Commit b7e724d3 authored by Eric Paris's avatar Eric Paris

capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable

security_capable takes ns, cred, cap.  But the LSM capable() hook takes
cred, ns, cap.  The capability helper functions also take cred, ns, cap.
Rather than flip argument order just to flip it back, leave them alone.
Heck, this should be a little faster since argument will be in the right
place!
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
parent 6a9de491
...@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ pci_read_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, ...@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ pci_read_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
u8 *data = (u8*) buf; u8 *data = (u8*) buf;
/* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */ /* Several chips lock up trying to read undefined config space */
if (security_capable(&init_user_ns, filp->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) { if (security_capable(filp->f_cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) {
size = dev->cfg_size; size = dev->cfg_size;
} else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS) { } else if (dev->hdr_type == PCI_HEADER_TYPE_CARDBUS) {
size = 128; size = 128;
......
...@@ -1666,7 +1666,7 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, ...@@ -1666,7 +1666,7 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted); const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred, int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap); int cap);
int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap); int cap);
...@@ -1863,8 +1863,8 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new, ...@@ -1863,8 +1863,8 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted); return cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted);
} }
static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
const struct cred *cred, int cap) struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{ {
return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
} }
......
...@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) ...@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
BUG(); BUG();
} }
if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) { if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return true; return true;
} }
......
...@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, ...@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
effective, inheritable, permitted); effective, inheritable, permitted);
} }
int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred, int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap) int cap)
{ {
return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
......
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