Commit 5431fdd2 authored by Peter Zijlstra's avatar Peter Zijlstra

ptrace: Convert ptrace_attach() to use lock guards

Created as testing for the conditional guard infrastructure.
Specifically this makes use of the following form:

  scoped_cond_guard (mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTNOINTR,
		     &task->signal->cred_guard_mutex) {
    ...
  }
  ...
  return 0;
Signed-off-by: default avatarPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231102110706.568467727%40infradead.org
parent 18caaeda
...@@ -226,4 +226,6 @@ static inline void task_unlock(struct task_struct *p) ...@@ -226,4 +226,6 @@ static inline void task_unlock(struct task_struct *p)
spin_unlock(&p->alloc_lock); spin_unlock(&p->alloc_lock);
} }
DEFINE_GUARD(task_lock, struct task_struct *, task_lock(_T), task_unlock(_T))
#endif /* _LINUX_SCHED_TASK_H */ #endif /* _LINUX_SCHED_TASK_H */
...@@ -548,5 +548,31 @@ DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(spinlock_irqsave, spinlock_t, ...@@ -548,5 +548,31 @@ DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(spinlock_irqsave, spinlock_t,
DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1_COND(spinlock_irqsave, _try, DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1_COND(spinlock_irqsave, _try,
spin_trylock_irqsave(_T->lock, _T->flags)) spin_trylock_irqsave(_T->lock, _T->flags))
DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(read_lock, rwlock_t,
read_lock(_T->lock),
read_unlock(_T->lock))
DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(read_lock_irq, rwlock_t,
read_lock_irq(_T->lock),
read_unlock_irq(_T->lock))
DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(read_lock_irqsave, rwlock_t,
read_lock_irqsave(_T->lock, _T->flags),
read_unlock_irqrestore(_T->lock, _T->flags),
unsigned long flags)
DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(write_lock, rwlock_t,
write_lock(_T->lock),
write_unlock(_T->lock))
DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(write_lock_irq, rwlock_t,
write_lock_irq(_T->lock),
write_unlock_irq(_T->lock))
DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(write_lock_irqsave, rwlock_t,
write_lock_irqsave(_T->lock, _T->flags),
write_unlock_irqrestore(_T->lock, _T->flags),
unsigned long flags)
#undef __LINUX_INSIDE_SPINLOCK_H #undef __LINUX_INSIDE_SPINLOCK_H
#endif /* __LINUX_SPINLOCK_H */ #endif /* __LINUX_SPINLOCK_H */
...@@ -386,6 +386,34 @@ static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data) ...@@ -386,6 +386,34 @@ static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data)
return 0; return 0;
} }
static inline void ptrace_set_stopped(struct task_struct *task)
{
guard(spinlock)(&task->sighand->siglock);
/*
* If the task is already STOPPED, set JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP and
* TRAPPING, and kick it so that it transits to TRACED. TRAPPING
* will be cleared if the child completes the transition or any
* event which clears the group stop states happens. We'll wait
* for the transition to complete before returning from this
* function.
*
* This hides STOPPED -> RUNNING -> TRACED transition from the
* attaching thread but a different thread in the same group can
* still observe the transient RUNNING state. IOW, if another
* thread's WNOHANG wait(2) on the stopped tracee races against
* ATTACH, the wait(2) may fail due to the transient RUNNING.
*
* The following task_is_stopped() test is safe as both transitions
* in and out of STOPPED are protected by siglock.
*/
if (task_is_stopped(task) &&
task_set_jobctl_pending(task, JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP | JOBCTL_TRAPPING)) {
task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_STOPPED;
signal_wake_up_state(task, __TASK_STOPPED);
}
}
static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long flags) unsigned long flags)
...@@ -393,17 +421,17 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, ...@@ -393,17 +421,17 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
bool seize = (request == PTRACE_SEIZE); bool seize = (request == PTRACE_SEIZE);
int retval; int retval;
retval = -EIO;
if (seize) { if (seize) {
if (addr != 0) if (addr != 0)
goto out; return -EIO;
/* /*
* This duplicates the check in check_ptrace_options() because * This duplicates the check in check_ptrace_options() because
* ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() have historically * ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() have historically
* used different error codes for unknown ptrace options. * used different error codes for unknown ptrace options.
*/ */
if (flags & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK) if (flags & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
goto out; return -EIO;
retval = check_ptrace_options(flags); retval = check_ptrace_options(flags);
if (retval) if (retval)
return retval; return retval;
...@@ -414,88 +442,54 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request, ...@@ -414,88 +442,54 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
audit_ptrace(task); audit_ptrace(task);
retval = -EPERM;
if (unlikely(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) if (unlikely(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
goto out; return -EPERM;
if (same_thread_group(task, current)) if (same_thread_group(task, current))
goto out; return -EPERM;
/* /*
* Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference; * Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference;
* SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently * SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently
* under ptrace. * under ptrace.
*/ */
retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR; scoped_cond_guard (mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTNOINTR,
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex)) &task->signal->cred_guard_mutex) {
goto out;
task_lock(task); scoped_guard (task_lock, task) {
retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS); retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
task_unlock(task); if (retval)
if (retval) return retval;
goto unlock_creds; }
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); scoped_guard (write_lock_irq, &tasklist_lock) {
retval = -EPERM; if (unlikely(task->exit_state))
if (unlikely(task->exit_state)) return -EPERM;
goto unlock_tasklist; if (task->ptrace)
if (task->ptrace) return -EPERM;
goto unlock_tasklist;
task->ptrace = flags; task->ptrace = flags;
ptrace_link(task, current); ptrace_link(task, current);
/* SEIZE doesn't trap tracee on attach */ /* SEIZE doesn't trap tracee on attach */
if (!seize) if (!seize)
send_sig_info(SIGSTOP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, task); send_sig_info(SIGSTOP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, task);
spin_lock(&task->sighand->siglock); ptrace_set_stopped(task);
}
}
/* /*
* If the task is already STOPPED, set JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP and * We do not bother to change retval or clear JOBCTL_TRAPPING
* TRAPPING, and kick it so that it transits to TRACED. TRAPPING * if wait_on_bit() was interrupted by SIGKILL. The tracer will
* will be cleared if the child completes the transition or any * not return to user-mode, it will exit and clear this bit in
* event which clears the group stop states happens. We'll wait * __ptrace_unlink() if it wasn't already cleared by the tracee;
* for the transition to complete before returning from this * and until then nobody can ptrace this task.
* function.
*
* This hides STOPPED -> RUNNING -> TRACED transition from the
* attaching thread but a different thread in the same group can
* still observe the transient RUNNING state. IOW, if another
* thread's WNOHANG wait(2) on the stopped tracee races against
* ATTACH, the wait(2) may fail due to the transient RUNNING.
*
* The following task_is_stopped() test is safe as both transitions
* in and out of STOPPED are protected by siglock.
*/ */
if (task_is_stopped(task) && wait_on_bit(&task->jobctl, JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT, TASK_KILLABLE);
task_set_jobctl_pending(task, JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP | JOBCTL_TRAPPING)) { proc_ptrace_connector(task, PTRACE_ATTACH);
task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_STOPPED;
signal_wake_up_state(task, __TASK_STOPPED);
}
spin_unlock(&task->sighand->siglock);
retval = 0;
unlock_tasklist:
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
unlock_creds:
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
out:
if (!retval) {
/*
* We do not bother to change retval or clear JOBCTL_TRAPPING
* if wait_on_bit() was interrupted by SIGKILL. The tracer will
* not return to user-mode, it will exit and clear this bit in
* __ptrace_unlink() if it wasn't already cleared by the tracee;
* and until then nobody can ptrace this task.
*/
wait_on_bit(&task->jobctl, JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT, TASK_KILLABLE);
proc_ptrace_connector(task, PTRACE_ATTACH);
}
return retval; return 0;
} }
/** /**
......
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