Commit 3b2d6911 authored by Seunghun Han's avatar Seunghun Han Committed by Rafael J. Wysocki

ACPICA: Namespace: fix operand cache leak

ACPICA commit a23325b2e583556eae88ed3f764e457786bf4df6

I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.

Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[    0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[    0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[    0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[    0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[    0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[    0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[    0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[    0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[    0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[    0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[    0.186820] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS
virtual_box 12/01/2006
>[    0.188000] Call Trace:
>[    0.188000]  ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[    0.188000]  ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[    0.188000]  ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[    0.188000]  ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[    0.188000]  ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[    0.188000]  ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[    0.188000]  ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[    0.188000]  ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[    0.188000]  ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[    0.188000]  ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[    0.188000]  ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[    0.188000]  ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[    0.188000]  ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[    0.188000]  ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30

When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls
acpi_ns_terminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list).

But the deletion code in acpi_ns_terminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.

This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.

To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in acpi_ns_terminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.

Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/a23325b2Signed-off-by: default avatarSeunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarRafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
parent 2e337c72
...@@ -594,25 +594,20 @@ struct acpi_namespace_node *acpi_ns_validate_handle(acpi_handle handle) ...@@ -594,25 +594,20 @@ struct acpi_namespace_node *acpi_ns_validate_handle(acpi_handle handle)
void acpi_ns_terminate(void) void acpi_ns_terminate(void)
{ {
acpi_status status; acpi_status status;
union acpi_operand_object *prev;
union acpi_operand_object *next;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE(ns_terminate); ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE(ns_terminate);
#ifdef ACPI_EXEC_APP /* Delete any module-level code blocks */
{
union acpi_operand_object *prev;
union acpi_operand_object *next;
/* Delete any module-level code blocks */ next = acpi_gbl_module_code_list;
while (next) {
next = acpi_gbl_module_code_list; prev = next;
while (next) { next = next->method.mutex;
prev = next; prev->method.mutex = NULL; /* Clear the Mutex (cheated) field */
next = next->method.mutex; acpi_ut_remove_reference(prev);
prev->method.mutex = NULL; /* Clear the Mutex (cheated) field */
acpi_ut_remove_reference(prev);
}
} }
#endif
/* /*
* Free the entire namespace -- all nodes and all objects * Free the entire namespace -- all nodes and all objects
......
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