Commit 439e1757 authored by Thomas Gleixner's avatar Thomas Gleixner

init, x86: Move mem_encrypt_init() into arch_cpu_finalize_init()

Invoke the X86ism mem_encrypt_init() from X86 arch_cpu_finalize_init() and
remove the weak fallback from the core code.

No functional change.
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224545.670360645@linutronix.de
parent 9df9d2f0
...@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); ...@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
#define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted") #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
#else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ #else /* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
...@@ -83,13 +85,12 @@ early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) {} ...@@ -83,13 +85,12 @@ early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) {}
static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { } static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
static inline void mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
#define __bss_decrypted #define __bss_decrypted
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ #endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
void add_encrypt_protection_map(void); void add_encrypt_protection_map(void);
/* /*
......
...@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ ...@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h> #include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/kgdb.h> #include <linux/kgdb.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/io.h>
...@@ -2414,4 +2415,14 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) ...@@ -2414,4 +2415,14 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
} else { } else {
fpu__init_check_bugs(); fpu__init_check_bugs();
} }
/*
* This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
* operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
* mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
* not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
* must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
* hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
*/
mem_encrypt_init();
} }
...@@ -95,7 +95,6 @@ ...@@ -95,7 +95,6 @@
#include <linux/cache.h> #include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/rodata_test.h> #include <linux/rodata_test.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
#include <linux/kcsan.h> #include <linux/kcsan.h>
#include <linux/init_syscalls.h> #include <linux/init_syscalls.h>
#include <linux/stackdepot.h> #include <linux/stackdepot.h>
...@@ -786,8 +785,6 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_init(void) ...@@ -786,8 +785,6 @@ void __init __weak thread_stack_cache_init(void)
} }
#endif #endif
void __init __weak mem_encrypt_init(void) { }
void __init __weak poking_init(void) { } void __init __weak poking_init(void) { }
void __init __weak pgtable_cache_init(void) { } void __init __weak pgtable_cache_init(void) { }
...@@ -1043,16 +1040,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address __noreturn start_kernel(v ...@@ -1043,16 +1040,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address __noreturn start_kernel(v
arch_cpu_finalize_init(); arch_cpu_finalize_init();
/*
* This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
* operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
* mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
* not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
* must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
* hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
*/
mem_encrypt_init();
pid_idr_init(); pid_idr_init();
anon_vma_init(); anon_vma_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86 #ifdef CONFIG_X86
......
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment