printk: prevent userland from spoofing kernel messages
commit 3824657c upstream. The following statement of ABI/testing/dev-kmsg is not quite right: It is not possible to inject messages from userspace with the facility number LOG_KERN (0), to make sure that the origin of the messages can always be reliably determined. Userland actually can inject messages with a facility of 0 by abusing the fact that the facility is stored in a u8 data type. By using a facility which is a multiple of 256 the assignment of msg->facility in log_store() implicitly truncates it to 0, i.e. LOG_KERN, allowing users of /dev/kmsg to spoof kernel messages as shown below: The following call... # printf '<%d>Kernel panic - not syncing: beer empty\n' 0 >/dev/kmsg ...leads to the following log entry (dmesg -x | tail -n 1): user :emerg : [ 66.137758] Kernel panic - not syncing: beer empty However, this call... # printf '<%d>Kernel panic - not syncing: beer empty\n' 0x800 >/dev/kmsg ...leads to the slightly different log entry (note the kernel facility): kern :emerg : [ 74.177343] Kernel panic - not syncing: beer empty Fix that by limiting the user provided facility to 8 bit right from the beginning and catch the truncation early. Fixes: 7ff9554b ("printk: convert byte-buffer to variable-length...") Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.cz> Cc: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [ kamal: backport to 3.13-stable: retain local 'int i' ] Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com>
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