Privileged syslog operations currently require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.  Split
this off into a new CAP_SYSLOG privilege which we can sanely take away
from a container through the capability bounding set.

With this patch, an lxc container can be prevented from messing with
the host's syslog (i.e. dmesg -c).

Changelog: mar 12 2010: add selinux capability2:cap_syslog perm
Changelog: nov 22 2010:
	. port to new kernel
	. add a WARN_ONCE if userspace isn't using CAP_SYSLOG
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-By: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>