ecryptfs: propagate key errors up at mount time

Mounting with invalid key signatures should probably fail, if they were
specifically requested but not available.

Also fix case checks in process_request_key_err() for the right sign of
the errnos, as spotted by Jan Tluka.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Tluka <jtluka@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c

@@ -44,15 +44,15 @@ static int process_request_key_err(long err_code)
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	switch (err_code) {
-	case ENOKEY:
+	case -ENOKEY:
 		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "No key\n");
 		rc = -ENOENT;
 		break;
-	case EKEYEXPIRED:
+	case -EKEYEXPIRED:
 		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Key expired\n");
 		rc = -ETIME;
 		break;
-	case EKEYREVOKED:
+	case -EKEYREVOKED:
 		ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Key revoked\n");
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		break;
@@ -963,8 +963,7 @@ int ecryptfs_keyring_auth_tok_for_sig(struct key **auth_tok_key,
 	if (!(*auth_tok_key) || IS_ERR(*auth_tok_key)) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "Could not find key with description: [%s]\n",
 		       sig);
-		process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(*auth_tok_key));
-		rc = -EINVAL;
+		rc = process_request_key_err(PTR_ERR(*auth_tok_key));
 		goto out;
 	}
 	(*auth_tok) = ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(*auth_tok_key);

fs/ecryptfs/main.c

@@ -248,10 +248,11 @@ static int ecryptfs_init_global_auth_toks(
 			       "session keyring for sig specified in mount "
 			       "option: [%s]\n", global_auth_tok->sig);
 			global_auth_tok->flags |= ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID;
-			rc = 0;
+			goto out;
 		} else
 			global_auth_tok->flags &= ~ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID;
 	}
+out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -416,7 +417,6 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "One or more global auth toks could not "
 		       "properly register; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
 	}
-	rc = 0;
 out:
 	return rc;
 }