mac80211/wpa: use constant time memory comparison for MACs

Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

net/mac80211/wpa.c

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
 #include <net/mac80211.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
 
 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
 #include "michael.h"
@@ -153,7 +154,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
 	key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
 	michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
-	if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
+	if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN))
 		goto mic_fail;
 
 	/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
@@ -1048,7 +1049,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 		bip_aad(skb, aad);
 		ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
 				   skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
-		if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
+		if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
 			key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 		}
@@ -1098,7 +1099,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 		bip_aad(skb, aad);
 		ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
 				       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
-		if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
+		if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
 			key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 		}
@@ -1202,7 +1203,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 		if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
 				       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24,
 				       mic) < 0 ||
-		    memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
+		    crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
 			key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++;
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 		}