efi: random: combine bootloader provided RNG seed with RNG protocol output
Instead of blindly creating the EFI random seed configuration table if the RNG protocol is implemented and works, check whether such a EFI configuration table was provided by an earlier boot stage and if so, concatenate the existing and the new seeds, leaving it up to the core code to mix it in and credit it the way it sees fit. This can be used for, e.g., systemd-boot, to pass an additional seed to Linux in a way that can be consumed by the kernel very early. In that case, the following definitions should be used to pass the seed to the EFI stub: struct linux_efi_random_seed { u32 size; // of the 'seed' array in bytes u8 seed[]; }; The memory for the struct must be allocated as EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY pool memory, and the address of the struct in memory should be installed as a EFI configuration table using the following GUID: LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID 1ce1e5bc-7ceb-42f2-81e5-8aadf180f57b Note that doing so is safe even on kernels that were built without this patch applied, but the seed will simply be overwritten with a seed derived from the EFI RNG protocol, if available. The recommended seed size is 32 bytes, and seeds larger than 512 bytes are considered corrupted and ignored entirely. In order to preserve forward secrecy, seeds from previous bootloaders are memzero'd out, and in order to preserve memory, those older seeds are also freed from memory. Freeing from memory without first memzeroing is not safe to do, as it's possible that nothing else will ever overwrite those pages used by EFI. Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> [ardb: incorporate Jason's followup changes to extend the maximum seed size on the consumer end, memzero() it and drop a needless printk] Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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