• Stefan O'Rear's avatar
    riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage · d14fa1fc
    Stefan O'Rear authored
    childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread
    in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since
    the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the
    gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other
    means.
    
    [From the email thread]
    
    The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used
    for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or
    when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have
    PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec.
    
    childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable
    from userspace in at least five ways:
    
    1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting
       register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has
       sp = user stack, gp = kernel __global_pointer$, all other integer registers
       zeroed by the memset in the patch comment.
    
       This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only
       way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch.
    
    2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread
       before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only
       happen at user/kernel boundaries.
    
    3. /proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for
       user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the
       registers it returns.
    
    4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel
       addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses
       are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under
       LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code.
    
    5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have
       not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user
       registers without already allowing access to kernel registers.
    
    Fixes: 7db91e57 ("RISC-V: Task implementation")
    Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
    Signed-off-by: default avatarStefan O'Rear <sorear@fastmail.com>
    Reviewed-by: default avatarAlexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327061258.2370291-1-sorear@fastmail.comSigned-off-by: default avatarPalmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
    d14fa1fc
process.c 6.21 KB