Commit af884cd4 authored by Kees Cook's avatar Kees Cook Committed by Linus Torvalds

proc: report no_new_privs state

Similar to being able to examine if a process has been correctly
confined with seccomp, the state of no_new_privs is equally interesting,
so this adds it to /proc/$pid/status.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20161103214041.GA58566@beastSigned-off-by: default avatarKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Freire <rfreire@redhat.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Robert Ho <robert.hu@intel.com>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Richard W.M. Jones" <rjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
parent 8f606604
...@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status: ...@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ read the file /proc/PID/status:
CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000000000000000
CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
NoNewPrivs: 0
Seccomp: 0 Seccomp: 0
voluntary_ctxt_switches: 0 voluntary_ctxt_switches: 0
nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches: 1 nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches: 1
...@@ -262,6 +263,7 @@ Table 1-2: Contents of the status files (as of 4.1) ...@@ -262,6 +263,7 @@ Table 1-2: Contents of the status files (as of 4.1)
CapPrm bitmap of permitted capabilities CapPrm bitmap of permitted capabilities
CapEff bitmap of effective capabilities CapEff bitmap of effective capabilities
CapBnd bitmap of capabilities bounding set CapBnd bitmap of capabilities bounding set
NoNewPrivs no_new_privs, like prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIV, ...)
Seccomp seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...) Seccomp seccomp mode, like prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, ...)
Cpus_allowed mask of CPUs on which this process may run Cpus_allowed mask of CPUs on which this process may run
Cpus_allowed_list Same as previous, but in "list format" Cpus_allowed_list Same as previous, but in "list format"
......
...@@ -342,10 +342,11 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) ...@@ -342,10 +342,11 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
{ {
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "NoNewPrivs:\t", task_no_new_privs(p));
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "Seccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode); seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\nSeccomp:\t", p->seccomp.mode);
seq_putc(m, '\n');
#endif #endif
seq_putc(m, '\n');
} }
static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m, static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m,
......
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