KVM: x86/mmu: Add explicit access mask for MMIO SPTEs
When shadow paging is enabled, KVM tracks the allowed access type for MMIO SPTEs so that it can do a permission check on a MMIO GVA cache hit without having to walk the guest's page tables. The tracking is done by retaining the WRITE and USER bits of the access when inserting the MMIO SPTE (read access is implicitly allowed), which allows the MMIO page fault handler to retrieve and cache the WRITE/USER bits from the SPTE. Unfortunately for EPT, the mask used to retain the WRITE/USER bits is hardcoded using the x86 paging versions of the bits. This funkiness happens to work because KVM uses a completely different mask/value for MMIO SPTEs when EPT is enabled, and the EPT mask/value just happens to overlap exactly with the x86 WRITE/USER bits[*]. Explicitly define the access mask for MMIO SPTEs to accurately reflect that EPT does not want to incorporate any access bits into the SPTE, and so that KVM isn't subtly relying on EPT's WX bits always being set in MMIO SPTEs, e.g. attempting to use other bits for experimentation breaks horribly. Note, vcpu_match_mmio_gva() explicits prevents matching GVA==0, and all TDP flows explicit set mmio_gva to 0, i.e. zeroing vcpu->arch.access for EPT has no (known) functional impact. [*] Using WX to generate EPT misconfigurations (equivalent to reserved bit page fault) ensures KVM can employ its MMIO page fault tricks even platforms without reserved address bits. Fixes: ce88decf ("KVM: MMU: mmio page fault support") Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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