expired, based on the time
+	// given in the VerifyOptions.
+	Expired
+	// CANotAuthorizedForThisName results when an intermediate or root
+	// certificate has a name constraint which doesn't include the name
+	// being checked.
+	CANotAuthorizedForThisName
+)
+
+// CertificateInvalidError results when an odd error occurs. Users of this
+// library probably want to handle all these errors uniformly.
+type CertificateInvalidError struct {
+	Cert   *Certificate
+	Reason InvalidReason
+}
+
+func (e CertificateInvalidError) String() string {
+	switch e.Reason {
+	case NotAuthorizedToSign:
+		return "x509: certificate is not authorized to sign other other certificates"
+	case Expired:
+		return "x509: certificate has expired or is not yet valid"
+	case CANotAuthorizedForThisName:
+		return "x509: a root or intermediate certificate is not authorized to sign in this domain"
+	}
+	return "x509: unknown error"
+}
+
+// HostnameError results when the set of authorized names doesn't match the
+// requested name.
+type HostnameError struct {
+	Certificate *Certificate
+	Host        string
+}
+
+func (h HostnameError) String() string {
+	var valid string
+	c := h.Certificate
+	if len(c.DNSNames) > 0 {
+		valid = strings.Join(c.DNSNames, ", ")
+	} else {
+		valid = c.Subject.CommonName
+	}
+	return "certificate is valid for " + valid + ", not " + h.Host
+}
+
+
+// UnknownAuthorityError results when the certificate issuer is unknown
+type UnknownAuthorityError struct {
+	cert *Certificate
+}
+
+func (e UnknownAuthorityError) String() string {
+	return "x509: certificate signed by unknown authority"
+}
+
+// VerifyOptions contains parameters for Certificate.Verify. It's a structure
+// because other PKIX verification APIs have ended up needing many options.
+type VerifyOptions struct {
+	DNSName       string
+	Intermediates *CertPool
+	Roots         *CertPool
+	CurrentTime   int64 // if 0, the current system time is used.
+}
+
+const (
+	leafCertificate = iota
+	intermediateCertificate
+	rootCertificate
+)
+
+// isValid performs validity checks on the c.
+func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, opts *VerifyOptions) os.Error {
+	if opts.CurrentTime < c.NotBefore.Seconds() ||
+		opts.CurrentTime > c.NotAfter.Seconds() {
+		return CertificateInvalidError{c, Expired}
+	}
+
+	if len(c.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 {
+		for _, domain := range c.PermittedDNSDomains {
+			if opts.DNSName == domain ||
+				(strings.HasSuffix(opts.DNSName, domain) &&
+					len(opts.DNSName) >= 1+len(domain) &&
+					opts.DNSName[len(opts.DNSName)-len(domain)-1] == '.') {
+				continue
+			}
+
+			return CertificateInvalidError{c, CANotAuthorizedForThisName}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// KeyUsage status flags are ignored. From Engineering Security, Peter
+	// Gutmann: A European government CA marked its signing certificates as
+	// being valid for encryption only, but no-one noticed. Another
+	// European CA marked its signature keys as not being valid for
+	// signatures. A different CA marked its own trusted root certificate
+	// as being invalid for certificate signing.  Another national CA
+	// distributed a certificate to be used to encrypt data for the
+	// country’s tax authority that was marked as only being usable for
+	// digital signatures but not for encryption. Yet another CA reversed
+	// the order of the bit flags in the keyUsage due to confusion over
+	// encoding endianness, essentially setting a random keyUsage in
+	// certificates that it issued. Another CA created a self-invalidating
+	// certificate by adding a certificate policy statement stipulating
+	// that the certificate had to be used strictly as specified in the
+	// keyUsage, and a keyUsage containing a flag indicating that the RSA
+	// encryption key could only be used for Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
+
+	if certType == intermediateCertificate && (!c.BasicConstraintsValid || !c.IsCA) {
+		return CertificateInvalidError{c, NotAuthorizedToSign}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Verify attempts to verify c by building one or more chains from c to a
+// certificate in opts.roots, using certificates in opts.Intermediates if
+// needed. If successful, it returns one or chains where the first element of
+// the chain is c and the last element is from opts.Roots.
+//
+// WARNING: this doesn't do any revocation checking.
+func (c *Certificate) Verify(opts VerifyOptions) (chains [][]*Certificate, err os.Error) {
+	if opts.CurrentTime == 0 {
+		opts.CurrentTime = time.Seconds()
+	}
+	err = c.isValid(leafCertificate, &opts)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if len(opts.DNSName) > 0 {
+		err = c.VerifyHostname(opts.DNSName)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+	return c.buildChains([]*Certificate{c}, &opts)
+}
+
+func appendToFreshChain(chain []*Certificate, cert *Certificate) []*Certificate {
+	n := make([]*Certificate, len(chain)+1)
+	copy(n, chain)
+	n[len(chain)] = cert
+	return n
+}
+
+func (c *Certificate) buildChains(currentChain []*Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) (chains [][]*Certificate, err os.Error) {
+	for _, root := range opts.Roots.FindVerifiedParents(c) {
+		err = root.isValid(rootCertificate, opts)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		chains = append(chains, appendToFreshChain(currentChain, root))
+	}
+
+	for _, intermediate := range opts.Intermediates.FindVerifiedParents(c) {
+		err = intermediate.isValid(intermediateCertificate, opts)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		var childChains [][]*Certificate
+		childChains, err = intermediate.buildChains(appendToFreshChain(currentChain, intermediate), opts)
+		chains = append(chains, childChains...)
+	}
+
+	if len(chains) > 0 {
+		err = nil
+	}
+
+	if len(chains) == 0 && err == nil {
+		err = UnknownAuthorityError{c}
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func matchHostnames(pattern, host string) bool {
+	if len(pattern) == 0 || len(host) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	patternParts := strings.Split(pattern, ".", -1)
+	hostParts := strings.Split(host, ".", -1)
+
+	if len(patternParts) != len(hostParts) {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	for i, patternPart := range patternParts {
+		if patternPart == "*" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if patternPart != hostParts[i] {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true
+}
+
+// VerifyHostname returns nil if c is a valid certificate for the named host.
+// Otherwise it returns an os.Error describing the mismatch.
+func (c *Certificate) VerifyHostname(h string) os.Error {
+	if len(c.DNSNames) > 0 {
+		for _, match := range c.DNSNames {
+			if matchHostnames(match, h) {
+				return nil
+			}
+		}
+		// If Subject Alt Name is given, we ignore the common name.
+	} else if matchHostnames(c.Subject.CommonName, h) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return HostnameError{c, h}
+}